Al-ghazali’s Argument For the Eternity of the World and the Problem of Divine Immutability and Timelessness

Argument for Finite Temporality of the Universe

From here, al-Ghazali turned to his philosophical support for denying the eternity of the world. Craig outlines the argument as follows:

1- There are temporal phenomena in the world.

2- These are caused by other temporal phenomena.

3- The series of temporal phenomena cannot regress infinitely.

4- Therefore, the series must stop at the Eternal.[^34]

The first point is obvious, in that it is based in necessity of reason, for humans have sensual experiences of things coming into being and passing away from existence. Craig makes note of the second premise based on secondary causation, an idea that al-Ghazali thoroughly rejects.[^35]

This leads to al-Ghazali’s third premise, which was the crux of the argument. Al-Ghazali argued, in three different places, that science and philosophy speak of a temporal beginning to the universe. Al-Ghazali began by noting the contradiction in saying that the revolutions of the planets are eternal, while at the same time one can determine the length of their rotations around the world. “The world’s past eternity is impossible because it leads to affirming circular movements of the heavenly sphere whose number is infinite and whose individual units are innumerable, even though they [divide into] a sixth, a fourth, a half [and so on].”[^36]

Next, al-Ghazali asked if one could determine whether the number of planet rotations would be odd or even? If one states that they are either: odd or even, neither odd nor even, or both odd and even, they are being irrational. For, “if you were to say that the number is even, and the even becomes odd by [the addition of] one, then how can the infinite be in need of one?” Or how can the odd be made even in an infinite system? One is then forced to say that there is either odd or even, for the infinite is not like the finite, in that numeration is not equated.[^37]

Al-Ghazali pointed to this concept in the philosopher’s doctrine of the soul. Affirming that there are an infinite number of souls does not match with necessity of reason, in that there cannot be a numerated infinity. Some philosophers, according to al-Ghazali, have resorted to the Platonic theory of souls, that there was one primordial soul that was divided into each human, and all these separated souls will be reunited one day. This idea was “repugnant” to al-Ghazali, for, according to rational necessity, one could not say that the soul of one person is the same as another,[^38] in that each person necessarily knows that their soul is unique to them and that they are not similar to another. Moreover, if all souls were identical, then they would be equal in regard to their attributes and cognition, which experience witnesses that they are not. Furthermore, how can an infinite one, here a single infinite soul, be divided into two or one thousand? An infinite cannot be divisible. As such, philosophically speaking, asserting that the universe is infinite and eternal is illogical.

Second, later in the same proof, al-Ghazali turned to a second objection to the philosophers’ doctrine. “You deem the occurrence of a temporal event through an eternal improbable when it is incumbent on you to acknowledge it. For in the world there are events which have cause. If temporal events were to depend on [other] temporal eventsad infinitum , this would be impossible.”[^39] If this were so, there is no need to acknowledge a Maker.

Al-Ghazali recorded that the philosophers might reply that their rejection was not the improbability of the temporal event proceeding from an eternal, rather, they

Deem improbable the proceeding from an eternal an event that is a first event. For the state of coming into existence does not differ from what precedes it with respect to the preponderance of the direction of existence, whether in terms of the presence of a temporal moment, an organ, a condition, a nature, a purpose, or any cause. But if the event is not the first event, then it is possible [for a temporal event] to proceed from [an eternal] with the temporal occurrence of some other thing, such as a preparedness in the receptacle, the presence of suitable time, or something of that sort.[^40]

Al-Ghazali responded that putting aside ideas of preparedness, suitable time, and something coming anew, the question remained that these temporal events are either infinite or finite, ending at the eternal.[^41]

Al-Ghazali then commented that philosophers will appeal to their theory of emanation, stating that the basis of all temporal events is the “perpetual, eternal circular of the heavens…[based in] the souls of the heavens.”[^42] For just as the human soul moves the human body, so too do the heavenly souls move the heavenly bodies. It is these movements that cause temporal events to occur. In response, al-Ghazali asked if these circular motions of the heavens are temporal or eternal themselves. For if they are eternal, “how does [this foundation] becomes a principle for the first temporal event? If temporal, it would require another temporal event, [and so on,] regressing [ad infinitum ].”[^43]

Third, in Proof 2a, al-Ghazali assessed that when the philosophers spoke of God as prior to the universe, it was a priority of essence, not time.[^44] Being a priority of essence and not time means that the universe can exist co-eternally with its cause - God. Similar to the movement of a ring by the hand’s movement, or the movement of the water by a boat, the cause is co-existent with the effect. For if the Creator’s priority to the world was temporal, the philosophers argue, then “God would have preceded the world by a lengthy duration.”[^45] And if one asserts a concept of finite time, then it seems contradictory to say, “before the existence of time, infinite time would have existed,” especially since time is a measure of motion.

Al-Ghazali replied that “time is originated and created, and before it there was no time at all.”[^46] Thus, God was prior to both the universe and time, meaning that the essence of the Creator existed when the essence of the world did not exist. Furthermore, there is no difference between asserting that God was and the world was not, or stating that God will be and the world will be not - the future tense, as the philosophers might uphold. For this statement is relative, since the “future itself can become a past and be expressed in the past tense.”[^47] The problem in not seeing the timelessness of God is a problem of imagination not logic, for argument or hypothesis cannot demonstrate this argument to the “estimative faculty.”[^48]