An Introduction To the Political Upheaval At Medina

A. Direct Evidence

i) As soon as the Islamic movement entered its first stage of expansion, meeting and defeat- ing the rival forces in the open field, it became clear to all thinking persons that an Islamic State was in the making.

This idea grew in strength with time, and took possession of the mind of ambitious spirits; ii) The utterances of the Prophet and his conduct combined with the outstanding person- ality of `Ali and his services in the cause of Islam particularly his feats in the field of battle had not left any doubt that he had been marked out by the Prophet as his successor in the spiritual and temporal office.

There was another party which, as `Umar ibn al-Khattab rightly said 6 was bitterly opposed to this combination of nubuwwah (prophecy) and khilafah in one family, as they were averse to the rise, over other tribes, of one family, which looked to them un-precendented and intolerable.

This combined with the ambitious rivalry and jealousy of some and the personal hatred against `Ali of others whose.

relatives he had killed in the battles of Islam and who did not like his extreme zeal in the cause of Islam gave rise to a very noisy and powerful party against the house of the Prophet as represented by `Ali.

There was a third party of rich and i nfluential people who expected, as their birth right, a preferential treatment at the hands of the Caliph, and who rightly surmised that `Ali was not the proper person in this respect, as he would never sacrifice his principles of justice and equity for their sake, in fact, for any one's sake.

Naturally enough, this party wanted a pliant ruler who should pander to their wishes, and treat them as privileged people superior to the common run of men. All these factors joined together to give birth to a very powerful faction against `Ali; they had their own designs on the throne.

Though open opposition to the Prophet was impossible during his life, yet they were not entirely inactive even then. They tried secretly to secure adherents to their cause by taking advantage of every event that took place.

They pointed to the conduct and the utterances of the Prophet which appeared to them as giving undue preference to `Ali, they criticised the conduct of the Prophet when he confided his secrets to `Ali at an exclusive meeting with him, 7 their mur- murings amounted almost to open revolt when the Prophet passed a general order requiring all the companions whose houses opened into the mosque, except `Ali to close their doors.

These were thus shut out of the mosque, and the exception was galling to them.8 The members of this clique took a great advantage of this event to spread disaffection among the companions and to secure adherents to their cause.

They went to the extent of expressly disobeying the commands of the Prophet which seemed to them as creating opportunities for the smooth succession of `Ali.

They did not hesitate to plan the death of the Prophet. They could not con ceal their chagrin, and bitterly criticised his last speech at Ghadir Khumm holding up `Ali to the sight of a huge gathering as his successor. The Prophet himself was aware of the existence of this very powerful faction among his compan- ions.

The Qur'anic verse hints at the existence of a party to whom the succession of `Ali was distasteful, and for that reason they were prepared to go to the extent of causing harm to the Prophet.

iii) The attempts of this party to foil the efforts of the Prophet that were intended to provide means for the peaceful succession of `Ali. Clear instances of these attempts are recorded in History.

During his last illness, the Prophet thought that `Ali might succeed peace- fully if these ambitious members and leaders of this party were out of Medina at the time of his death. He, therefore, ordered all his compan- ions except `Ali and Banu Hashim to go out and join the army under Usamah ibn Zayd that was to invade the Roman territory to avenge the defeat and death of Zayd, father of Usamah. It appears that this punitive expedition had been postponed for this occasion intentionally.

The leaders of the opposite party were shrewd enough to realise the significance of this expedi- tion at this juncture, and refused to go. The Prophet continued urging the need of immediate march, but they kept evading the orders.

They did not move out, and the Prophet died.10 Another instance of this criminal and un- abashed disobedience of the express orders of the Prophet came during the same illness when the Prophet expressed his wish to write a will appointing `Ali as his successor.

The leaders of this opposition party prohibited the people from supplying the writing material to the Prophet, saying that the Prophet was delirious and talking non-sense.11 It is significant that Abu Bakr wrote his last will when he was so ill that he fainted during the dictation, so much so that `Uthman who was scribing the will wrote the name of `Umar ibn Khattab in the will while Abu bakr was unconscious,

fearing lest he might not regain conscious and die without completing the will.12 This shows the extent to which the members of this party were prepared to go.

They would not hesitate even to forge a will and foist it upon the nation. On that occasion the charge of ravings of a diseased brain was not levelled. On the other hand, `Umar ibn al-Khat- tab himself took out the document and forced the people to declare allegiance to what was writ- ten in it, with out announcing the contents.

13 iv) At the meeting of the Sagifah where the Caliph was to be "elected,"' Ali and his relatives, in fact Banu Hashim were not invited not even informed of it. 14

v) The possibility of a necessity arising to use force at the meeting at the Saqifah was not lost sight of by the actors of the Coup, and had been amply provided for. They had an armed force in Banu Sulaym ready for the occasion; and when the altercations reached a critical stage, they did intervene. `Umar ibn al-Khattab says that he was not sure of his success until the armed force of Banu Sulaym had arrived on the scene. 15 vi) The ansar (Helpers) were not averse to 'Ali's succeeding the Prophet; but the deeds and intrigues of the Opposition party of the muhaji- run (Immigrants) had convinced them that they would never accept `Ali and would get their own man placed on the throne. The ansar, could not, of course, tolerate this. They were, therefore, forced to set up their own man, Sa'd ibn ` Ubadah as a candidate for the caliphate. They 23 were not the first to move in the matter; long before they collected at the Saqifah, Abu Bakr had asked the people to come and elect a caliph from among themselves. This election speech was given just after the death of the Prophet when the speaker returned from his house at as-Sunh and saw his associate biding time by declaring, sword in hand, that he would kill anyone who would say that the Prophet had died. It is said that `Umar's extreme love for the Prophet caused him this loss of his senses. But this ebullition of exuberant love subsided at the sight of his comrade Abu Bakr, and then both of them went to the Saqifah as if, to use the words of Shibli, nothing had happened. 16 It seems that after this temporary politic loss, the senses returned with a vengeance. Shibli is forced to admit that this seeming loss was not due to any softer feelings, but that it was a political move to~arrest the news of the Prophet's 24 death from spreading.17 All this is a clear proof of the fact that this opposition party of the muhajirun and not the ansar were the first to move in the matter and start opposition against `Ali. The ansar stood up, not to oppose `Ali but to present a front against this party. The fact that after the people had been tricked or coerced into paying homage to the candidate of this party the ansar accepted the fait accompli and did not rise in revolt against the established authority who used all means in his power to guard against this eventuality has more explana- tions than one and is quite irrelevant in the present discussion. vii) This opposition party laid their plans very carefully and moved very cautiously. They foresaw possible lines of friction, and proceeded to smooth their way all round. They had their spies among the ansar, and had also tried to sow 25 dissentions among them. The speeches and the defections that took place in the meeting at the Saqifah clearly indicate that this policy of creating divisions among the enemy succeeded very well. viii) After the so-called election at the Saqifah, there was a bitter controversy, nay, open hostility, between the ansar and the muha- jirun over the question of outsing `Ali from the caliphate, and `Ali took the part of the ansar. ix) The so-called election was defective in many material points; it was not representative, no intimation of it had been given to the nation not even to the persons about whom every body knew that their leader had the best right to the khilafah and had been selected for it by the Prophet. 26 x) The election was, therefore, neither unanimous nor complete; Banu Hashim, Banu Umayyad, Banu Zuhrah, Zubayr, Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, `Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf, `Utbah ibn Abi Lahab, Khalid ibn Saeed ibn al-'As, al- Migdad ibn `Amr, Salman al-Farsi, 'Ammar ibn Yasir, al-Buraa ibn `Azib, Ubayy ibn Ka'b, Sa` d ibn `Ubadah and his party all declined to do homage to Abu Bakr. These persons occupied high positions in the nation. xi) The first care, therefore of the opposi- tion which was now the Government Party was to win these persons over by threats or entice- ments and both were used in abundance. `Umar ibn al-Khattab went with sword and fire towards the house of `Ali, and threatened to burn the house over them if they did not come out and pay homage to the Caliph. It was reminded to him that Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet 27 was also in that house. He replied, "Let her be, I do not mind."19 He also went to the mosque where those reluctant people had collected, and beat them into submission. 20 ` Ali went to the Caliph, but did not do the homage, though others had been terrified into submission. xii) The allurements offered by the Govern- ment were not less effective. The Caliph sent valuable gifts to win over the people to his side; most of them accepted them, but we hear of a widow who disdainfully refused to sell her conscience to them. 21 xiii) The arguments that were made at tlic Saqifah at the time of the so-called "election* were concerned solely with the question whether the Caliph should be selected out of the muha- jirun or out of the ansar; they mentioned neither the good of the State as the criterion or aim of 28 the election nor the abilities of any candidate. The wishes of the Prophet were not even hinted at. All this shows beyond all doubt that the party interest and not the good of the State was the object on which they had set their heart. xiv) During his Caliphate, `Umar ibn al-Kha- ttab heard the unpleasant news of a man saying that when `Umar would die, they would win the Caliphate for `Ali by the same contrivance by which Abu Bakr had been placed on the throne. This was too unpleasant to be entertain- ed even in thought; this set him thinking, and he came to the conclusion that though the hit had secured the boundary for him, yet that it was neither lawful nor reasonable and had set a dangerous example. He, therefore, ascended the pulpit, and gave a long harangue enlarging on the defects of this coup. He summed up his lecture with the order that if 29 anyone resorted to that sort of contrivance in favour of anyone, both that man and his candidate should be slain outright. 22 No better commentary on the nature and utility of so- called election proceedings can be imagined. The author himself condemns his own work. B.