An Introduction To the Political Upheaval At Medina

Supplement 1

v) The possibility of a necessity arising to use force at the meeting at the Saqifah was not lost sight of by the actors of the Coup, and had been amply provided for.

They had an armed force in Banu Sulaym ready for the occasion; and when the altercations reached a critical stage, they did intervene. `Umar ibn al-Khattab says that he was not sure of his success until the armed force of Banu Sulaym had arrived on the scene. 15

vi) The ansar (Helpers) were not averse to 'Ali's succeeding the Prophet; but the deeds and intrigues of the Opposition party of the muhaji- run (Immigrants) had convinced them that they would never accept `Ali and would get their own man placed on the throne.

The ansar, could not, of course, tolerate this. They were, therefore, forced to set up their own man, Sa'd ibn ` Ubadah as a candidate for the caliphate. They were not the first to move in the matter; long before they collected at the Saqifah, Abu Bakr had asked the people to come and elect a caliph from among themselves.

This election speech was given just after the death of the Prophet when the speaker returned from his house at as-Sunh and saw his associate biding time by declaring, sword in hand, that he would kill anyone who would say that the Prophet had died. It is said that `Umar's extreme love for the Prophet caused him this loss of his senses.

But this ebullition of exuberant love subsided at the sight of his comrade Abu Bakr, and then both of them went to the Saqifah as if, to use the words of Shibli, nothing had happened. 16 It seems that after this temporary politic loss, the senses returned with a vengeance.

Shibli is forced to admit that this seeming loss was not due to any softer feelings, but that it was a political move to~arrest the news of the Prophet's death from spreading.17 All this is a clear proof of the fact that this opposition party of the muhajirun and not the ansar were the first to move in the matter and start opposition against `Ali.

The ansar stood up, not to oppose `Ali but to present a front against this party.

The fact that after the people had been tricked or coerced into paying homage to the candidate of this party the ansar accepted the fait accompli and did not rise in revolt against the established authority who used all means in his power to guard against this eventuality has more explana- tions than one and is quite irrelevant in the present discussion.

vii) This opposition party laid their plans very carefully and moved very cautiously. They foresaw possible lines of friction, and proceeded to smooth their way all round.

They had their spies among the ansar, and had also tried to sow dissentions among them. The speeches and the defections that took place in the meeting at the Saqifah clearly indicate that this policy of creating divisions among the enemy succeeded very well.

viii) After the so-called election at the Saqifah, there was a bitter controversy, nay, open hostility, between the ansar and the muha- jirun over the question of outsing `Ali from the caliphate, and `Ali took the part of the ansar.

ix) The so-called election was defective in many material points; it was not representative, no intimation of it had been given to the nation not even to the persons about whom every body knew that their leader had the best right to the khilafah and had been selected for it by the Prophet.

x) The election was, therefore, neither unanimous nor complete; Banu Hashim, Banu Umayyad, Banu Zuhrah, Zubayr, Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, `Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf, `Utbah ibn Abi Lahab, Khalid ibn Saeed ibn al-'As, al- Migdad ibn `Amr, Salman al-Farsi,

'Ammar ibn Yasir, al-Buraa ibn `Azib, Ubayy ibn Ka'b, Sa` d ibn `Ubadah and his party all declined to do homage to Abu Bakr. These persons occupied high positions in the nation.

xi) The first care, therefore of the opposi- tion which was now the Government Party was to win these persons over by threats or entice- ments and both were used in abundance.

`Umar ibn al-Khattab went with sword and fire towards the house of `Ali, and threatened to burn the house over them if they did not come out and pay homage to the Caliph. It was reminded to him that Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet was also in that house. He replied, "Let her be, I do not mind."19 He also went to the mosque where those reluctant people had collected, and beat them into submission.

20 ` Ali went to the Caliph, but did not do the homage, though others had been terrified into submission.

xii) The allurements offered by the Govern- ment were not less effective. The Caliph sent valuable gifts to win over the people to his side; most of them accepted them, but we hear of a widow who disdainfully refused to sell her conscience to them. 21

xiii) The arguments that were made at tlic Saqifah at the time of the so-called "election* were concerned solely with the question whether the Caliph should be selected out of the muha- jirun or out of the ansar; they mentioned neither the good of the State as the criterion or aim of the election nor the abilities of any candidate.

The wishes of the Prophet were not even hinted at. All this shows beyond all doubt that the party interest and not the good of the State was the object on which they had set their heart.

xiv) During his Caliphate, `Umar ibn al-Kha- ttab heard the unpleasant news of a man saying that when `Umar would die, they would win the Caliphate for `Ali by the same contrivance by which Abu Bakr had been placed on the throne.

This was too unpleasant to be entertain- ed even in thought; this set him thinking, and he came to the conclusion that though the hit had secured the boundary for him, yet that it was neither lawful nor reasonable and had set a dangerous example.

He, therefore, ascended the pulpit, and gave a long harangue enlarging on the defects of this coup. He summed up his lecture with the order that if anyone resorted to that sort of contrivance in favour of anyone, both that man and his candidate should be slain outright.

22 No better commentary on the nature and utility of so- called election proceedings can be imagined. The author himself condemns his own work.