An Introduction To the Political Upheaval At Medina

B. Circumstantial Evidence

i) The effort of `Umar ibn al-Khattab to check the news of the Prophet's death from spreading, as he was not just then ready, his associate Abu Bakr being at as-Sunk, is very material in this enquiry.

As soon as the latter arrived, he at once started to put his plans into action. His imagination conjured up before his eyes a rally of 'Ali's friends before he himself was ready.

ii) The speech of Abu Bakr on his arrival was altogether a party speech, and not a bemoaning oration. He chastised the people for mourning over the loss of their Prophet and Benefactor; and invited them to select a successor.

iii) When they all were collected round the dead body of the Prophet, one of the spies appointed for the purpose came, and concealing himself behind a wall called `Umar ibn al-Khat- tab alone to himself, and informed him that the meeting at the Saqifah to nominate a Caliph had started.23

iv) `Umar kept the news a secret from all except Abu Bakr whom he took with himself and both started towards Saqifah.

On the way, Abu `Ubaydah ibn Jarrah met them as if by appointment. Of all the muhajirun, these three persons alone were present at the Saqifah meeting. 24 On the way, two more spies met and gave them the news of the Sagifah.

v) The next important factor is the place of the meeting. Saqifah was an out-of-the-way place where dacoits, ruffians and women mon gers used to assemble and contrive means for the execution of their nefarious projects.

It was at a distance from the mosque of the Prophet and his house. See how the plan is being kept secret from 'Ali and his relatives. The whole idea was to inflict it upon him as a fait accompli.

vi) The time chosen for action was in keeping with this plan. They knew the lofty nature of 'Ali and his high ideals. They were perfectly sure that 'Ali would not leave the dead body of the Prophet to join in the race for worldly, sordid gains.

vii) Had it been a frank, open and honest election or selection, they would have waited till the obsequies were over, and then would have invited the whole nation to a common meeting place, preferably the mosque where such political meetings had taken place before, and were taken after this incident.

There was no immediate need. They ought to have suggested to the ansar the advisibility of attending first to the funeral of the Prophet.

viii) The most important point to note in this connection is that they anticipated the eventuality of using force, and made arrange- ments for it.

ix) The coup was over, in the heat and haste of the moment, the people had done homage to Abu Bakr; now they found time to repent at leisure when the right and the wrong of the matter began to dawn upon them; they began to blame each other for acting hastily and falling a prey to the machinations of a party.

This was to be provided against, and it was done. Hastily and en masse, they were sent out on foreign expeditions which developed into Persian and Roman wars.

It was in consonance. with Arab nature; Arabs were passionately fond of women, loot and fighting, and this happy stroke of statesmanship provided them with all they wanted. There was a bit of pass-time nearer home as well.

Some of the tribes did not acknowledge Abu Bakr to be the rightful Caliph; they therefore, refused to pay him zakat which was in the nature of a tax. This was a dangerous beginning which might develop into a poisonous growth.

But a mere denial of zakat cannot be a good cause for killing a Muslim. It was, there- fore, given out that they were renegades from Islam.

It was not an organised rebellion, and those people were speedily over-come. But the armies were not allowed to come to Medina. While they were on the way, they were ordered to invade Persia and Rome, though these count- ries had given no cause for this action.

Such Imperialistic wars are not permitted in Islam. But to avoid internal trouble, they had to be undertaken. This is a contrivance which has been very often adopted by statesmen in similar circumstances.

In the face of this overwhelming evidence, it would be sheer folly to deny the following facts which are fully established:-

1. The succession to the Prophet was a disputed one;

2. There were distinctly two parties to this dispute. One party put forth `Ali as the rightful claimant to the succession by virtue of his ability, kinship with the Prophet and his desig- nation by the Prophet as his heir and successor; the other party headed by certain leaders had an eye on the throne.

3. Various causes which have been detailed in the book contributed to the success of this latter party. They captured the Caliphate by means of the coup which has been mentioned above.

Henceforth, naturally enough, their main concern was to keep down the rival party by any means, fair or foul. For this purpose, the first thing that they did was to divide the Muslim nation into two factions, (i) Compa- nions, and (ii) Ahlu'1-bayt, that is, the descen- dants of the Prophet.

The Government party identified itself with the Companions, and tried to win over all the companions by this move.

They won them over to their side by represent- ing to them that if the ruling power was once acquired by `Ali it would remain in the family of the Prophet, and they would never be able to get it, but that if it were confined to them alone, everyone of them might hope to get it in his turn.

During the proceedings at Saqifah the question of ability and fitness was not allow- ed to come in. In short, the children of the Prophet were from the very beginning con- sidered as a rival party and throughout the period of the Caliphate were treated as such.