Aristotelian Perspectives For Post-modern Reason (i)

Phronesis in Aristotle

Aristotle characterizes prudence (phronesis ) as

‘A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.’[^26] .

By means of this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition, or state of capacity (héxis ), it will be distinguished from science (episteme ), for prudence will be knowledge linked with human action. In the second place, as it is practical (praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technique (tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral virtues and sets it among the intellectual ones. Finally, the fact that it deals with what is good and bad for mankind, and not right and wrong in an abstract way, sets prudence apart from wisdom (sophia ).

So far we have sketched the limits of the notion of prudence and others akin to it, and the points where they overlap[^27] , but we must not forget that ‘Regardingpractical wisdom [phronesis ] we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it’.[^28]

Texts about prudence suggest that it is an intellectual virtue, but that it implies experience lived, which concerns both means and ends, for its final horizon is the good life as a whole, and that it is at the service of wisdom, that is, it is an instrument for obtaining this. However, Aristotle goes as far as to say:

‘We ought to attend to the undemonstrated saying and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom [phronimos ] not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.’[^29]

In general, prudence pursues wisdom and wisdom stimulates human prudence. It is best to ‘possess both, or preferably prudence’[^30] . Of animals, Aristotle says that they too are prudent[^31] , but as they lack wisdom their prudence is certainly limited. For all this, prudence is worth pursuing for itself, regardless of its possible usefulness, given that it is a virtue[^32] .

Prudence is a virtue, and virtue, for Aristotle, is:

‘a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom [phronimos ] would determine it.’[^33]

Virtue, therefore, is a habit or disposition to choosing the right medium between excess and shortage. But this is not easy, for the right means is not the arithmetic mean. To find it we need another rule. This rule will be the one established by the prudent man and applied just as he would apply it. In short, we cannot determine what is or is not virtuous without the concurrence of the prudent man.

The mid point is dictated by reason or by the straight rule of the prudent man. This reason or straight rule is, rather, correct reason, that is corrected reason. It is the limit to which a process of correction tends, one of elimination of errors, by relation to the end sought:

‘[...] there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule (katà tòn orthòn lógon )’[^34] .

Therefore, prudence requires experience:

‘Young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience.’[^35]

Experience is time and memory, but not just any lapse of time, but one which one has spent reflecting, trying to understand the nature of the things we see, of the actions we do and what happens to us. Experience is the memory of a time lived and thought, for it is the fruit of succeeding corrections.

But let us remember that prudence itself is a virtue and, moreover, ‘it is impossible to be practically wise [phronimos ] without being good’[^36] . Therefore, nobody could be prudent without following the ruled dictated by prudence. Nobody could be prudent without having been already. This vicious circle (or virtuous one, depending on how we look on it) is resolved by education and action, that is, by action steered by somebody prudent until one becomes prudent oneself[^37] .

The prudence of an experienced person serves for drawing up rules, ‘since the universals are reached from the particulars’[^38] . Butmethodological prudence , so to speak, cannot consist simply of a set of rules and meta-rules for the formulation and application of rules, which in turn would generate the same problems of definition and application, but at a higher level, ‘for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’[^39] .

Therefore, prudence also constitutes the criterion of application, interpretation and, when necessary, modification or violation of the rule. Aristotelian prudence is rooted in the indelegable experience and in responsibility - in the risk, Pierre Aubenque would say - of each human being. Man cannot cede the risk of decision and action (nor, obviously, can the scientist) to any rule or automatic process of decision.

Not even the laws of the city can be applied completely literally. Aristotle warned that such a process could lead to grave injustice. The application of the law to the case requires something very much like prudence: equity (epieíkeia )[^40] .

‘The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct.’[^41]

The proper application of the law is not guaranteed by science alone, as in the case of Plato’s king-philosopher, but rather science itself, for belonging to the general, is subject to the same problems as the law in its relation with the concrete[^42] .

But this does not condemn us to irrationality or to subjectivism in our practical decisions, for prudence is not science, yet neither is it simple opinion or skill[^43] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. Research must be understood as a part of human action, decisions taken in it are practical decisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept of practical truth, the type of truth that prudence seeks[^44] .

In conclusion, Aristotle achieves a noticeable integration of knowledge and human action, of freedom and nature, as well as of the ends of science which we call instrumentalist and realist. This composition is not arrived at in the Platonic way, where the science of Ideas will be the ultimate practical guide. Aubenque assures us that:

‘in man, Aristotle does not set one against the other, but maintains both: contemplative vocation and practical demand. But the latter no longer finds its model and guide in the former, and must look on its own level for a rule which, nevertheless, will still be intellectual or “dianoetic”.’[^45]

This integration is achieved, then, through prudence and practical truth: scientific research is still part of human action and, as such, is subject to the ethical rule of prudence, and to the service of the ultimate of man’s ends, happiness, which in turn consists in true knowledge, as well as co-existence[^46] and a moderate degree of welfare[^47] .

Science is rooted in human life, in practical values, in time and in experience through prudence, which is a virtue and is intellectual; or, more correctly, through the prudent person. Furthermore, this prudential conception of human reason is rooted in a very realistic, profound, fruitful and commonly accepted idea of human nature: ‘desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire’[^48] .