Aristotelian Perspectives For Post-modern Reason (ii)

Practical Truth

Aristotle defines prudence (phrónesis ) as:

A true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man[^4] .

By this definition he distinguishes prudence from other notions. Given that it is a disposition (héxis ), it will be distinguished from science (episteme ), for prudence will be a knowledge linked to human action. Secondly, as it is practical (praktike ), its result will be an action, not an object, which distinguishes it from art or technology (tekhne ). The demand for rationality and truth (‘...metà lógoy alethe ’) distinguishes prudence from moral values and sets it among the intellectual virtues. Lastly, the fact that it concerns good and evilfor mankind , and not good and evil as abstract concepts, differentiates prudence and wisdom (sophia ).

Prudence is not science, but neither is it simple opinion or skill[^5] , it is genuine rational knowledge with the intention of objective truth. The truth of human action falls within the jurisdiction of the Aristotelian concept ofpractical truth , the kind of truth that seeks prudence:

Now this kind of intellect and of truth - according toEN - is practical [...] of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire[^6] .

Practical truth has two dimensions: concord between desire and intellect (which is why it is a kind of truth) and creation of an objective good (which is why it is practical). When there is agreement between desire and intelligence, an objective good is also produced, in the world by the action and in the subject that constructs and improves itself. So practical truth does not consist only in the agreement between two human faculties, but also has an objective dimension:

It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced [...] without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good. But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory [...] behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do[^7] .

That is, in order to know truthfully  what is good for man, one must do it:

For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them[^8] .

According to Aristotle, the inherent truth of science (‘episteme ’ in the narrow sense) is necessary and is not mixed with error, and the Greeks themselves suspected that this perfect knowledge was reserved for God, and man could only aspire to it[^9] . Practical truth, however, is the result of successive corrections, of a history of trial and error, of rectifying in our conduct the tendencies to the powerful attraction of extremes; a history, according to Aristotle, of approaching the happy medium, or equilibrium. On the other hand, to lose ground towards either of the extremes is, as Aristotle says, very easy, you just have to let yourself go[^10] .

Finally, it might seem that practical truth has to do only with the interest or usefulness of an action, and with its potential for making for a pleasant life. Thinking this way reduces prudence to a mere skill (deinós ) or ability to achieve any ends. But prudence does not only seek partial ends but, in the final analysis, ‘good life in general’[^11] . Science governed by ability would be instrumental in the poorer sense of the word.

But this is only so if we forget that among man’s most conspicuous interests is knowledge[^12] , the satisfying of curiosity about what surrounds him. Aristotle says that virtue is about pleasures and pains[^13] and that, therefore, the most virtuous life will be the most pleasurable, the one most full of happiness[^14] . But, according to him, what produces the most pleasure is knowledge of the world, of man himself and of the divine. Therefore, he who seeks happiness is he who seeks knowledge, truth, the philosopher in the original sense.