Bidayah Al-hikmah (arabic-english) [the Elements of Islamic Metaphysics]{edited}

المرحلة الثانية عشر فيما يتعلق بالواجب تعالى من إثبات ذاته و صفاته و أفعاله

CHAPTER TWELVE: The Necessary Being, the Proofs of Its Existence, Its Attributes and Acts

12 Units

الماهيات الممكنة المعلولة موجودة فهي واجبة الوجود لأن الشي‏ء ما لم يجب لم يوجد و وجوبها بالغير إذ لو كان بالذات لم يحتج إلى علة و العلة التي بها يجب وجودها موجودة واجبة و وجوبها إما بالذات أو بالغير و ينتهي إلى الواجب بالذات لاستحالة الدور و التسلسل.

12.1. THE PROOFS OF ITS EXISTENCE

The reality of existence is necessarily existent, for it is fundamental (there being nothing fundamental except it) and absolute (shirf) (for it is not mingled with anything other than itself, as it has no other or second, as mentioned in Chapter One). This is so because it is necessary for a thing to be what it is and impossible for it to be its own contradictory, which is non-existence in this case. Further, this necessity (wujûb) derives either from itself (bi al-dzât) or from something else (bi al-ghayr). However, it is self-contradictory to regard this necessity as deriving from something else, for, in this case, there is no ‘other,’ nor a second. Hence it is necessarily existent-by-itself (wâjib al-wujûd bi al-dzât).

Another Proof

The quiddities, which are caused (ma’lûl) and contingent (mumkin) existents, also exist by necessity, for a thing does not come into being unless it is necessitated. However, their necessity is by virtue of something else; because were they necessary-by-themselves, they would not stand in need of a cause. Now the cause that necessitates their existence is also existent by necessity. This necessity is either by-itself or by-something-else, and this line of reasoning leads to that which is necessarily existent by-itself, because of the inadmissibility of a vicious circle or an indefinite regress.

12.2. THE PROOF OF ITS UNITY

As the Necessarily Existent Being [wâjib al-wujûd , henceforth referred to as “the Necessary Being”] is the reality of absolute existence (al-wujûd al-shirf), which has no other, this establishes Its unity, which is ‘true unity’ [al-wahdat al-haqqah) wherein it is impossible to assume any multiplicity. For if the reality of absolute existence were assumed to have a second, this second will turn out to be the first one due to the absence of any distinction, contrary to the case of numerical unity wherein a second, when assumed, makes it a duality, and so on and so forth.

Another Proof

If there were two or more Necessary Beings, each of them would be distinct from the other while sharing the quality of being necessarily existent. Now the factor that makes them distinct from one another has, of necessity, to be other than what they hold in common, and this entails that their essences be composed of what they hold in common and what makes them distinct from one another. This composition entails the need for parts - something that contradicts their being necessary-by-themselves (al-wujûb al-dzâtî, henceforth translated as ‘essential necessity’], a condition that is the criterion of absolute self-sufficiency (al-ghinâ al-shirf ).

A Supplementary Note

Ibn Kammûnah has formulated an objection that contests this proof. Why should it be inadmissible to suppose two simple entities (huwiyyatân) of unknown nature that differ from one another with all their quiddities, while each of them is a self-existing necessary being, so that the concept of existential necessity be abstracted from each of them in an accidental manner? The answer to this is that it is inadmissible because it involves the abstraction of a single concept from different entities qua different entities.

Moreover, this line of reasoning ascribes quiddity to the Necessary Being, and it was established earlier that Its quiddity is Its existence. Furthermore, it involves the derivation of existence from quiddity, whereas, as mentioned earlier, existence is fundamental (ashîl) and quiddity derived (i’tibârî), and the derivation of something fundamental from that which is derived makes no sense.

It follows from the unity of the Necessary Being - i.e., in this particular sense of unity - that Its existence is not limited by any limit of privation (hadd ‘adamî) so as to exclude anything beyond It.

It also follows from it that Its essence is simple, without composition of any kind; for composition, whatever its form, does not occur without parts that make up the whole, whose actualization depends on the actualization of the parts that it needs, and need contradicts essential necessity.

ما سواه تعالى من الوجودات الإمكانية فقراء في أنفسها متعلقات في حدود ذواتها فهي وجودات رابطة لا استقلال لها حدوثا و لا بقاء و إنما تتقوم بغيرها و ينتهي ذلك إلى وجود مستقل في نفسه غني في ذاته لا تعلق له بشي‏ء تعلق الفقر و الحاجة و هو الواجب الوجود تعالى و تقدس.

تتمة

قالت الثنوية :إن في الوجود خيرا و شرا و هما متضادان لا يستندان إلى مبدإ واحد فهناك مبدئان مبدأ الخيرات و مبدأ الشرور.

12.3. THE NECESSARY BEING IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY BEING AND EVERY EXISTENTIAL PERFECTION

Every existent other than It is essentially contingent (mumkin bi al-dzât). That is because essential necessity is exclusive to It. Every contingent being has a quiddity which is indifferent to existence and non-existence. Therefore, it needs a cause to exist. The cause necessitates its existence, whereupon it comes into being. If this cause be an existent necessary-by-itself, the argument ends there; but if it is necessary-by-something-else, the chain must ultimately terminate in that which is necessary-by-itself. Hence the Essentially Necessary Being (al-wâjib bi al-dzât) is that from which emanates the existence of every existent from among the quiddities.

Another Proof

As opposed to God, the Exalted, all contingent beings (al-wujûdât al-imkâniyyah) are needy in themselves, dependent in their very essence. Hence they are relational existents (wujûdât râbithah), which have no independence, neither for coming into being nor for continuing to exist. They subsist through something other than themselves. This chain of dependence leads up to a being that is independent in itself, self-sufficient, free from need or dependence on anything. That being is the exalted and holy Necessary Being.

This shows that the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of emanation (mufîdh) of everything else. In the same way that It is the source of their being, it is also the source of the properties (âtsâr) that subsist through them as well as the relations and connections between them. That is so because the cause, which necessitates a thing and sustains its existence, is also the necessitating cause of its properties and their sustainer, as well as of the relations sustained by it.

Hence the Exalted Necessary Being is the sole originating source of everything else, its owner (mâlik) and governor (mudabbir). Thus He is the Sustainer of the worlds and there is no sustainer besides Him.

A Supplementary Note

The dualists hold being to consist of good and evil, as two opposites that do not derive from a single source. They believe in two sources: a source of all that is good and a source of all that is evil.

Plato, in refuting them, has offered the following argument: All evil is non-being. That which is non-existent does not need a cause; rather, its ‘cause’ is absence of existence. He has illustrated the minor premise with examples, such as that of homicide, which is regarded as something evil. The evil in this case is not the killer’s capacity to carry out the act of killing, for it is a perfection (kamâl) in him. Nor is it the sharpness of the sword, for instance, and its ability to cut, which is a perfection in it. Nor is it the passivity of the victim’s neck in relation to the blow, which is a perfection in the body. Hence, there remains no evil except the ceasing of the victim’s life as a result of the act. This is something involving non-being. The same reasoning applies to other instances of evil.

According to Aristotle, five possibilities are conceivable in this regard: (i) that which is purely good; (ii) that whose good is greater than its evil; (iii) that whose good and evil are equal; (iv) that whose evil is greater than its good; and (v) that which is sheer evil. The first kind exists, such as the immaterial Intellect, which is wholly good. So also does the second kind, such as all the material existents, whose good is preponderant in view of the order of the universe. Had they not come into existence, a greater evil would have resulted. As to the three remaining possibilities, they do not exist. The creation of that whose good is equal to its evil would involve preponderance without a preponderant. As to that whose evil is greater than its good, its creation involves the preponderance of the non-preponderant over what is preponderant. As to that which is sheer evil, its matter is quite obvious. In summary, nothing except that which is purely good or predominantly good essentially derives from the Cause. As to that whose evil is lesser, it derives from the Cause together with the predominant good that accompanies it.

12.4. THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE NECESSARY BEING AND THE MEANING OF THEIR ATTRIBUTION

The Attributes of the Necessary Being are divided, first, into (i) the Attributes of Essence and (ii) the Attributes of Act. The Attributes of Essence are those that relate solely to the Essence, without the need to take into account anything extraneous to It such as Its life and Its knowledge of Itself. The Attributes of Act are those which cannot be ascribed to It without taking into account what is extraneous to It, such as creation, giving life and providing.

The Attributes of Act are many, which are abstracted in their multiplicity from Divine activity and are extraneous to the Divine Essence. Our discussion in these sections relates to the Attributes of Essence.

As we have seen above, the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of all existence and all existential perfections. It was established in the foregoing discussions that the creative cause of a thing possesses the reality of that thing to a higher and superior degree, for the giver cannot be devoid of what he gives. Hence He, the Glorious One, possesses, in some way or other, certain attributes of perfection such as knowledge, power and life.

As for the kinds of Attributes of Essence and His manner of possessing them, it may be observed that the Attributes are divided into (ia) the positive attributes (such as knowledge and power) and (ib) the negative attributes, the latter implying a negation. However, as we saw in the foregoing discussion, one may not negate any of the perfections in relation to God, the Exalted, for He is the source of all perfections. Hence His negative attributes signify the negation of deficiency (naqsh) and need (hâjah) in relation to Him, such as the negation of ignorance, incapacity and substantiality. Since deficiency and need imply the negation of perfection, a negative attribute signifies negation of the negation of perfection, which is affirmation of perfection. Hence the negation of ignorance means negation of the negation of knowledge, which implies affirmation of knowledge.

Further, the positive Attributes are divided into (ia 1) those that are ‘intrinsic’ (haqîqiyyah; lit., real), such as ‘the knowing,’ and (ia 2) those that are ‘relative’ (idhâfiyyah), such as ‘possessing power over’ and ‘possessing knowledge of.’ The intrinsic Attributes are in turn divided into (ia 1a) the ‘absolutely intrinsic’ ones (haqîqiyyah mahdhah) such as life and (ia lb) the ‘relatively intrinsic’ ones (haqîqiyyah dzât idhâfah) such as His knowledge of things other than Himself. There is no doubt that the relative Attributes are additional to the Divine Essence, for they are i’tibâri concepts and are not applicable to the Exalted Essence. The negative Attributes derive from the positive intrinsic Attributes, and that which applies to the latter is also true of them.

There are various views concerning the intrinsic Attributes, including the absolutely intrinsic and the relatively intrinsic attributes.

One of these views is that they are identical with the Essence and each of them is identical with the other [in respect of its referent].

A second view is that they are additional to the Essence and accompany It, being eternal like the Essence.

A third view holds that they are additional to the Essence, but not eternal.

A fourth view is that the meaning of the possession of the Attributes by the Essence is that Its acts are such as are performed by one who has these attributes. Thus, the statement ‘He is knowing’ means that His acts, in respect of their perfection, purposefulness, and precision are like the acts of someone who acts with knowledge. The same applies to the other attributes. Hence the Essence is represented in the Attributes.

The first view, which is ascribed to the philosophers, is the right one. As we have seen, the Exalted Essence is the source of every existential perfection, and the source of perfection cannot be devoid of it. Hence His Essence possesses the reality of every perfection emanating from Him, and this is what is meant by the identity of the Attributes and the Essence.

Further, as each of His Attributes of perfection is identical with the Essence, which possesses alb of them, It includes all the Attributes and is identical with them. Hence the Attributes differ from one another in regard to their meaning, but are one in respect to their referent, which is the Exalted Essence.

The view held by some that the cause of creation is His volition (masyiyyah) and will (irâdah), not His Essence, is of no consequence. For if the will be an attribute of the Essence and identical with It, the ascription of creation to will amounts to its ascription to the Essence, and this view has nothing enlightening to offer. If it be an attribute of Act (shifat al-fi’l), abstracted on the plane of Act, the Act would precede the will, and its dependence on the Act for coming into existence implies the precedence of the effect to the cause, which is impossible. Moreover, such a view implies that the ascription of creation and bringing into existence to God be metaphorical.

As to the second view, which is ascribed to the Ash’arites, the question arises whether or not these Attributes - which according to them are: life, power, knowledge, hearing, sight, will and speech - are caused by something. If they are not caused by anything and are self-existent and necessary in themselves, there would be eight necessary beings: the Essence and the seven Attributes. Such a view stands refuted by the proofs of the Unity of the Necessary Being.

If these are caused, they are either caused by the Essence or by something else. If caused by something else, they would be necessary-by-something-else, and this necessity ultimately leads up to a being that is necessary-in-itself, other than the Necessary Being of whom they are attributes. This conclusion, like the former one, is also refuted by the proof of the Unity of the Necessary Being. Moreover, it implies that the Necessary Being stands in need of something else to possess its attributes of perfection, which is impossible.

The second case [i.e. if the Attributes are supposed to have been caused by the Essence] implies that their cause precedes them in terms of causality while it is itself devoid of the perfections emanating from it, which is impossible.

Moreover, this view implies that the Essence of the Necessary Being is devoid of the attributes of perfection, whereas, as mentioned earlier, It is

absolute existence, which is not devoid of existence or any existential perfection, and this involves a contradiction.

As to the third view, which is ascribed to the Karrâmiyyah, that the Attributes are additional and non-eternal, it implies that the Exalted Essence possesses a matter that receives these Attributes that come to exist in It. This implies that the Essence is composite - which is impossible - and in itself devoid of perfection, which is also impossible.

As to the fourth view - that the Essence is represented by the Attributes - which is ascribed to the Mu’tazilah, it also implies that the Essence is devoid of them, whereas, as we have seen, It is absolute existence, which cannot be devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence this view involves a contradiction.

12.5. GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

It was mentioned earlier that every immaterial being has knowledge of itself, which is the presence of its essence for itself, or self-knowledge.

It was also mentioned that the Exalted Essence is absolute existence not bounded by any limit, nor is it devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence all the details of creation, of existence and existential perfections, with their existential order, exist in It in their highest and noblest form without being separate from one another. Hence he knows them with an undifferentiated knowledge, which at the same time discloses details (‘ilman ijmâliyyan fî ‘ayn al-kasyf al-tafshîlî).

Further, all existents, being Its effects, depend upon It with the dependence of something relative (râbith) on that which is independent, and they are present for It with their existence. Hence It knows them with an immediate knowledge on the plane of their existences, the immaterial among them with their very being and the material ones through their immaterial forms.

This establishes that the Exalted Necessary Being has an immediate knowledge (‘ilrn hudhârî) of Itself and a detailed immediate knowledge of the things before their creation on the plane of Its Essence, and that this knowledge is identical with Its Essence. It also has a detailed immediate knowledge of them on their own plane, extraneous to Its Essence. It is evident that Its knowledge of things implies also the knowledge of their knowledge [of themselves and other things].

A Supplementary Note

As hearing and seeing consist of the knowledge of that which is audible and visible, they are included in knowledge in general. Thus the attributes related to seeing and hearing have subsistence in God, the Exalted, who is the hearer and the seer in the same way as He is the knower.

Some Related Views

There are various views concerning Divine knowledge; we shall review some of the well known among them in the following:

(i) One of these views is that the Divine Being has knowledge of Its own Essence, not of Its effects, because Its Essence is pre-eternal (azalî) and the existence of every effect is preceded by its non-existence (hadîts).

This viewpoint, however, is not correct, because knowledge of the effect in pre-eternity does not imply that the effect existed in pre-eternity with it particular existence, as we saw above.

(ii) A second view, which is attributed to the Mu’tazilah, is that quiddities do have a kind of objective subsistence (tsubût ‘aynî) daring their non-existence (‘adam), and it is to this that God’s knowledge pertains before their coming into being.

However, as discussed earlier, the notion of subsistence of non-existents is an invalid idea.

(iii) The third view, which has been ascribed to the Sufis, is that the contingent quiddities (al-mâhiyyât al-mumkinah) have an epistemic subsistence (tsubût ‘ilmî) subsumed in the Names and the Attributes, and it is to this that God’s knowledge pertains before creation.

However, the view that existence is fundamental and quiddities are derivative precludes the assumption of any kind of subsistence for quiddity prior to its particular external existence.

(iv) The fourth view is ascribed to Plato, who held that God’s detailed knowledge of things consists of immaterial Ideas and divine archetypes that possess all the perfections of the species.

This view is also inadequate, because even if such archetypes are assumed to exist, that only helps in conceiving God’s detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, not on the plane of the Essence, leaving It devoid of knowledge, whereas God is absolute existence, which is not without any existential perfection. Hence it leads to contradiction.

(v) The fifth view is attributed to Suhrawardî, who is followed by a number of authorities in holding it. According to it, all things, material and immaterial, are present with their very existence for God, the Exalted, not being hidden from Him. This constitutes His detailed knowledge of things.

The problem with this view is that presence is inconsistent with materiality, as mentioned in the discussion on knowledge and the known. Moreover, it helps solely in conceiving God’s detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, and, like the fourth theory, it leaves the Essence devoid of the perfection of knowledge.

(vi) The sixth view, which is ascribed to Thales of Miletus, holds that God knows the First Intellect, which is the first effect, by virtue of the presence of its essence for Him. Other things are known to Him through the reflection of their forms in the First Intellect.

The objections mentioned in relation with the previous theory apply to this view also.

(vii) The seventh view holds that God’s essence has a detailed knowledge of the first effect and a non-detailed knowledge (‘ilm ijmâlî) of things below it. The essence of the first effect has a detailed knowledge of the second effect and a non-detailed knowledge of things below it, and so on. The above-mentioned objections apply here also.

(viii) The eighth view, which has been attributed to Porphyry, is that God’s knowledge is through His union (ittihâd) with the known.

The problem with this theory is that it only explains the manner in which God’s knowledge is realized, namely, that it involves union, not accidence (‘urûdh) or something of the kind. But it does not explain God’s detailed knowledge of things prior to their creation. Hence it suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories.

(ix) The ninth theory, which is ascribed to most of the later philosophers, is that God’s knowledge of His own Essence is as well a non-detailed knowledge of things. Hence He knows all things in a non-detailed manner through His knowledge of His own Essence. His detailed knowledge of things is posterior to their existence, for knowledge is incident to the known and there is nothing to be known prior to the existence of the known.

This theory also suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories. Moreover, as will be explained later on, it is inadmissible to regard God’s knowledge as acquired, and obtained through perceived forms.

(x) The tenth theory, which is ascribed to the Peripatetics, states that God’s knowledge of things prior to their creation is by presence in His Essence of their quiddities, as per the existing order of being, not in the manner of a union (ittihâd) or penetration (dukhûl), but as universals sustained by the Essence through a mental subsistence. It is universal in the sense that it does not

change with the changes of the known thing. Hence it is a fore-knowledge (‘ilm ‘inâ’î) wherein cognitive apprehension is accompanied by its objective realization. This view is subscribed to by

most of the theologians (mutakallimûn), though they have [erroneously] faulted it in respect of its assertion of universality in Divine knowledge [due to their misunderstanding of the term ‘universal’].

Thus they hold God’s knowledge to be an acquired one prior to creation, remaining unchanged before and after the existence of things.

This theory suffers from the inadequacies of the previous ones, in addition to the fact that it ascribes acquired knowledge to an existent that is immaterial in essence and actuality. However, as mentioned in the discussions on knowledge and the known, an existent that is immaterial in its essence and in actuality cannot have acquired knowledge. Moreover, this view posits mental existence without there being any external existent to which it should correspond, which entails another objective existence of the external existent prior to its particular objective existence separate, from God. Hence it boils down to the fourth view mentioned above.

12.6. THE ATTRIBUTE OF POWER

As mentioned earlier, the attribute of power means that an entity be a knowing source of its acts. It is known that contingent existents derive from the Divine Essence, for there is nothing beyond contingent existents except the unconditioned Necessary Being. Hence God is the source of everything and His knowledge is identical with His Essence, which is the source of contingent effects. He has power and it is identical with His Essence.

Now if someone were to say that a human being’s voluntary actions are a creation of the human soul, for they are incident to his will - he performs them if he likes and refrains from performing them if he so wills. Had they been created by God and determined by Him, man would be compelled (mujbir) in his acts, not a free actor who acts out of his free choice (mukhtâr). Hence man’s voluntary acts (al-af’âl al-ikhtiyâriyyah) lie outside the ambit of Divine power, which does not encompass everything.

The answer to this is that the meaning of the voluntary character of an act is not that it remains neutral in its relation to existence and non-existence until its coming into being; for it is impossible for a contingent to come into being without there being a preponderant on the side of existence or that of non-existence. Rather, by virtue of its essential contingency, a voluntary action requires a complete cause for coming into existence. Hence when the cause exists it cannot fail to exist, for its relation to the cause is one of necessity. However, its relation to man - who is a part from among the parts of a complete cause - is one of contingency, similar to that of its other parts such as a receptive matter, other temporal and spatial conditions and so on.

Hence the voluntary act does occur without becoming necessary-by-something-else, like all other effects, and it is evident that something that is necessary-by-something-else does not actuate without ultimately terminating in that which is necessary-by-itself. There is nothing necessary-by-itself except God, the Exalted. Hence His power is all-encompassing and includes even the acts of free will.

Considering the same problem from another angle, voluntary acts, like other contingents, are caused, and, as mentioned in the chapter on cause and effect,’ the existence of an effect is relative (râbith) in relation to its cause, and is not realized except through dependence on something independent that may sustain it. There is nothing that is independent-in-itself except that which is necessary-in-itself. Hence God is the primary source of all effects dependent for their existence on a cause, and He has power over all things.

Now if someone were to say: that if the acts of free will were subject to Divine power it would imply that they are compelled (jabarî); for it means that voluntary actions depend on the Divine will, which is never frustrated. Hence their occurrence is necessary, and, as a result, man is compelled in his voluntary acts and not free.

Also, considering the issue from yet another angle, since God has prior knowledge of every act that takes place, its occurrence is necessary; for otherwise it would not be knowledge but ignorance, which is far from God’s station. Hence the voluntary acts are compelled, not free.

Our answer is that the case is indeed not such, because the Divine will relates to man’s actions as they are in themselves, and as such they remain

attributed to the person who is part of the complete cause. Their being subject to the Divine will does not change what they are. Hence the subjection of the actions to the Divine will is through man’s free choice. It was God’s will that man should perform such and such acts out of his own free will, and it is impossible for His will to be frustrated.

A similar answer may be given to the objection based on the subjection of voluntary acts to God’s pre-eternal knowledge. For acts of free will are subject to God’s knowledge as they are, that is, as voluntary actions which one can perform or refrain from performing, and the knowledge of something does not alter its reality. Hence, if the act were to occur without the exercise of free will, that would imply ignorance on God’s behalf.

Someone might say that this explanation of Divine power - i.e. on the basis of the dependence of the existence of a contingent effect on its becoming necessary-by-something-else and the termination of this necessity in that which is necessary-in-itself -  leads to a conclusion contrary to what was intended. That is because the necessity of God’s acts implies that He is compelled by necessity. In other words, His acts are forced upon Him by necessity and it is impossible for Him not to carry them out. In view of this, Divine omnipotence becomes meaningless.

The answer to this is that necessity, as we know, is abstracted from existence. In the same way as the effect’s existence is derived from the cause, so also its necessity-by-something-else derives from the cause, and it is impossible that a property characterizing a thing’s existence should in turn affect the existence of the cause that creates the property in it. Hence it is impossible that the necessity that God’s acts derive from Him should in turn make the act necessary upon Him and deprive Him of His omnipotence, which is identical with His Essence.

From what has been said, it becomes clear that God, the Exalted, is a free actor by essence; for there can be no compulsion except from something extraneous to an agent that may force it to act contrary to its will, and there is nothing extraneous to God except His Act, which is in harmony with the agent. Hence, His Acts are what His Essence requires and chooses.

12.7. THE ATTRIBUTE OF LIFE

For us something ‘living’ means a conscious agent (al-darrâk al-fa’’âl). That is, life is the source of consciousness and activity, or the source of knowledge and power, or anything associated with knowledge and power. If the predicate ‘living’ is applicable to us as human beings, while knowledge and power are additional to our essences, it is predicable, with greater reason, of the Essence of the Necessary Being in whom they exist with their very reality. Hence God, the Exalted, is Life and is the Living One by virtue of His Essence.

Moreover, God, the Exalted, is the source of the life of every living being, and the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it.

12.8. THE ATTRIBUTES OF WILL AND SPEECH

The metaphysicians state that God’s will (irâdah) is His knowledge of the best [possible] order of the universe. In other words, it is His knowledge that a certain act is good. Hence in the same way as His being the ‘hearer’ and the ‘seer’ (i.e. having knowledge of that which is audible and visible) are two aspects of His knowledge, His will is also an aspect of His knowledge, which is identical with His Essence.

It is also said that speech, as we know it, consists of words, which signify meanings in one’s mind. Hence a word is a ‘conventional existent’ (mawjûd i’tibârî), which by virtue of conventional signification (dalâlah wad’iyyah) signifies another existent in the mind. Should there be a real existent that signifies another existent with a ‘natural’ signification (dalâlah thab’iyyah) - such as an effect, which signifies its own cause - and should its attribute of perfection manifest the consummate perfection of its cause, then it can be called a ‘word’ (kalâm) with greater reason due to the strength of its signification. If it were a being unitary in its essence (ahadî al-dzât)P whose essential attributes of perfection, which by virtue of the details of its perfection and effects (âtsâr) manifest that unitary being, which is the Necessary Being, it is worthier of being called a ‘speaker.’ Hence He is the ‘Speaker’ (mutakallim) by virtue of the existence of His Essence for Himself.

I say: In this view, the concepts of Divine will and speech are reduced to an aspect of knowledge and power. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider them in separation from knowledge and power. As to the will and speech that are attributed to God, the Exalted, in the Qur’ân and the Sunnah, they refer to the attributes of Act, in the sense to be explained shortly, God willing.

12.9. THE DIVINE ACT AND ITS DIVISIONS

God’s Act (i.e. creation), in the sense of existence emanating from Him, has various divisions in accordance with the conclusions of the previous discussions, such as its division into material and immaterial, changeable and unchangeable, and so on.

Our purpose here is to make a passing reference to that which has already been mentioned,’ that there are three realms: the realm of the Intellect (‘âlam al-’aql), the imaginal realm (‘âlam al-mitsâl), and the material realm (‘âlam al-mâddah).

The realm of the Intellect is immaterial and without matter and its properties (âtsâr).

The imaginal world is also devoid of matter without, however, being devoid of its properties, such as spatial dimension, shape, configuration and so on. It contains bodily images (asbbdh) which are analogous in their characteristics to bodies in the material realm and with an order that is similar to their order in the material world. But they do not succeed one another in respect of existence, nor do they change from one form to another or from one state to another by passing from potentiality to actuality by motion, as is the case in the material world. Thus the imaginal forms in their succeeding one another are similar to the subjective imaginary forms in respect of change and motion. As knowledge is immaterial and there is no potentiality or change in it, it is knowledge of change, not change of knowledge.

The material world, together with its substances and accidents, is associated with matter.

These threefold realms stand in an existential hierarchy. Thus the realm of the Intellect existentially precedes the imaginal world, and the imaginal world existentially precedes the material world.

That is because absolute actuality, without any trace of potentiality, is existentially stronger and more powerful than that which has either pure potentiality or traces of potentiality in it. Hence that which is immaterial has existential precedence over that which is associated with matter.

Further, the immaterial Intellect is least bound by limits and conditions and is existentially more expansive and simpler than the immaterial imaginal form (al-mitsâl al-mujarrad). Whenever an existent is stronger and more expansive, its precedence is greater in the graded hierarchy of existence and it is nearer to the First Source, which is absolute existence, without any limits and not lacking any perfection. Hence the world of the Intellect existentially precedes all being, and below it is the imaginal world, below which is the material world.

From what has been said it becomes clear that the above-mentioned hierarchy is one based on causality. That is, the world of the Intellect is the emanating cause (mufîdh) of the imaginal world and the imaginal world is the emanating cause of the material world.

It also becomes clear from that which was stated earlier - that the cause possesses the perfection of its effect to a higher and superior degree - that the threefold worlds correspond to one another. Thus the imaginal world has an imaginal order corresponding to the material order while being superior

to it, and the world of Intellect has an order corresponding to it while being simpler and more undifferentiated (ajmal), and to it corresponds the divine order (al-nizhâm al-rabawî) that exists in the knowledge of the Exalted Necessary Being.

12.10. THE IMMATERIAL INTELLECTS AND THE POSSIBLE MANNER OF THEIR MULTIPLICITY

It should be known that without association with matter quiddity is not subject to multiplicity in terms of individuation. The proof of it is that numerical multiplicity is either (i) by virtue of complete quiddity or (ii) part of it, or (iii) by virtue of a non-separable accident or (iv) by a separable accident. It is impossible for a quiddity to have any individuals in the first three cases, for in each of these cases an individual would itself be multiple when found, and every multitude is composed of individuals. Thus each of the individuals would necessarily have to be a multiplicity in order to be an instance of its quiddity, whereas this multiplicity in turn would be comprised of individuals. This leads to an indefinite regress and does not yield an individual member. Therefore, its individual cannot actualize, and hence multiplicity, too, remains non-actualized. This involves a contradiction. Therefore, multiplicity does not occur except by virtue of a separable accident, which requires a receptive matter for its association with quiddity. Hence every quiddity possessing a multiplicity of individuals is material; conversely, every immaterial quiddity, which is existentially immaterial, does not have multiple individuals.

Yes, there can be a multiplicity of individuals in the immaterial Intellects where an individual from a material species, such as man, develops by substantial motion from the plane of materiality and potentiality to the plane of immateriality and actuality, whereat its distinctive individual characteristics associated with its material origin accompany it.

Further, since it is impossible that there should be a multiplicity of individuals in the immaterial Intellect, any multiplicity therein would be a multiplicity of species, in the sense that each separate species of it will be confined to a unique individual. This is conceivable in two ways, vertical and horizontal. As to vertical multiplicity, it means that there are a definite number of Intellects, each of which is the efficient cause of the succeeding Intellect of a different species. In horizontal multiplicity, there would be different multiple species none of whom is the cause or the effect of another and all of whom are effects of the Intellect above them.

12.11. THE VERTICAL INTELLECTS AND THE FIRST OF THEM

Since the Necessary Being is one and simple in all respects, it is impossible for something multiple to emanate from It, irrespective of whether it is immaterial, such as the horizontal Intellects, or material, like the material species. That is because nothing except what is one can emanate from that which is one. Hence the first to emanate from God is the Intellect that with its ‘quasi-unitary existence’ (wujûd al-wâhid al-zhillî) reflects the existence of the Necessary Being in Its unity.

As its being the first means its existential precedence over other contingent existents, it is the intermediate cause between God and other endues to emanate from Him. In this there is no limiting of the absolute power of the Necessary Being, which is identical with its exalted Essence in accordance with the proof mentioned earlier. That is because, as mentioned before, it is impossible that something multiple qua multiple should emanate from something one qua one, and power relates only to that which is possible. That which is essentially impossible, being intrinsically void, has no reality to be the subject of Divine power - such as a thing’s not being what it is, and the simultaneous truth or falsehood of two contradictories, for instance. Hence their impossibility of existence does not imply a limitation on God’s power or its absoluteness.

Further, the First Intellect, though one in its being and simple in its emanation, has a quiddity - which is derivative and non-fundamental - by virtue of its contingency, for quiddity is the locus of contingency. Considering the matter from yet another angle, since the First Intellect intellects its own essence as well as the Necessary Being, it has multiple aspects, and for this reason it can be the source of more than a single effect.

However, the aspects (jihât) existent in the imaginal world, which is below the world of the Intellect, are so numerous that the few aspects of the First Intellect are not sufficient to emanate it. Hence it has to bring into being the Second Intellect, then the Third Intellect and so on and so forth until the number of aspects of multiplicity reaches the number necessary for the creation of the imaginal realm below it.

From this, it becomes clear that there are multiple vertical Intellects (al-’uqûl al-thûliyyah), although there is no way of determining their number.

12.12. THE HORIZONTAL INTELLECTS

The Emanationists posit the existence of the horizontal Intellects (al-‘uqûl al-‘aradiyyah), between whom there is no relation of causality and which correspond to the material species in the material world, each of them governing its respective species. They are called the ‘lords of the species’ (arbâb al-anwâ’), or Platonic Ideas, so called because Plato was persistent in his advocacy of them. The Peripatetics reject them and attribute their governing function to the last of the vertical Intellects, which they call ‘the Active Intellect’ (al-’aql al-fa’’âl).

However, those who posit the reality of the horizontal Intellects differ in their views concerning them. According to the soundest of them, as reported, at the outset of its existence each material species has an immaterial individual possessing all the possible perfections of that species in actuality. It attends to the material individuals of its species and governs them through the means of its specific form. Thus it develops them from potentiality to actuality by impelling them in their substantial motion by virtue of its subordinate accidental motions.

They have advanced various arguments in favour of their view. According to one of them the vegetative faculties (al-quwâ al-nabâtiyyah), such as those of nourishment, growth, and reproduction, are accidents in the bodies of the plants. These faculties undergo change with changes occurring in their bodies, and disintegrate with their disintegration. The plants have no consciousness or cognition, and it is impossible that they themselves should be the generative source of these varied compositions and activities, and the source of the beautiful shapes and graceful contours that accord with a precise and perfect order that confounds the human mind. Hence, there must be an immaterial intelligent substance that governs them and guides them towards their goal of perfection.

However, the problem with this view is that it is also possible to ascribe to something else the acts that they attribute to the ‘lord of the species,’ for the functions of every species depend on its specific form and, it may be said, that above it is the last vertical Intellect posited by the Peripatetics, which they call the ‘Active Intellect.’

Another argument they have advanced is that the species found in this world of ours, with their constant and unchanging order, are not creatures of accident. Hence this permanent and unceasing order has real causes which are nothing but the immaterial substances that bring the species into being and attend to them and govern them, not as imagined by some people who, on the basis of an unfounded conjecture, ascribe them to the actions and properties of the temperaments (amzijah) and the like. Rather, every species has a universal archetype (mitsâl kullî) that governs it. What is meant by ‘universality’ here is not correspondence to a multiplicity of referents. Rather, by virtue of its immateriality, the archetype has an equal relation to all the individuals of its species.

The difficulty with this view is that the actions and properties associated with every species derive from its specific form, and had it not been for this, the specificity of the species would not have actualized. Hence the accidents particular to every species are evidence that there exists a substantial form

which is their immediate source, in the same way as common accidents are evidence that there is a common substratum.

Hence the agent of the prevailing order in a species is the specific form, and the agent of the specific form, as mentioned earlier, is an immaterial substance that brings it into being in a matter possessing potential (isti’dâd). Hence the forms differ with the differing levels of potential. However, this argument is not sufficient to establish whether this immaterial substance that brings the species into being and governs it is a horizontal Intellect associated with a certain species, or a vertical Intellect presiding over all the species.

Another argument that has been advanced by the proponents of this view rests on the basis of the ‘principle of the nobler contingent’ (qâ’idah imkân al-asyraf). There is an established philosophical principle according to which whenever there exists a baser contingent (al-mumkin al-akhass), it is necessary for a nobler contingent (al-mumkin al-asyraf) to exist prior to it. There is no doubt that the immaterial man, for instance, who possesses all the perfections of

humanity in act, is existentially nobler than the material human being, which is in potentiality in relation to most of its perfections. Hence, the existence of the material human being found in this world is the evidence of its archetype (mitsâl) in the realm of the Intellect, which is the lord of its species.

However, the condition for the application of the principle of nobler contingent is that the baser and the nobler share a common specific quiddity, so that the base existence of the baser may imply the possibility of the nobler in external reality in accordance with its quiddity. The mere applicability of a conception to something does not necessarily make its referent an individual of its species, in the same manner as the application of the conception of knowledge to immediate knowledge does not imply its being a psychic quality. Therefore it is possible that a universal Intellect (‘aql kullî) from among the vertical Intellects may be the referent, for instance, of the conception of universal man intellected by us. That universal Intellect may possesses all the primary and secondary perfections of the material human species, so that the conception of ‘man’ may be applicable to it due to its possessing the existential perfection of man, though not because it is a member of the human species.

In short, the applicability of the concept of man, for instance, to the immaterial universal man intellected by us does not imply that the object of our intellection is an individual possessing the quiddity of man so that it be regarded as an archetype of the human species in the realm of the Intellect.

12.13. THE IMAGINAL WORLD

It is also called the ‘intermediate realm’ (barzakh, lit. barrier) due to its being situated between the immaterial realm of the Intellect and the realm of material substances. It is also referred to as al-khiyâl al-munfashil (lit. ‘separate imagination,’ that is an imaginal realm separate from and independent of an imagining subject) due to its being independent of animal imagination (al-khiyâl al-hayawânî), which is a subjective faculty.

As mentioned, it is a plane of immaterial existence possessing material properties. In it are particular substantial forms created by the last of the vertical Intellects - the ‘Active Intellect’ of the Peripatetics - or one of the horizontal Intellects of the Emanationists. They are a multitude in accordance with the multiplicity of aspects of the Intellect that emanates them. These forms appear to others as different shapes without this difference of shapes compromising the individual unity of any of them.

12.14. THE MATERIAL WORLD

It is the world that we perceive, at the lowest and the basest plane of existence. The association with matter of the forms that exist in it and its association with potentiality (quwwah) and potential (isti’dâd) distinguish it from the other realms. The perfections of every existent in it are in potentiality at the beginning, after which it advances by gradual motion towards actuality, from which obstacles often hamper it. Hence it is a world of interference and conflict.

Physical investigations and mathematical studies that have been carried out up to the present have revealed many things about the parts of this world and their configurations, relations and prevailing order. Perhaps that which remains unknown far exceeds what is known.

This world with the existential relation between its parts is essentially a unity in flux, moving with its substance and accompanying accidents. Superimposed on this general motion are the particular substantial motions of plants, animals and human beings. The final end, where this motion will cease, is complete immateriality, as mentioned in the chapter on actuality and potentiality.

Since this world is in motion with its substance and essentially in flux, its essence is identical with renewal and change. Hence it is valid to consider it as deriving from a fixed cause. The fixed unchanging agent has created its renewing being, not that it first brought it into existence and then caused its being to undergo renewal. Such a picture avoids the problems that may arise from the notion of the dependence of the changeable on the unchangeable and the relation of something temporal (hâdits) to the eternal (qadîm).

Here the book concludes, and all praise belongs to Allah. Its compilation was completed on the seventh day of Rajab in the year 1390 H / [September 8, 1970] in the sacred shrine of al-Imam al-Ridhâ, may the best of salutations and blessings be upon him.