Importance of the Problems of World View

Chapter 5 : Scientific Philosophy

Admitting the existence of problems that must be investigated on a philosophical plane, Marxism has tried to pretend that these problems can be solved by using the discoveries made by the experimental sciences. The way Marxist writers go about doing this is that they first give an example from nature, and follow it with an example drawn from social or historical phenomena. Their third step is to draw a general conclusion by forcing a connection between these two examples, thereby, in their own imagination, proving the philosophi­cal principle in question. Supposedly, the whole exercise authorizes them to call their philosophy as "scientific" and as based on discoveries made by the experimental sciences. Although this procedure may have some effect on those who are unfamiliar with philosophical problems and scientific methodology and are, therefore, unable to distinguish the weak points and fallacies hidden in this line of reasoning, it has no philosophical value and is considered a form of sophistry and public fraud by those who are knowledgeable in such matters.

We do not deny that there has been a fragmentation in the sciences caused by the extensive specialization of the various fields, and there is, therefore, a need for synthesizing the results of their investiga­tions and bridging the gaps separating the numerous fields of science. Nor do we have any objection to such an endeavour's being called "scientific philosophy," since there is no ethical or legal injunction against coining new terms and names. What we do object to, however, is the abuse of terms and covering up of facts under misleading labels. This, we believe, is reprehensible and must be fought against.

It should be kept in mind that Marxist writers have not created their so-called "scientific philosophy" in order to serve the world of science and scholarship, by making a synthesis of the results of the investigations of the different sciences, and by connecting the endeavours of the diverse fields with one another. Far from such altruistic aims, their real motivation is to provide a justification for their baseless ideology and a philosophical foundation for their immature and inconsistent ideas. Moreover, even though the very

notion of relying on scientific findings for finding solutions to metaphysical problems is incorrect and unfruitful-and as it has been stated before, philosophical issues cannot be settled in such a manner­the Marxists are not even loyal to this misguided approach, since they ignore many irrefutable scientific facts, and rely, instead, on weak and unproven theories lacking any scientific value whatsoever. And when the fallacy of these theories is proven, instead of learning a lesson from all the wasted effort and recognizing the futility of their approach, or having recognized it, admitting it, they move on with undaunted courage to grasp at another theory, and through peculiar intellectual acrobatics at which they are so adept, set it forth as further proof of the validity of dialectical materialism.

We shall leave an examination of the fumblings and public deceptions of the Marxists to some future occasion and simply state the fact that the notion of a "scientific philosophy"-in the sense of a philosophy that attempts to solve philosophical problems through the application of the methodology of the experimental sciences with reliance on scientific discoveries alone-is an anomaly unacceptable to any competent thinker. And the adjective "scientific" for philosophy not only does not add anything to its worth, since it ascribes to it a characteristic inappropriate to philosophy, but it simply exposes the bankruptcy of its originators which proves that they were unable to distinguish the boundaries separating science from philosophy and the correct method of tackling philosophical problems. It seems that our Marxist wizards justify this blatant contradiction as an example of "dialectical contradiction," and set it forth as a highly advanced philosophical phenomenon to the credulous devotees of "dialectics."

Another point to be noted here is that just as ascribing the term "scientific" to discussions of philosophical issues is caused either by ignorance, or intentions to deceive the public, to denigrate and condemn them as "unscientific" is also a form of distortion and abuse of the prestige of the word "scientific". And just as being characterized as "scientific" adds nothing to the value of metaphysical investigations, their being labelled as "unscientific" does nothing to bring down their value either. Since, as we mentioned before, being "scientific" means that a subject must lend itself to empirical verification, whereas the quality that purely theoretical problems transcend the realm of sense experience is essential to them, and is not a shortcoming or defect on their part. In other words, just because something is outside the realm of sense experience and cannot be proved through experimental methods, it does not mean that it is worthless or unverifiable. It means, rather, that it should be analysed with the help of the rational method and by the means of the self-evident axioms -of reason. Moreover, as shall be demonstrated later, scientific problems themselves are in need of metaphysical and rational principles.