Islamic Philosophy and the Problem of Evil; a Philosophical Theodicy

References:

[1] Abedi Shahrudi, Ali (1373), "A Critique of the Existential Theory of Good and Evil ", Kayhane Andishe, No. 48.

[2] Avicenna, (1404 A.H.)Al-Isharat wa Al-Tanbihat , accompanied with Al-Tusi's commentary, Daftar Nashri al-kitab, vol.3

[3] Avicenna (2005),The Metaphysics of The Healing , translated, introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press: Provo, Utah.

[4] Al-Farabi (1408 A.H),Al-Taaliqat , Beyrut: Dar al-Manahil.

[5] Hospers, J. (1992),An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis , 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

[6] Mirdamad,Al-Qabasat (1374 A.H), Mehdi Muhaqiq (ed.), Tehran University Press: Tehran.

[7] Morewedge, Parviz, (1973),The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sina) , London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[8] Mulla Sadra,Al-Hikmat Al-Mutealiyah fi Al-Asfar Al-Aqliyat Al-Arbaah ,[Al-Asfar] , (1990a), vol. 4, Beyrut, Dar Ihyaa al-Turath alAarabiyah.

[9] Mulla Sadra,Al-Hikmat Al-Mutealiyah fi Al-Asfar Al-Aqliyat Al-Arbaah ,[Al-Asfar] ,  (1990b), vol. 6, Beyrut, Dar Ihyaa al-Turath alAarabiyah.

[10] Mulla Sadra,Al-Hikmat Al-Mutealiyah fi Al-Asfar Al-Aqliyat Al-Arbaah, [Al-Asfar] , (1981c), vol.2, Beyrut, Dar Ihyaa al-Turath alAarabiyah.

[11] Mulla Sadra,Al-Hikmat Al-Mutealiyah fi Al-Asfar Al-Aqliyat Al-Arbaah, [Al-Asfar] , (1981), vol. 7, Beyrut, Dar Ihyaa al-Turath alAarabiyah.

[12] Mulla Sadra, (1363),Mafatih Al-Ghayb , Mohammad Khajawii (ed.), Tehran, Muassese Mutaleat wa Tahqiqat-e Farhangi,

[13] Al-Nuri Al-Zinuzi, Mulla Abdollah, (1974),Al-Lamaat Al-Ilahiyyah ,

[14] Al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din and Khwaje Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1404 A.H),Sharhay al-Isharat , Qum, Maktabat al-Marashi,.

[15] Suhrawardi, (1373),Hikmat al-Ishraq , in Suhrawardi's Collected Works, introduction and edition by Henry Corbin, Tehran, Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1373 A. H., vol. 2.

[16] Al-Zinuzi, Agha Ali Modarres (1376), BadayeAl-Hikam , Ahmad Waezi (ed.), Alzahra: Tehran.

[17] Peterson, Michael L. (ed.) (1992),The Problem of Evil ; Selected Readings, Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press.

[18] Al-Shirazi, Qutb al-Din,Sharhu Hihmat al-Ishraq , Qum.

[19] Suhrawardi (1373),Hikmat al-Ishraq , in Suhrawardi's Collected Works, introduction and edition by Henry Corbin, Tehran, Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies, vol. 2.

[20] Taliferro, Charles (1998),Contemporary Philosophy of Religion , Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Notes

[^1]: Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

[^3]: This article also does not deal with Muslim theologians' views, since beside a few common aspects, the whole theological approach here differs deeply from that of philosophers (both in the formulations of the problem and in the proposed resolutions). Nevertheless, I shall sometimes refer to the views of some thinkers (Like Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and al-Tusi) who are commonly known as Muslim "theologian-philosopher".

[^4]: It is worth noting that in the current literature "theodicy" in its narrow sense is used against the "defense".

[^5]: Roughly speaking, the logical problem claims a kind of inconsistency between the belief in an omnipotent, omniscience and wholly good God and the belief in the existence of evils. According to the evidential problem, however, the existence of evils provides strong evidence against the existence of God and thus, renders the theistic beliefs unreasonable.

[^6]: To paraphrase this question in a more contemporary form, we may simply ask: Why does God permit evils?

[^7]: For example, the title of the relevant chapter in Avicenna's The Healing is: "On providence, showing the manner of the entry of evil in divine predetermination". (Avicenna, 2005, p 339). Mulla Sadra adopted a bit different and longer title: "On Divine providence and allembracing mercy and the manner of the entry of evil and harm in the [realm of the] predetermined beings in terms of divine decree and predetermination". (Mulla Sadra, 1981, p. 55)

[^8]: For a detailed statement of this problem, see: (Mulla Sadra, 1363 , pp. 275-276)

[^9]: Muslim philosophers believe that, regarding the hierarchical order of existence, it is impossible for a higher level (i. e. more perfect) being to something in behalf of a lower (less perfect) one. According to this principle, God's action, as a simple eternal reality, has no end except the very Divine essence. However, this does not deny the fact that the particular actions of God must have reasonable ends and purposes.

[^10]: What is meant here by Sadra seems to be much similar to what Leibniz called "metaphysical evil".

[^11]: As we shall see later, following Aristotle, Muslim philosophers believe that some of God's creatures, such as pure nonmaterial intellects (oqul) are totally free from any kind of evils. So, it would be enough clear that in this context "evil" could not be used in the first sense mentioned by Sadra.

[^12]: It is worth noting that some of Muslim philosophers trace this theory to Plato. Mirdamad, for example, after mentioning TNNE writes: " … and this is a principle by means of which Plato, the theosopher, refuted the doubt instilled by the dualists in order to prove two creators; the creator of goods and that of evils." Mirdamad, 1374, p.434)

[^13]: I mean by "metaphor" here what we may call "philosophical metaphor" in contrast to "linguistic metaphor". This idea is grounded in the philosophical consideration that we sometimes attribute the property of one thing to another because of the close connection between the two things. To present a simple (and inaccurate) example, we may call a certain syrup "sweet" while the thing which is really sweet is the sugar dissolved in the liquid.

[^14]: In the contemporary philosophy of religion, evil is normally divided into two main kinds: natural evil and moral evil. Moral evils result directly or indirectly from immoral actions. War, murder, and torture are examples of moral evil. On the contrary, natural evils, like diseases, floods and volcanoes (or, more accurately, the sufferings caused by natural phenomenon) do not follow immoral actions. Of course, the contrast between these two kinds is not always clear. For more discussion see: (Taliferro, 1998, p. 301). According to Leibniz, evil emerges in three main forms: metaphysical, physical and natural. Sometimes, a fourth kind is added i.e., the emotional evil, which is thought of to be identical with suffering and pain.

[^15]: Sadra elsewhere cites this claim with some hesitations: It is firmly possible to claim that this subject is selfevident and the mentioned examples were just for admonition." See: (Mulla Sadra, 1981, p. 62). There are other philosophers who believe that TNNE is self

evident (c.f. Mirdamad, 1374, p. 428 and Al-Nuri Al-Zinuzi, 1374, p. 410 and Al-Zinuzi, 1376, p. 478).

[^16]: For an example, see: (Al-Shirazi, p. 520)

[^17]: Sadra summarizes this argument and reveals its main logical form: "And the form of this deductive argument in its natural order is this: If the evil were an existential entity, then the evil would be not evil; the consequent is false [because it is a contradiction], thus the antecedent is false too." (Ibid. p. 59)

[^18]: By "apprehensional evil" I just mean any evil which consists in a kind of apprehension. It is helpful to note that apprehensional evil, in the above sense, should not be bounded to pain and suffering; there are other types especially what is called "double ignorance" (jahl almurakab). Pain and suffering, however, play the main role in the challenge.

[^19]: For another expression of this response, see: (Mirdamad, 1374, p. 331)

[^20]: In the view of later Muslim philosophers, knowledge (in its broad sense) has two main kinds: 1) "Knowledge by presence" in which the subject knows the object directly and without the medium of conceptualization since the object itself, and not its mental idea (surah), is present for the subject. 2) "Acquired knowledge" in which the subject knows its object indirectly and by means of its mental idea.

[^21]: Recently some authors distinguished between various proposed solutions in different religious and philosophical traditions. To give an example, John Hospers distinguishes between seven solutions. See: (Hospers, 1992, pp. 310-319)

[^22]: Mulla Sadra mentions two definitions for the "cause":

"We say that "cause" has two meanings: First, it is the thing from its existence the existence of another thing takes place [i.e., the effect] and from its nonexistence the nonexistence of another thing takes place. In the second meaning, it is the thing on which another thing is dependent in its existence…" (Mulla Sadra, 1990c, p. 127)

[^23]: What is written between [[ ]] is my addition.

[^24]: Advocating this view, Mirdamad pointed out that the evils in question should be considered as accidental from two different aspects: first, they are accidental in that they are existents which cause some privations. Second, they are also accidental in the sense that they are willed by God accidentally. See: (Mirdamad, 1374, p. 435)

[^25]: For a detailed presentation of these two approaches see: (Mulla Sadra, 1981, pp. 108-118).

[^26]: It seems that this universalist perspective, though successful in answering the present challenge of inconsistency between Divine wisdom and the apparent futility and vainness of evils, can not contribute in solving the problem of Divine Justice. For a contemporary critique of the universalist view, see: (Abedi Shahrudi, 1973)