Islamic Philosophy and the Problem of Evil; a Philosophical Theodicy

Several Versions of the Problem

In fact, what we called the "theoretical problem" can be expressed in several ways.

According to a contemporary point of view, the main versions of the problem are two: "logical problem of evil" and "evidential problem of evil".5 This distinction, however, has not been common among Muslim philosophers up to now. Indeed, we may hardly be able to find any similar distinction in their works. The main section where they discuss the problem is that which deals with God's attributes and actions.

Many of Muslim philosophers begin their discussion on evil with a consideration of the property of Divine providence. By this property, they usually mean a composition of three attributes: God's knowledge of the best possible order of the universe, His being its actual effective cause and, finally, His being satisfied with its actual realization.

Avicenna puts this definition in this way:

It must, hence, be known that providence consists in the First's knowing in Himself [the mode] of existence of the order of the good, in His being, in Himself, a cause of goodness and perfection in terms of what is possible, and in His being satisfied [with the order of the good] in the manner that has been mentioned. He would thus intellectually apprehend the order of the good in the highest possible manner, whereby what He intellectually apprehends in the highest possible way as an order and a good would overflow from Him in the manner, within the realm of possibility that is most complete in being conductive in order. (Avicenna, 2005, p.339)

However, according to this characterization, Divine providence apparently would imply that our actual world must be of the best possible order. Borrowing Leibniz' terminology, we may say that, given the Divine providence, our world must be the "best possible world". The best possible world, however, seems to be necessarily void of any kind of evils, since we surely maintain that such a world has a better order than that of a world containing evils. So, regarding the reality of evil in our actual world, the theoretical problem arises: How can one who believes in God and His providence (in the above sense) give reason for the actual evils in the world? How can one reconcile between these beliefs: the belief that God is aware of the best order of the world and causes it and is satisfied with it, on the one hand, and that evils are real, on the other hand?

The above questions are commonly expressed by Muslim philosophers appealing to the notion of Divine decree (al-qadha al-ilahi ) and predetermination (al-taqdir al-ilahi ). We should notice that in Muslim philosophers' worldview, the existence of any actual being or the occurrence of any actual event, in the whole universe and in all times, is decided and appointed by Divine eternal decree. In other words, God, as the ultimate (or more accurately, the unique real) efficient cause, necessitates the existence and the occurrence of all actual beings and events. Moreover, all the characteristics and properties of God's creatures are eternally predetermined by God. Thus, if evils are to be real entities, their very realization must be according to the Divine decree and their characteristics must be according to

His predetermination. Therefore, the main question could be expressed as: How do evils come to be according to Divine decree and predetermination?6

We find most Muslim Philosophers deal with the problem of evil under a main title which contains terms such as "Divine providence", "Divine decree" and "Divine predetermination".7

We may then count the above version of the problem as the main version for Islamic philosophers. Let us call it "the problem of evil and Divine providence". The general attempt to solve this problem has been manifested in the attempt to show that evils, in contrast to the goods, are decided and predetermined by God only accidentally and not essentially (I shall return to this solution later).

There are, however, some less important versions of the problem that have been formulated in a much less detailed way of which we rarely cannot find more than some implicit allusions. One of these subordinate versions relates to the problem of the creator of evils. According to Islamic philosophy, and Islamic doctrines in general, God is the most conceivable good and benevolent being. So, how could it be the case that such a God creates evils (pains, sufferings, harms and so on)? If God does not create the evils, then there must be another being (perhaps a cosmic devil) who is responsible for bringing the evils into existence. According to Islamic philosophy, however, this could not be the case, since, God is the ultimate creator of all things so that no other being can be conceived of who is able to create something despite of or against God's will and decision. We may call this problem "the creation-dualism problem".8 As we shall see, Muslim philosophers' key solution for this problem is based on a negative interpretation of the very nature of evils.

Another variation of the problem of evil, which deserves to be mentioned here, originates from Muslim Philosophers' belief in God's absolute wisdom (al-hikmat al-ilahiyyah).

"Wisdom" signifies more than one meaning:

from one aspect, It says something about God's knowledge and insists on its being totally comprehensive and absolutely perfect.

Moreover, wisdom sometimes is applied to Divine actions; God is wise (hakim) in the sense that His actions are perfect as well as reasonable. Avicenna interprets Divine wisdom as follows:

Wisdom, in our opinion applies to two things: to complete knowledge and to perfect action. (Morewedge, 1973, p. 70)

Indeed, the second sense is what we are concerned with here. One may claim that (at least some kinds of) actual evils, if seen as God's actions, are neither perfect nor reasonable. (To be "reasonable", when used as a property of actions, should be understood as having reasonable purposes and goals). For example, natural evils (like earthquakes) are apparently the result of some disorders and imperfect designs in the world. Moreover, one may think that evils like diseases and pains of the innocent creatures could not result in any rational objective.9

Therefore, we confront another problem: It seems that the reality of evils in our actual world contradicts Divine wisdom since they are manifestations of disorder and chaos, from one hand, and vainness and futility, from

another hand, while God's wisdom requires all His actions to be the most perfect and to have reasonable goals and objectives.