Mulla Sadra's Seddiqin Argument For the Existence of God

Chapter II: The Seddiqin Argument

Explanation of the argument

As mentioned in the beginning of this research, the Seddiqin argument in Mulla Sadra's view has some philosophical foundations which should be known for an understanding of this argument. In the previous chapter these foundations were explained in detail. Now, in order to propose the argument these foundations will be repeated in brief:

1- Existence has both a notion in the mind and a deepest reality in the external world. The deepest reality and the truth of existence is the most apparent, because it is not other than appearance, and others have their appearance and reality by it. But, the essence of the reality of existence is in the extremity of hidden-ness. Since its deepest reality is external, it cannot be grasped by mind. In this argument the truth and reality of existence is considered, not its notion which is different from its reality.

2- There is only existence (its truth not its concept) in the external world. By observing the limitations of existence and its boundaries with non-existence1 our mind makes some concepts of things that are different from each other which these concepts are quiddities. Therefore, what is fundamentally real is existence; quiddity is mentally posited as that which has existence only figuratively. The fundamental reality of existence is the main basis of this argument.

3- The reality of existence is one in all beings; in different beings there is not different truth, but all refer to the one truth. Simultaneously, there are multiple beings that have multiplicity in this reality of existence. Since there is nothing in reality other than the truth of existence, so the unifying factor is the same as the distinguishing factor; both are existence. The reality of existence is "one" at the same time that it is "many"; it has unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity. So, differences of existence are due to intensity and weakness, to perfection and imperfection, or to priority and posteriority. In fact, intensity and weakness are only about degrees of one truth in which the unifying factor is the same as the distinguishing factor. This view is called "analogical gradation"; therefore, the existence has analogical gradation in reality.

4- The relation of cause and caused in the light of the fundamental reality of existence: the cause is what gives existence to the caused. It is not only a mental ascription, but a real external relation between cause and caused. However this does not mean that there are three things (cause, caused and what that cause gives to the caused) and two actions (giving by the cause and taking by the caused). The caused is not other than what the cause brings into existence, which is just the act of giving, nay, the act of bringing into existence. Therefore, the caused is just what is given by the cause, what takes existence from the cause, and the act of giving and taking. It is our mind that considers causality in several aspects compares it with other things, and then creates several notions within it. In fact, there is nothing in reality but the existence of the cause and dependent existence of the caused. That the caused is a dependent being does not mean that it is a being that has its dependency added like an accident; rather it is not other than dependency and need, the cause. It is just a need, so that its relation to its cause is an illuminative one which has only one side, not a categorical relation that is based on two sides. In the light of the analogical gradation of existence, the caused is a weaker degree of existence than its cause which gives existence to it continually. The cause has some perfection that the caused does not have, because its essential need makes it posterior to its cause. The dependent identity of the existence of the caused that is naught but need posits it in a situation at the boundary of existence and non- existence. As soon as this relation is eliminated, it will be in nonexistence, nay it would not be any thing to non-exist. Consequently, being caused produces a kind of limitation that makes the caused tangent to non-existence; the quiddity of the caused is what results from these limitations by the mind.

Based on the above foundations two different interpretations have been derived from Mulla Sadra's statements about his Seddiqin Argument.

a: Mesbah Yazdi (1931- ) has posed the rest of Argument as follow2:

a.1- The criterion of the need of the caused for the cause is just the dependency and copulation of its existence due to the cause namely to the weakness of its existence. As long as there is any weakness in a being, it will be necessarily caused and will need essentially a more complete being without any independence on a cause.

a.2- Different degrees of existence, with the exception of the highest degree that has infinite completeness and absolutely no need and is independent, are just dependency and relation. If that highest degree was not a real existent and did not have truth, then the other degrees would not exist at all; because if it is supposed that they exist without existence of highest degree, it would imply that those degrees one independent and have no need; whereas their existential character is just copulation, dependency and need.

b: M. Motahhary (1921-1981) in another interpretation of the argument has explained the rest of the argument as follow3:

b.1- The truth and reality of existence does not accept non-existence. An existent being in so far as it is an existent being will never be non-existence. Likewise nonexistence 4 in so far as it is non-existence will never be existence. The truth of becoming non-existence in existent beings is the limitation of special existences. It does not mean that existence accepts non-existence which is its contradiction. Non-existence is not a real thing; we comprehend the meaning of non-existence by comparing one degree of existence or its limitations with another degree and its limitations. This is a relative matter.

b.2- The truth of existence without any respect, relation and dependency that may limit and condition it, is equal to perfection, absoluteness, rich, intensity, actuality, unlimited-ness and glory. But, all of deficiency, weakness, conditionality, poverty, possibility, limitation and determination are not from the essence of existence, but from non-existences that are the result of being caused. A being, in so far as it is a limited existence and joined to non-existence, has these qualifications, all of which arise from non existence. The pure truth of existence is opposite to non-existence; the circumstances of non-existence are outside the pure truth of existence and are negated by it.

b.3- The pure truth of existence exists, because it is just existent; non-existence is absurd for it. The truth of existence in its essence, i.e. in being existent and in its reality, is not conditioned by any nor does it depend on any stipulation. Pure existence exists because it is existence, not by any other criterion or by the supposition of the existence of any other thing. Pure existence in its essence is not conditioned by any condition. On the other hand, completeness, glory, intensity, richness, actuality, being unlimited and independence arise from existence, and have no reality but existence. Therefore, the truth of existence in its essence is equal to unconditionality in relation to any other thing, i.e. eternal essential necessity. It is, also, equal to completeness and independence, etc. Consequently, the truth of existence in its essence without any external determination joined to it is equal to the eternal existence of God. Thus, the fundamental reality of existence guides us directly to God, not to any other thing. This does not result in: "God exists": the result is that "truth of existence in essence is not but God". Other realities than God, which are nothing except His acts, effects and manifestations, must be explained by other reasons.

Motahhary's view can be clarified by an example which in some respects clarifies the argument, but is not similar to our subject in all respects. If we suppose that there is only a luminous source that shines by itself as such (note that to be luminous in essence does not require that this source be unique), then will be a light in the world, but all the lights that we can see do not come directly from the source. There are many other things that have light so they can be seen, but all of these lights that come from different things are dependent lights that are the result of reflection and absorption of the light of the source. Since everything has some characteristics like special shape and quality, so its light will be limited in shining and color. Some of these things reflect the light directly from the source, some others reflect this first reflection, and i.e. they reflect the light of source indirectly. Every lighted thing itself can be a source for other things and makes them bright. When the sun shines, some things get light from it directly and shine - like earth and the outsides of buildings. Some other things get their light from these things which can be the cause of the brightness of others, and so on until there may be a very weak light in the most inner parts of a house (for example). So, some things have light directly from the source, some others indirectly with one, two, three or more intermediaries.

It is evident that every thing like B that has its light from other thing like A as its cause, has a weaker degree of light than the light of its cause. If its cause is combined of three colors, the caused can not be combined of other colors. The color of that which is caused can only be equal or less than its cause and certainly of a lesser intensity. For a thing which has light in a caused manner this light must be limited and weaker. The limitation and weakness is essential to a caused light and indicates that it is caused as to light. However, the source that has light as such has no limitation in its shining. In physics every source of light shines spherically in all directions without any differences. The philosophical demonstration of spherical shining is that no direction has advantage over others which would make light shine in one direction stronger than another. If it does not shine in one direction there must be an external obstacle. If its shining is not spherical, there must be some reason for it; but spherical shining does not need any reason; the essence of the source of light is unconditional in this respect.

Therefore, there are two types of lights. The first type is light in itself and from itself, and the second is light by something else (that is dependent light). The latter is really the light from a source; it is a representation of the light of the source which in other things is limited.

Now, it can be asked why a certain thing is a special degree of light with a kind of limitation, but there is no way to ask why the source, which is light in itself not by something else, has light. It is unconditional light without any limitation in essence. Every one - even blind people - that only know and believe that there is light in the external world recognize the two kinds of light: first light-by-something-else and second light by essence. It is evident also that light by essence has light, nay, it is light and others have light and appear by it. What is disputable is why a certain light is a weaker grade of light and is limited by darkness. The answer is in the fact that it is light, not in itself, but by something else and this light is caused. Dependency or being caused is the essence of this light; every light that can be supposed to be a caused light will be caused.

Light is similar to existence in some respects, with the difference that there is nothing other than existence externally. There is no limiting factor other than existence, while in the example of light there are many things with their special properties that cause some limitations for light. There are some other differences including that existence in itself requires unity, while light does not.

The above was an interpretation of Sadra's philosophy from the point of view of two commentators with some more explanation and example. He himself stated the argument as follow in his famous book "al-hikmat al-muta aliyah fi l-asfar al-aqliyyat alarba ah " (“The Transcendent Wisdom Concerning the Four Intellectual Journeys of the Soul”) which is called briefly "Asfar"5 :

"The existence, as it was said before, is one, real and simple truth that there is no difference between its individuals in its essence except in completeness and deficiency and intensity and weakness or by additional matters as in individuals of species. And ultimate of its perfection is what does not belong to something else. Any thing more complete than it is not conceived. Because, every deficient (thing) belongs to something else and needs for being complete. It was explained in anticipation that completeness anticipates to deficiency, and actuality anticipates to potentiality, and existence anticipates to non-existence; and it was also explained that completeness of the thing is just the thing and what is added to it. So, the existence is either needless to something else or need, in its essence, to something else.

The first one is necessary being and it is the pure existence that there is no complete (being) rather than it; and neither non-existence nor deficiency taints it. The second one is what is other than it (and that is one) of its acts or effects. There is no firmness for what is other than it except by it. This is because of what was said previously that the truth of existence has no deficiency; and deficiency is joined to it because of being caused. This is because of the fact that it is not possible for caused to be in excellence of existence the same as its cause. If the existence is not made by a forcible that bring it into existence and make it acquired - as it requires that - it can not be conceived that it has a kind of shortcoming (deficiency) because the truth of existence - as you have known - is simple and unlimited, and have no determination other than pure actuality. If it is not so, then there will be a kind of composition in it or it will have a quiddity other than being existence. It was said previously that if existence is a caused one then it is made in itself as a simple making and its essence will depend essentially on a maker; and its substance and essence will belong to its maker. Therefore, it is proved and is made clear that the existence is either complete in its truth and necessary in its identity or needy in its essence to that and belongs substantially to that. So according to each kind it is proved and explained that the existence of necessary existence is independent identity on every thing other than He. This is what we purposed.”

Mulla Sadra then compared his argument's foundations with the view of "illuminationists" (Ishraqiyyon ) who are a group of Islamic philosophers; then he concludes that his argument and its foundations has the advantages of that philosophy without suffering its deficiencies. Then he answers the two questions of the illuminationists explaining that such questions arise from their inability to conceive the meaning of the analogical gradation of existence and confusion of existence with quiddity.

Afterwards, he says that6 :

"Oh, you that seek (the truth); light of the truth shined from horizon of this statement that strikes your hearing (and it is the fact) that since the truth of existence is a simple matter, without any quiddity and there is not any thing that make it firm (or stand on it) and limit it, it (the truth of existence) is just the Necessary that requires the most complete perfection that does not have extremity in intensity. This is because every other grade of existence in intensity is not the pure truth of existence but it is existence with some shortcoming, and shortcomings of every thing are necessarily something other than it. Shortcomings of existence are not existence itself but it is the lack of existence which is attendant to existence not for existence itself but for being in the next grade and thereafter. So, shortcomings and lacks are essential to the secondaries in so far as they are secondaries. So, the First is in His most complete perfection that has no limitation and nothing can be conceived to be more complete than it. The shortcoming and dependency arise from effusion and creating, and those two will be complete by Him because identities of secondaries belong to the First, and its shortcoming is compensated by its completeness, and its need and dependency is compensated by its richness and independence."

He adds some other explanations about the results and advantages of his argument which will be mentioned later.

The Name of Seddiqin

There are several ways to prove the existence of God. Kant classified these arguments in three kinds: teleological, ontological and cosmological. The cosmological argument, also, has some variations, all of which begin with a fact in the world that is used as a premise for argumentation. Some of these in the view of some philosophers begin with such premises as:

  • Plato: Things move (as can be established by observation)7

  • Aristotle: Things do changes (established by observing movement the most obvious form of change)8

  • Augustine: There are timeless and immutable truths9 .

  • Anselm:

1- Good things exist10 .

2- Some beings are more nearly perfect than others.

3- Something exists.

  • Alfarabi: There exist things whose essence is distinct from their existence11.

  • Avicenna (in one of his arguments): There are possible beings.

  • Thomas Aquinas:

1- Things do move12.

2- There are efficient causes in the world.

3- There are beings that begin to exist and cease to exist.

4- There are different degrees to perfection among beings.

  • Duns Scotus: Some being is produced.13

  • Descartes: I am doubting14.

  • Leibniz: The entire world is changing15.

  • Christian Wolff: The human soul exists16.

  • Taylor: The Universe as a whole does not explain its own existence.

In the teleological arguments the main premise is: "There is a great design in the world." The ontological argument will be discussed later.

The basis of all of these arguments is that our understanding that in fact there is a universe which is limited, incomplete and dependent helps us reach God who is unlimited, complete and independent. How can a weak and defective being have a complete explanation that leads us to the highest being? We can transcend by these arguments, but it is difficult to reach thereby a most high existence. This is the main base for dispute between philosophers and mystics. Junayd Baqdadi, to one of the great mystics when asked about his argument for proving the existence of God answered: "We don't need a candle to light the day17"; the light of candle cannot make the sun clear. So, some philosophers tried to transcend these kinds of argumentation. They are not inclined to begin their arguments from an act or effect of God for proving His existence. For reaching God, mystics did not like to use a rational way of argumentation but offered intuitional knowledge possible through refining the soul. However, some philosophers introduce a rational way and explanation that begins from considering the essence of God which is not other than the mere truth of existence by explanation and argumentation that existence directs us first to God, then to other beings which are his acts and effects.

Avicenna first used this kind of argumentation, and called it Seddiqin Argument (borhani Seddiqin) which means the argument of the sincere men or the truthful ones. He characterized this as a kind of argumentation used by those who are truthful.

Since truthful persons, whose argument is pure truth with no taint of untruthfulness in their argumentation, use this argument it is called the argument of the truthful or Seddiqin Argument. They witness to essence of Truth by an argument that begins from the essence of Truth.

In his book " al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat" he argues18:

"Consider how our statements in proving The First -almighty- and His unity and His acquittance from all deficiencies did not need anything other than existence itself; and there is no need to consider His creatures and acts. Although they are, also, some reasons for His existence, but this kind of demonstration is a stronger one and has a higher position. This means, when we survey the mode of existence we consider that existence, in so far as it is existence, witnesses to the existence of God, then it witnesses to other beings."

He gives evidence from the Qur'an for this kind of demonstration: "Is it not sufficient as regards your Lord that He is a witness over all things?" (Surah 41, ayah 53) He called this judgment the type of the judgment by there who one truthful.

However, Mulla Sadra did not accept Avicenna's Argument as a Seddiqin kind of argumentation, but only that it is near to it in character. Mulla Sadra prefers his argument which he states as follow19:

"Oh! Know that the ways to God are numerous because He has numerous virtues and directions... but some of them are more confident and more honorable and more luminous than others. The strongest and most honorable argument is one in which the intermediate is not really but him, therefore the way toward purpose is just the purpose. This is the way of truthful men who call witness to Him by Him, then call witness by His essence to His attributes and by His attributes to His acts one by one. The others, like theologians and scientists and others, resort for having knowledge of Him and His attributes to intermediating another matter than him, like contingency of quiddity, or coming-into-existence of creatures or motion of bodies or something else. Those are, also, reasons for His essence and evidences for His attributes, but this way is firmer and more honorable. It is indicated in the Divine Book (Qur'an) to those ways by his -almighty- words: 'We will soon show them our signs in the Universe and in their own souls, until it will become quite clear to them that it is the Truth.' And to this way by His -almighty- words: 'Is it not sufficient as regards your Lord that He is a witness over all things?' This is because those who love God regard the existence and consider its truth and know that it is the origin of every thing, then they conclude - by considering it- that it is, due to the origin of its truth, Necessary Being. But possibility and need and being caused and others join to it not because of its truth in so far as it is truth, but because of deficiencies and lacks which are out of the origin of His truth. Afterwards, by considering what is requirement of necessity and possibility they conclude the unity of His essence and His attributes. Then, they conclude from His attributes to quality of His acts and effects. This is the way of prophets as it is in His -almighty- words: 'say this is my way, I call (people) to God by insight.' "

Avicenna's Seddiqin Argument:

The proof for the existence of God is proposed in three of Avicenna's famous philosophical books viz. Al-Shifa' and Al-Negat and Al-Isharat wa-l-Tanbihat. In the first two books his argument is shaped in a cosmological manner. Although Avicenna's argument in the first book is brief, it depends on his previous detailed philosophical essays in the book. In Al-Shifa', after a careful survey, he explains his argument based on the character of necessary and contingent being and the four kinds of cause; agent, material, final and formal. He notes that the agent causes can not continue one after the other ad infinitum, there must be a cause that is not caused which is necessary being. Then he argues for the finitude of the three other causes one by one. All four causes must end in an absolute cause that is distinct from all beings and is the origin of the existence of all beings. These propositions seem to be the major premise of his proof for the existence of God. Although he does not propose directly his minor premise that there are some beings in reality that have the character of being caused and need formal, agent, final and material cause, it can be understood from his writings in this book that he assumes this minor. By adding this minor to that major he concludes the reality or existence of necessary being. By this minor, his argument constitutes a cosmological type of proof for the existence of God.

Afterwards, he argues that necessary being, in the rational division of existence, does not have any cause and contingent being is a caused being. Then he elaborates the characteristics of necessary being: unity, simplicity and inchangability. All of these are worked out by reasoning on the meaning of necessary being20.

Avicenna's argument in his second book, Al-Negat21, is nearer to his Seddiqin argument. This argument begins with the minor that "there is no doubt that there are existent beings." By this fact he attempts to prove the existence of necessary being. Then he adds the major premise that "every being is either necessary or possible. If it is necessary it is just our purpose. And if it is possible we will explain that every possible being must depend entirely in existence on a necessary being."

In this argument, Avicenna begins with a real fact in external world that there are some beings that have existence. He does not explain how we obtain this certainty or how we

can divide existence into necessary or possible? Is this division in the concept of existence that we have by a universalization in our mind, or it is in the real existent being? If this division is in the concept of existence, then it can prove the existence of necessary being in the mind, but it is difficult to conclude from existence that is gained from some contingent beings and by a generalization that the real existence may be a necessary one. If this division is in real existence we must know firstly that there are both contingent beings and necessary being externally by a kind of knowledge. If it is so, then there is no need for demonstration; because we know in advance that there is a necessary being. So, the term "if it is necessary it is just our purpose" will be meaningless, because it proves just what we first assumed. There is no need for the rest of the demonstration either, because the demonstration for the existence of necessary being from contingent beings is without any utility because it is also assumed that we know the existence of the necessary being. The only result of this second division (viz. of real existent beings into necessary or contingent) is, after knowing that there are contingent being and necessary being, the reliance of all those contingent beings on that necessary being that we are sure of their existence.

Therefore this is not an argument for the existence of God or Necessary Being, but for the dependence of contingent beings on Necessary Being and it explains the kind of relation between those two kinds of existence.

However, in another respect the argument has a more logical meaning.

Avicenna may intend to divide not existence, but our knowledge about existence. He means that if somebody knows that there is necessary being externally then there is no need to argue for the existence of necessary being because it is known certainly. But how can one know directly the existence of Necessary Being; who has this knowledge? These questions may be answered if we do not restrict knowledge to sense and empirical knowledge or knowledge gained indirectly in a rational manner. One can contend that he has a direct knowledge by intuition. This is the claim of mystics and gnosis. Some mystics believe not only in intuition and direct knowledge of God, but also in the fact that there is nothing externally (and internally) but God.

Avicenna, then, says that if anybody does not know the existence of Necessary Being directly and he knows the existence of contingent being, then he can know the existence of necessary being by a rational argumentation that he will propose later. He has explained previously meaning of necessary and contingent being in detail22:

"Necessary existence is the existence that if assumed non-existent, causes absurdity; and the contingent being is a being that if assumed non-existent does not cause absurdity."

As was said before, this division can be neither in the meaning of existence nor in the reality of existence. This division must be in the ascription of existence to a being. If we compare existence with a being, what kinds of ascription can be set in this comparison? Some beings can have existence essentially while others can have it accidentally. The first is called necessary being, the second is called possible being. For example, if you see wet clothes and say "these clothes are wet"; you can compare wetness with the clothes. You see that wetness is not necessary for the clothes; the clothes may or may not be wet; wetness is not in the truth of clothes. But in the proposition "The water is wet", if we compare wetness with the truth of water, it can be known that water has wetness essentially; it is absurd that water may be without wetness. Wetness is necessary for water both in reality and in the mind. Therefore, wetness is essential for the truth of water while it is not essential for the truth of clothes. Although wetness is not essential for the truth of clothes, it is necessary for wet clothes to be wet because it is wet. But this necessity differs from the previous necessity that is ascribed to wetness of water. This wetness is necessary for these clothes while they are not necessary for the clothes in so far as it is clothes. This necessity does not come from clothes-ness but from another thing that has made this wet clothes wet, namely, water, while the necessity of wetness for the water does not come from another thing but from the essence of water itself. Therefore, there are two kinds of necessity, necessity by essence and necessity by something else. If something that has necessity by something else is considered from its essence, then that attribute (like wetness) will be not a necessary but a possible attribute.

Existence, like wetness, can be compared and ascribed to a being; this ascription can be either contingent or necessary and is either by essence or by something else. If existence is compared with a being it may have existence essentially and necessarily or contingently. For example when existence is ascribed to a certain existent book, it has existence possibly in so far as it is a book and the essence of book does not require its existence. But it has existence necessarily in so far as it is an existent book, but this necessity does not come from its essence while another existent being can have existence both necessarily and by essence. Therefore, possible being in one respect is just necessary being by something else in another respect, while it differs basically from necessary being by essence.

The division of existence either in the mind or in the reality into necessary and possible may be accounted as arbitrary or without result. But if we survey the kind of attribution of existence to existent being (like wetness to wet beings), then the division will be logically true.

In "Al-Negat", Avicenna, does not refer directly to his intention in this division. Although he distinguishes necessary by essence and by something else after defining the necessary being and possible being, but this precise attention to the kinds of division and his choice is not mentioned in this book. But it can be understood indirectly that he has attended the last division. By this explanation we want to show that the argument for the existence of God introduced in this book is not in a cosmological type of argumentation and it is near to the Seddiqin type of argumentation explained directly in his third book.

In "Al-Negat", his argument continues as follow after his first explanation:

"There is no doubt that there is existent being, and every existence is either necessary or possible. If it is necessary it is just our purpose. And if it is possible we will explain that every possible being must depend ultimately its existence on a necessary being."

Therefore, if he wants to argue for the existence of necessary being he must demonstrate that the existence of a possible being accepted as an existent being depends on the existence of necessary being, and hence that the existence of necessary being must be accepted too; the existence of possible being refers to the existence of necessary being. For this demonstration he first sets forth two introductory arguments23:

"It is not possible that, in one time, for every possible-being-in-essence to have possiblebeingin essence causes ad infinitum.” and "It is not possible, also, that it has finitude number causes and each of them can be possiblebeingin-essence but it is necessary by another so that it makes a circle."

He proves these two statements in details and demonstrates his rejection of every assumed way for another answer to those statements. Then he argues that every possible being must be an existent coming-into-being or occurs in existence, that it must be conserved after coming into being; and that it must have a conserving cause by this statement that24:

"The conservation of coming-into-being- existence and its existence after coming-into-being is because of a cause that extends its existence; and its existence in essence is unnecessary .”

And

"The caused beings need a cause for conservation of their existence."

After these introductory statements he concludes that25:

"A necessary being must exist, because possible beings, if they exist and their existence is conserved, must have a cause for the conservation of their existence. The cause for comingintobeing of that being can be either the cause for conserving it in existence or another one. But all of them must end, undoubtedly, to a necessary being, because we explained previously that the causes can not continue ad infinitum and can not make a circle."

This was Avicenna's argument in "Al-Negat" that we set forth briefly, but he does not introduce it as a "Seddiqin" kind of argumentation in this book.

In his third book "Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat" he sets forth his "Seddiqin Argument" and calls it such. He proposed his argument in the second chapter of this book viz. Theology, in the fourth section (Namat) "The Existence and Its Causes". In this section, first of all, he argues that existent beings do not restrict sensible beings. Then he distinguishes the cause of essence and the cause of existence. According to him, sometimes, we know and understand the meaning of something like triangle, then we doubt its existence in reality. In this case, the cause of essence of a triangle exists, but the cause of its real existence does not exist. He emphasizes that he wants to survey the cause of existence. Then he proposes his argument for the existence of Necessary Being as follow which will be explained afterwards26:

"[1] Every existent being, when it is respected in so far as its essence and without any other respect, is either a being whose existence is necessary or it is not so. If it is necessary, then it will be the Truth by its essence, and it is everlasting.

And if it is not necessary, it is not permitted to say it is impossible after it is assumed as an existent being. But if, in respect to its essence, a stipulation is allied to it, like either stipulation of non-existence of its cause, it will become impossible, or stipulation of existence of its cause it will become necessary. And, if it is not allied a stipulation to it, neither presence of cause nor non-existence of it, it will remain for it in its essence the third matter, and it is possibility; and it is in respect of its essence, a thing that is neither necessary nor impossible. Therefore, every being is either necessary being in its essence or possible being due to its essence."

"[2] [Every thing] that its truth in itself is possible, does not become existent being by its essence; because its existence by its essence is not prior to its non-existence, in so far as it is possible being. If one of those two becomes prior, then it must be because of either presence of a thing or absence of it. Therefore, existence of every possible being is from another one."

"[3] That [the need of possible being to another being] can be either succession ad infinitum [or vicious circle that is evidently impossible, or end to a necessary being that is our purpose; if it is an infinite series,] then every one of this series will be possible in its essence. And [since] the whole belongs to those [ones], therefore it is also unnecessary, and will be necessary by another one. We must add some explanation to this."

"[4] Every whole that every one of its unit, is caused, demands a cause that is out of its units. This is because:

"either it does not demand any cause at all, then it will be necessary and uncaused; and how can it be so, while it is necessitated by its units? Or it demands a cause and this cause is all of units, then it will be caused if its essence; because that whole and the all is one thing. Or it demands and it is all in the meaning of every one, then the whole does not necessitate by it. Or it demands and it is a part or one of the units, then [it is not possible too, because] a part of units is not prior to another part when every one of them is [also] a caused; because its cause is prior to that [i.e. to be cause of the whole]. Only one assumption remains: the whole demands an external cause that is out of its units."

"[5] Every cause of a whole that is other than its units, is firstly the cause of those units then [the cause of] the whole. If it is not so, then the units do not need it. Therefore, the whole that is completed by its units does not need it. If it is assumed that a thing [external cause] is the cause of a part of the units [not all of them and] not another part, then it [i.e. that external cause] will not be the cause of the whole absolutely."

"[6] Every whole that is arranged from causes and causeds successively, and contains an uncaused, will be an ultimate side; because if it is an intermediate then it will be caused."

"[7] It was made clear that every series that is arranged from causes and causeds -either finite or infinite-, when there is not except caused beings in it, needs an external cause, but it conjoins inescapably an ultimate side. It was also made clear that, if there is a being that is not caused then it will be entire side and ultimate. Therefore, every series ends at necessary being in essence."

This was what Avicenna said in his Seddiqin Argument. It needs explanation and more classifications in order to become clearer.

His argument runs in following titles:

(1) The division of existence into possible existence and necessary existence.

(2) The need of possible existence for another being for its existence.

(3) This other being is either necessary or possible existence; in the second assumption it constitutes either a vicious circle, an infinite succession, or ends in a necessary being.

(4) The infinite succession of an existential series is not possible because:

a) The series as a whole needs a cause.

b) This cause can not be all of those possible beings or one of them or a part of them, therefore:

c) It must be out of series It results that:

  1. this cause of the series is the cause of those possible beings one by one before being the cause of the series.

  2. This cause must be ultimate.

d) This cause can not be possible being, because it is ultimate; therefore:

(5) Every series of cause and caused -either finite or infinite- must end ultimately at a necessary being.

(6) The existence either is necessary or end ultimately at a necessary existence.

We return to each of these titles to see what can be understood from Avicenna's intention:

(1) As it was seen in his previous argument -in the Al-Negat-, the division of existence in reality or mind constitutes some difficulties for the proof of the existence of a necessary being. But the comparison of existence to an existent being and surveying whether it is necessary or possible, does not have those difficulties. We saw that he did not pose his criteria of this division in his previous book, Al-Negat, but he declared clearly his

criteria in the book, Al-Esharat wa al-Tanbihat. He said that if we survey existence in essence of every existent being only in so far as it is existent being -not in other respect-, it can be either necessary in essence or possible in essence.

This is because it can not be impossible existence because it is assumed to be an existent being; and if existence is in its essence so that it necessitates existence in its essence like wetness for water, it will be necessary being in and from its essence; and if it does not require in its essence existence and non-existence it will be possible existence in its essence which will exist by its cause and will be non-existence without its cause.

Avicenna did not survey existence in a special existent being that has existence certainly but he compared existence with the essence of every existent being in so far as it is existent being, like when you survey redness with the essence of apple in so far as it is apple. It is clear that redness is not in the essence of apple, although a special red apple is certainly red.

In this division he did not take account of special beings, but he respected every being in so far as it was an existent being. Therefore, no special being -either one or many or whole- is the base of this argument so that this special imperfect being helps us to reach the existence of most perfect being, viz. God. Because of this fact Avicenna named his argument Seddiqin. He begins with existence and its kinds in every assumed existent being without any regard to special existent beings. He says at the end of this chapter of Al-Esharat wa al-Tanbihat that27:

"Consider, how our statements in proving the First -Almighty- and His unity and his acquaintance from all deficiencies did not need anything other than existence itself, and there is no need to consider His creatures and acts. Although they are, also, some reasons for His existence, but this kind of demonstration is a stronger one and have a higher position. This means, when we survey the models of existence we consider that existence, in so far as it is existence, calls witness to the existence of God, then it calls witness to other beings."

(2) Since possible being does not have its existence from its essence, therefore, it must have it from another being; like when you say, since clothes do not require wetness in their essence, a wet clothes must have wetness from another source than its essence.

Avicenna argues that: 'Since the possible being, in so far as it is possible, does not require existence, and existence is not preferred over non-existence in its essence, therefore, if one

of them (existence or non-existence) is preferred to another, it must be because of the presence of another being or its absence.'

(3) That other being can be either necessary or possible. If it is necessary we will reach our purpose that there is a necessary being that has its existence through its essence. If it is possible it will either end at a necessary being, or will depend on another possible being in a vicious circle, or will continue ad infinitum. Avicenna explains the third assumption. He tries to reject infinite succession; therefore he concludes the first assumption that there is a necessary being. Since the rejection of the second assumption that there is a vicious circle is clear for him, because it requires priority of a being to itself which is absurd, therefore he does not explain it directly; his argument for rejecting infinite succession is set up in a way that it is also an argument for rejecting a vicious circle.

(4) For rejecting infinite succession, he demonstrates that the series of possible beings as a whole -either finite or infinite- needs also a cause to be a series; and this cause can not be an internal one in the series, therefore it must be out of the series that has been gathered of all possible beings. This outer cause can not be anything other than necessary being because:

a: If the series does not need any cause at all, since it exists or has existence, it must be a necessary being that is an uncaused existence. But it is impossible that the series can be a necessary existence because it needs its units to be a series. Therefore it needs a cause.

b: However, this cause cannot be either all of its units, or one of them or some of them. Since all of the units is not other than the series, therefore, it can not be its cause because it will be the cause of itself, which is absurd because than it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. The cause of the series cannot be, also, every one of the units; because every one does not require the existence of all (otherwise the series of all will exist by the existence of every one). The cause cannot be one of the units because since we assumed that every unit is possible and is a caused being without any difference from another one in so far as it is possible and caused, then every one that is assumed as cause of the series has certainly a cause and its cause prefers to it to which would have priority in being the cause of the series; therefore no one can be the cause of the series.

c: Since the cause of the series can be neither all of its units, nor every one of them, nor one of them, therefore, it must be out of the series and it must be absolutely the cause of the series therefore:

  1. This cause must be, firstly, the cause of every one in the series. For proving this statement he demonstrates by Reductio ad absurdum in the following statement that if every one does not need this cause then the whole that is constructed from all of those units will not need the cause of the series because if all of them exist, the whole and the series will exist without any need for that cause, while it is proved that the series does need a cause. On the other hand, if some of those do not need it, then the cause of the series will not be the cause of the series absolutely, but it can be the cause of a part of them not of all of them as a whole.

  2. The cause of the series which is outside of the series must be on the ultimate side of the series because were it an intermediate it would be caused one, for an intermediate cause is one that is both the cause of a being and at the same time caused of another being.

d: Since all possible beings are gathered in the series, the cause of the series is not in the series but it is out of the series as its ultimate side; therefore it can not be a possible being.

(5) Every series of cause and caused or possible beings -either finite or infinite- needs a cause that is not in the series and which it must be a necessary existence.

(6) Therefore, either the existence is necessary, or it ends ultimately at a necessary being.

This was the Seddiqin Argument in Avicenna's writings. Thereafter, he set forth some arguments for the unity of Necessary Being and proves its attributes and acts, one after one. As he has emphasized at the end of this chapter of the book Al-Esharat wa al-Tanbihat, in this argument he does not use any special and incomplete fact to prove the existence of God, but erects his argument only on the existence in an absolute sense without pointing to any special existent being.

As seen, Avicenna's Seddiqin Argument did not depend on special finite fact in the world. It was good to set forth an argument which leads us first to God then to other beings as His acts. But the power of his argument have may be doubted, especially his argument for rejecting an infinite succession of causes, though he had proposed stronger arguments for this rejection in other places, specially be famous "The intermediate part and ultimate side" argument.

The Advantages of Mulla Sadra's Seddiqin Argument over Avicenna's:

First of all, it must be noted that Avicenna had two kinds of argumentation for the existence of God, the first one is a cosmological type of argumentation that begins with the fact that there are some possible beings in external world. This is what has been known in Western philosophy as Avicenna's argument for the existence of God. The second one is a Seddiqin type of argumentation. Here he did not apply a certain fact of beings, but analyzed existence without any specification. Then he divided it in a rational way into necessary and possible, and concluded that it is either necessary or possible. If the existence is the first one it is just his purpose that there is a necessary being, and if it is the second one it is obligated to reach a necessary existence because of the absurdity of infinite succession in this matter. In view of its commentators the Seddiqin Argument as posed by Mulla Sadra has the following advantages over Avicenna's Seddiqin Argument:

1- In Avicenna's philosophy the argument begins with the concept of existence not in so far as it is a concept but in so far as it is a concept about reality; but in Sadra's philosophy the discussion is about the truth of existence that is fundamentally real, not its notion. In the first one, the division is in concept of existence while in the second one the division is in the reality and truth of existence.

2- Avicenna's intention of possibility is "quidditive possibility" while Mulla Sadra differentiated between "quidditive possibility" and "ontological poverty" and used "ontological poverty" in his argument. The concept of existent being in the view of Avicenna is ascribed to both necessary being and existent quiddities, while in Sadra's philosophy the truth of existence does not include quiddities that are only mentally posited.

The truth of the highest degree of existence is independent by essence, in the lower degree it is a relation or dependency on Him by essence.

3- Since in Avicenna's philosophy "quidditive possibility" is discussed, he needed to demonstrate the absurdity of infinite succession in proving the existence of God, while in Sadra's view in which the ontological poverty of limited beings is mentioned there is no need to demonstrate the absurdity of infinite succession in Seddiqin Argument. After proposing his argument Mulla Sadra himself spoke about this advantage28:

"This way that we measured is firmest and most honorable and simplest one so that the disciple of Him does not need any intermediate thing other than Him for having a knowledge about His essence and attributes and acts; and there is, also, no need to annul infinite succession and circular causality..."

Some commentators of Sadra's philosophy themselves held and ascribe this view to him, that not only does this argument not need to rule out infinite succession, but itself is a proof for the impossibility of infinite succession29.

4- By the Seddiqin Argument of Mulla Sadra, the unity of Necessary Being can be proved directly, and the argument can also be an argument for the unity of God, while in Avicenna's argument the unity must be proved by another argument. As Sadra demonstrated, existence is one truth that has analogical gradation in intensity and weakness. Hence, the multiplicity of existence arises from weakness of existence, whereas in its essence existence has no deficiency and hence no multiplicity in its infinitude. Mulla Sadra said at the end of his argument30:

"Therefore the existence of Necessary Being is proved by this argument. It is also proved by this argument His unity. Because the existence is one truth that due to its essence has no taint of deficiency, and no multiplicity can conceived in his infinitude."

5- Sadra's Seddiqin Argument gives a better description about both the attributes of God and the relation between Him and His creatures. His explanation will be presented later at the end of this book.

The Development of the Seddiqin Argument

The Seddiqin Argument was defined as an argument that proves the existence of God and His attributes by a meditation in the truth of existence. Since this kind of argumentation has more advantages than other kinds of reasoning, some philosophers had tried to state it in other ways. Mehdi Ashtiani in his book "Ta'liqah Ala Sharh al-Manzumah fi al-Hikmat " enumerated nineteen statements of the Seddiqin Argument as posed by several philosophers31. However, this argument obtained a new and promising articulation by Mulla Sadra. After him, two philosophers developed his Seddiqin argument and posed it in a new form. Here, we only explain its two statements by Sabzavari (17971828) and Tabatabaii (1902-1981).

Sabzevari

Sabzavari has a commentary on Sadra's famous book, Asfar. He stated his argument in his commentary on Sadra's explanation of the Seddiqin Argument32. He noted that all of the foundations that are used by Mulla Sadra for his Seddiqin Argument are not necessary for proving the existence of God, although they are useful for the result of this argument, viz. for proving the attributes of, God and explaining the kind of relation between God and creatures. These, however, are not necessary in the basic argument.

Moreover these foundations also make proving the existence of God difficult and need to be stated with great precision in order to be understood. As was explained, the Seddiqin Argument in Sadra's philosophy is based on some foundations like (1) the fundamental reality of existence, (2) the analogical gradation of existence and (3) the simplicity of existence; the argument itself is explained by a meditation on the truth of existence.

Sabzavari posed his argument by using only the first foundation of Sadra's argument i.e. the fundamental reality of existence. Therefore his argument is shorter than Sadra's argument. His argument run as follows:

After admitting fundamental reality of existence it can be said that the truth of existence is just the external and the fundamental truth of reality while quiddity is its function and representation. Hence quidditive existent beings are not that truth itself, but a kind of manifestation of it. So, the truth of existence itself is an absolute truth, not a limited or conditioned truth. It would be absurd for this truth, though not for its manifestations, to accept non-existence because every thing that has a contradictory and opposite does not accept its contradictory and opposite. So, the mere truth of existence rejects non-existence essentially (note that this is not conditioned by 'as long as its essence remain', because if this rejection is conditioned by the term 'as long as its essence remains' the mere truth of existence will not be a mere and absolute fact). Therefore, the mere truth of existence is necessary being by essence; and this necessity is not an essential (logical) necessity, but an eternal necessity (or essential philosophical necessity). So, that truth of existence is essentially necessary being.

The main character of Sabzavari's argument is the distinction between "existence" and "what has existence". We can easily have the notion of existence by abstracting the meaning of existence from all existent beings; but, then, what we grasp is its notion not its reality, whereas what he referred to as the truth of existence was that of which existent beings are representations. They are limited and bounded existences. What is meant by the truth of existence is that reality (not notion) that in other beings is bounded is limited. This truth in other beings is the same while its limitations or boundaries are different. If the reality of existence is attended in a certain existent being, its truth will not be that other beings also represent it, but it will be a manifestation of that truth which is represented in that being (indeed, that being is a representation of it). If we can eliminate those limitations (that are different in each being) then we can attend to that truth merely and absolutely. The conception of existence in its absolute meaning is far from the mere truth of existence. The mere truth of existence is represented in existent beings which because of their limitations generate quiddities in the mind. The mind abstracts from beings the notion of existence as a concept which is different from quiddities and adds or ascribes to quiddity in the mind; then the mind conceives it as absolute meaning. Although this absolute meaning in some way refers to a fact in reality, it is far from that mere truth.

It must be noted that existence is a fact that is different from other meanings and realities.

Some problems arise from comparing existence to quiddity. If we consider existence as a quiddity that, in some viewpoints, is the same in the external and the internal, then it will immediately lose its truth. Because of this fact, some Islamic philosophers have this opinion that the problem in proving the existence of God is not in affirming His existence, but in conceiving what is meant by God. They believe that the existence of God is evident and does not need a proof, because it is evident that existence exists. The difficulty is in conceiving the truth of existence, since the mere truth of existence is not a meaning in the mind (as are quiddities), so we should not try to bring it into our mind, but must go toward it. Therefore, they do not view all rational arguments for the existence of God as proofs for His existence, but as attention and notes focusing on His existence.

Sabzavari's interpretation of Seddiqin Argument requires a profound concentration on the mere truth of existence in order to be understood.

Tabatabaii

Sabzavari's argument made Seddiqin Argument shorter than that offered by Mulla Sadra, because there was no need for analogical gradation of existence and its simplicity. The only foundation for Sabzavari's argument was affirmation of the fundamental reality of existence.

However, Tabatabaii made the argument shorter even than Sabzavari, for in Tabatabaii's argument there is no need for any philosophical foundation even for the fundamental reality of existence. His argument can be posed as a first subject in philosophy. He posed his argument in his notes on Sadra's explanation of Seddiqin Argument in the Asfar33. Tabatabaii's argument can be explained as follow:

Before discussing about external reality (that it is existence or quiddity), the reality is accepted. This argument begins with the truth of reality. First of all, it is inescapable for every intellectual to accept reality. Reality cannot be proved, because it is essentially evident. Tabatabaii did not assert that reality is just what we conceive, but he argues that everybody believes that there is something real externally, whatsoever it is, regardless to its specifications or numeral characteristics. If we try to prove the truth of reality we have confessed previously that there are a speaker, a listener, an argument and a relation between premises and result. All of these are realities that are supposed in advance. Therefore, the fundamental reality - in general - is evident and cannot be proved.

This truth of reality can not decline and does not accept any kind of disappearing; and rejects essentially annulment. Because, if this reality in every condition or stipulation or time or state declines, then there must be really a time or state or condition that this reality has declined in that situation. So, we must accept some other realities by rejection of reality. Even if we do not state those conditions and say that this reality may decline and become non-reality, we also affirm the reality, because if it declines really and truly then there is a reality and its declination is a reality; and if it does not decline really and we imagine that it declines then the truth of reality will remain and will not disappear. Therefore, it is not possible that the truth of reality declines or accepts nihility even in supposition. Everything that supposition of its declination requires its existence, its nihility must be essentially absurd.

If its nihility is absurd then its existence and truth must be essentially necessary. This essential necessity is a philosophical one (not a logical one), and is just eternal necessity. Therefore, there is an essential necessary being which is real in eternal necessity. In studying every being, we understand that neither one of them nor all of them are the truth of reality, because they can be supposed as non-existence while it is not possible to suppose necessary being in this argument as non-real. Those are not the absolute reality but they have reality by that truth of reality. (The reality may not also be the matter of the universe, because it is possible to suppose it as non-real in a special situation. The truth of reality is what is real even in case of supposing all other beings as non-existence). All beings that have reality need it essentially for their reality. They need it to be real and their realities or existences depend on it.

Tabatabaii continued that it became obvious for those who concentrate on this argument that the existence of essentially necessary being is necessary in human belief and arguments that prove his existence are, in fact, give special attentions and notes.

Like Sabzavari's argument, in this argument the difficulty is not in proving the existence of God, but in perceiving the truth of the reality which is called God, for it is difficult to separate "reality" from "what has reality". However, Tabatabaii identifies the reality of existence as God (not God the as reality of existence). His argument needs a precise meditation not about his proof, but about what he intends by the reality of existence that is different from those which have it but are not just it.

Notes:

1- We use the words 'boundaries with non-existence' in this argument, but this is not intended to mean a real thing in such wise that non-existence is a thing and the boundaries is a line between the two things, i.e. existence and non-existence. This meaning is quite rejected, because there is nothing but existence. Non-existence is bereft of reality because it is non-existence. We use boundaries of existence and non-existence figuratively, whereas there is only existence with some limitations that can be grasped by comparing one existent being with another.

2 - Mesbahi Yazdi, Amoozeshi Falsafeh II, pp. [^342]:

3 - See footnotes of M. Motahhari in Osoole Falsafeh wa Raveshe Realism IV (The Principles of Philosophy and Method of Realism), pp. 117-[^124]:

4 - See note No. [^1]:

5 - Mulla Sadra, Asfar VI, pp.13, 14, [^15]:

6 - Ibid., pp. 23, [^24]:

7 - References to Plato are taken from Plato: the Collected Dialogues 8 - Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, ch. [^8]:

9 - Augustine, On Free Will II, 1-[^15]:

10 - Anselm, Monologion, chs. 1-[^3]:

11 - See Armand Maurer, A History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 95-[^97]:

12- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1,2,[^3]:

13 - Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, pp. 39-[^56]:

14 - Descartes, Meditations III 15 - Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, pp. 32-39

.

16 - See James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy, pp. 137-[^138]:

17 - Mohammad Lahiji, Sharhi Golshani Raz, p. [^69]:

18 - Avicenna, Al-Esharat wa Al-Tanbihat, vol. III P. [^66]:

19 - Mulla Sadra, Asfar VI , pp. 12-[^14]:

20 - Avicenna, Al-Shifa' (Al-Elahiyyat), pp. 37-43, ed. by Ebrahim Madkoor, (Qom, Iran Najafi Library).

22 - Avicenna, Al-Negat, p. [^566]: "The Chapter about the Proof of Necessary Being", ed. by Daneshpazhooh, (Tehran: University of Tehran).

23 - Ibid., p. [^546]:

24 - Ibid., p. [^567]:

25 - Ibid., p. [^571]:

26 - Avicenna, Al-Esharat wa Al-Tanbihat, vol. III, pp. 18-[^28]:

27 - Ibid., p.[^66]:

28 - Mulla Sadra, Asfar VI, pp. 25-26

29 - See A. Javadi Amoli, Sharhe Hekmat Mota'alieh Asfar Arba'ah, sec.1, vol. IV, p. 134, and M.T. Mesbahi Yazdi Amoozeshe, Falsafeh, PP. 79-80, [^343]:

30 - Mulla Sadra, Asfar VI, pp. 24-[^25]:

31 - Mehdi Ashtiani, "Ta'liqah Ala Sharh al-Manzumah fi al-Hikmat", pp. 488-[^497]:

32 - See footnotes of pages 16 and 17 of Asfar VI, written by Sabzavari.

33 - See footnotes of pages 14 and 15 of Asfar VI, written by Tabatabaii.