Mulla Sadra's Seddiqin Argument For the Existence of God

Chapter III: The Differences between the Ontological Argument and the Seddiqin Argument

The ontological argument has a strange history. On the one hand, it attempts to show that the proof for the existence of God is an evident fact which does not need to use a real fact in the external world to help us reach to the existence of God. On the other hand, some philosophers like Arthur Schopenhauer assert1 that the ontological argument is a "charming joke," a kind of ontological sleight of hand, because it assumes the existence of God and then pretends to arrive at it in the conclusion: the rabbit was in the hat all the while. Or, to use Schopenhauer's own illustration, the chicken was already in the egg the theist was brooding over.

Whatsoever the ontological argument will be, it is an argument that attempts to prove the existence of God through a scrutiny of the meanings of existence and necessary existence without any reliance on a special fact in the world, like motion, contingency, etc. The conclusion is that the very meaning of necessary existence or most complete being necessitates its real existence. Has this argument been successful or not? The answer needs another survey that is not related to this research, but the attempt to prove the existence of God not through a special incomplete fact but through the meaning of God makes this argument an attractive one. This means that the argument is so evident that everybody, even a fool, must accept it2. Therefore, the argument makes the bridge between faith and reason to be very short, not a bridge which is incomplete and weak in which poor facts make us to reach to a most complete being, nor in the least from believing in Him. St. Anselm, himself, did not want to introduce an argument for believing in God, but an argument for manifesting his belief. He sees his endeavor in ontological argument as the following3:

"I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe, -that unless I believed, I should not understand."

These beautiful words can be said only through an ontological attitude, not through cosmological argumentation.

The Seddiqin Argument seems, firstly, to be an argument like the ontological one and perhaps as another kind of this argument; but, in spite of some similarities, it differs from the ontological argument. The Seddiqin Argument is similar in that it tries not relying on incomplete, weak, poor facts in the world to prove the existence of the most complete being and to make the argument for proving His existence more evident than other beings that are His effects. Yet it differs from the ontological argument in the following ways:

1-The ontological argument begins with the meaning of existence, then the meaning of necessary existence all of which are conceptions in the mind; then it endeavors to make this meaning real outside the mind by some reasons. But in the Seddiqin Argument begins with the reality of existence, not its notion; and it continues by searching in this reality. In other words, the pyramid of existence in the ontological argument is built in the mind then the head of this pyramid - the necessary existence- comes out of the mind and is projected into the reality; in contrast in the Seddiqin Argument this pyramid is a building in reality; stands on its head, which is also real working in the very reality of existence rather than its notion, and its accuracy in the distinction between the notion and the reality of existence have vaccinated this argument against most of the criticisms that have created troubles for the ontological arguments.

2- The problem in the ontological argument is a problem of judgment, while in the Seddiqin Argument the problem is to some extent a problem of presentation and perception. In all kinds of ontological argument that have been proposed in the view of Anselm, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hartshorn, Malkolm and Plantinga the conception and meaning of God or the Necessary Being is assumed by a definition, and then the argument begins to prove His existence and gives a judgment for its listener about the reality of this meaning. But, the Seddiqin Argument tries to provide a good presentation of God by some philosophical surveys into the reality of existence that is important for having a good perception from what is intended from God. If someone can have this presentation (that may need some intuitional knowledge), then the judgment about its reality will be clear and evident without any difficulty in proving it. Therefore, the problem is to give a correct and suitable conception of God through the fundamental reality of existence and its analogical gradation and copulative and independent existences and possible poverty in caused beings and so on. After these presentational surveys there is no problem in having a judgment about its existence that had been made clear through previous presentations.

That is why some Muslim philosophers believe that4 "The problem of proving the existence of God lies at the level of presentation, not of judgment. In other words, what is difficult is for the mind to have a correct presentation of that conception; when it reaches this purpose its judgment will be easy. This contrasts to in other types of knowledge where the presentation of the meanings and conceptions is easy, but the difficulty is in the judgment and affirmation.

In the ontological arguments the proposition that must be proved is: "God or necessary existence exists", but in the Seddiqin Argument the proposition to be affirmed or proved is: "The pure existence or reality is God and others are His representations." It means a conversion in the proposition, where the subject and the predicate have changed their places.

3- The purpose of those scholars who developed Seddiqin Arguments was not only to present an argument for proving the existence of God, but also to give a suitable view of the relation between Him and His creatures. This relation is not a "categorical one" that stands on two sides like the relation between subject and predicate which are two different things, but an "illuminative relation" that stands on one side, the other side being only this relation. According to ontological and cosmological arguments, God is a necessary existence that must exist necessarily; other existent beings are contingent existences whose existence depends on that necessary existence. In this view there are two kinds of being: one of which depends on the other; this is a categorical relation. But, In the Seddiqin Argument this relation is an illuminative one. We explained previously in the section "the types of existence” the difference between "independent existence" and "copulative existence". It is said that the relation between cause (not preparatory cause) and its caused is a copulative one, and that the caused is not a being that needs a cause but is just need. Let me repeat that paragraph:

It will be discussed in the section "cause and caused" that the need of the caused to the cause is in the essence of the caused, and this requires that the caused is nothing but need, its essence stands only by the existence of the cause, and it has no independence in existence. This necessitates that the existence of the caused must be copulative in relation to its cause by attention to this relation. But, with relation to itself and by attention to itself alone, it will be an independent existence. So, the type of existence of the caused is due to our attention. From one aspect it is copulative, and from another it is independent.

In this view the relation between God and other beings is like a thing and its shadow, or like a man and his picture, one is real and the other is relation to that real5. In other words, other beings are representations of God. He is the real existence and the others show Him before showing themselves. Tabatabaii has a beautiful analogy to show the relation of other beings to God6:

"Suppose: you are sitting in a quiet place with a tranquil mind, and you are focusing your attention on this moving world and regarding it and looking at every up and down, inner and outer, small and big thing in it and gloating this world. It is a boundless space...

Let's come nearer: The earth and its blue horizons, thick jungles and roaring seas, extensive deserts, living animals and their inner organizations, the vital relations of human beings and their comprehensive thoughts, the elements and compositions, condensed atoms and countless molecules, individual and social activities... To sum up, you are looking at this strange discipline with all of its dependencies...

At a single instance, you are shocked by an inner attention, and realize that all of these that you are regarding are in the mirror not in your last supposition that you are looking directly.

Now, in consequence of this circumstance how will your situation be? It is obvious that all of that you were observing and remembering will change; but not in a manner that all of your previous knowledge and observations -not even one of them- change to be false or non-existence; no, never it will be so. However, the

secondary transfer [the realization that all of those are in the mirror], in spite of preserving all of those essences and their activities that is observed, takes only the existential independency from your first observations.

Each of your observations has independency before that transfer so that it acts in its area of action; and after that transfer all of those scattered independencies gather and focus in one place (the mirror) without that one of those independencies disappear or a small part of those observed activities is decreased."

Notes

[^1]: From The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, translated by Mme. Karl Hillebrand, revised edition. (London).

2 St. Anselm sets his argument in a title like: “Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God”. Therefore he believes that even a fool must accept God.

3 .Anselm prefaced his ontological argument by this statement in his Proslogion see Anselm’s Basic Writings, translated by S. N. Deanse.

4 See for example the introduction which is written by M. Motahhary on Tabatabaii’s book, Osoole Falsafeh wa Ravishi Realism V p.[^34]:

5 See footnotes of M. Motahhary on Osoole Falsafeh wa Ravishi Realism V, p. [^69]:

6 Ibid. pp. 68-[^74]:

Part three:

The Replies of the Seddiqin Argument to the Systematic Criticisms Against the Arguments for the Existence of God

Introduction

In this chapter we want to examine the Seddiqin Argument to show its strength vis a vis the main criticisms proposal in the history of philosophy against the arguments for proving the existence of God. Since the most important and powerful arguments for the existence of God are cosmological and ontological arguments with their philosophical foundation, and since the Seddiqin argument is in some aspects like cosmological argument and in other aspects like the ontological one, we will study only the basic criticisms posed against these arguments.

In the history of philosophy, the most famous philosophers who attacked and have some criticisms against these arguments are David Hume and Immanuel Kant. These criticisms influenced deeply philosophers who came after them until recent years. Thus these criticisms have been standard or classical problems against proving the existence of God. This chapter will focus on these criticisms and then examine some others. The key criticisms can be classified as follows:

a: Objections to the ontological arguments:

I- Hume's objection1:

1- There is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable because:

(1). Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction (for if it leaves open any other possibility, then this position is not necessarily true).

(2). Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction (if it were contradictory, it would not be distinctly conceivable; it can not be possible).

(3). Whatever we conceive to exist we can also conceive as nonexistent (the existence or nonexistence of things can not be ruled out conceptually).

(4). There is no being, therefore, whose nonexistence implies a contradiction.

(5). Consequently, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.

II- Kant's objections2:

1- First, he objected to the fact that we have no positive concept of a necessary being. God is defined only as that which cannot not be.

2- Necessity does not apply to existence but only to propositions.

Necessity is a logical, not an ontological, qualifier. There are no existentially necessary propositions. Whatever is known by experience (which is the only way existential matters are knowable) could be otherwise.

3- No contradiction is involved in rejecting both the idea and the existence of a necessary Being, just as there is no contradiction in rejecting both the triangle and its three-side-ness. Contradiction results in rejecting only one without the other.

4- Existence is not a predicate, as though it is a perfection or property that could be affirmed of a subject or thing. Existence is not a perfection of an essence but a positing of that perfection. Kant implies the following argument to support this point:

(1). Whatever adds nothing to the conception of an essence is not part of that essence.

(2). Existence adds nothing to the conception of an essence (i.e. no characteristic is added to an essence by positing it as real rather than as imaginary; a real dollar does not have any characteristics which an imagined one lacks)

(3). Therefore, existence is not part of an essence (i.e. it is not a perfection which can be predicated of something).

b: Objections to the cosmological arguments:

I- Hume's objections3:

1. Only a finite cause needs be inferred from finite effects. The cause need only be adequate to the effect. And since the effect (the world) is finite, one need only posits a cause sufficient to explain that effect. Hence, the best one could conclude from the cosmological argument is a finite God.

2. No proposition about existence can be logically necessary. The opposite of any proposition about experience is always logically possible.

But if it is logically possible that anything known by experience could have been otherwise, then it is not rationally inescapable that it be the way it is. It follows that nothing based on experience is logically demonstrable.

3. The words "necessary Being" have no consistent meaning. It is always possible to conceive of anything, including God, as not existing. And whatever might not exist does not need to exist. That is, if its nonexistence is possible, its existence is not necessary. Hence, it makes no sense to speak of something as a logically necessary Being.

4. If "necessary Being" means only "imperishable," then the universe may be the necessary Being. If the universe cannot be a necessary being in the sense of being imperishable, then neither can God be imperishable. Hence, either the universe is a necessary being or else God is not imperishable.

5. An infinite series is possible. An eternal series cannot have a cause because cause implies priority in time. But nothing can be prior in time to an eternal series. Therefore, an eternal series is possible.

6. There is no way to establish the principle of causality. Existence does not provide us with the necessary connections needed to establish the

cause/effect relationship. Events are conjoined, but never connected. Only after constant (habitual) conjoining does the mind assume that there is a cause/effect relationship. Hence, causality is built on custom. We know B occurs after A, but not because of A: the sun rises after the rooster crows, but not because the rooster crows. The cosmological argument is built on a post hoc, ergo proper hoc, fallacy.

7. The universe as a whole does not need a cause, only the parts do.

The world as a whole does not call for a cause; only parts need a cause. The whole is the explanation of the parts. The principle of sufficient reason applies only to parts within the universe but not to the universe as a whole.

The parts are contingent and the whole is necessary. And the whole universe may be necessary in only a mathematically accidental sense, such as the products of 9 always use 9 (e.g. 9*41=369 and 3+6+9=18 or 2*9)

8. Theistic arguments convince only those who like abstract reasoning. Only those with a "metaphysical head" are convinced by theistic arguments. Most people are too practical to be swept away with such abstract reasoning. Even the arguments that begin in experience soon fly into the thin air of pure and unconvincing speculation.

II- Kant's objections4:

1. The cosmological argument depends on an invalid ontological argument. In order to arrive at a logically necessary conclusion, the cosmological argument leaves the realm of experience with which it begins and borrows the concept of a necessary Being. Without this ontological leap from the a posteriori to a priori, the cosmological argument cannot complete its task. The leap is necessary but invalid. There is no way to show that it is logically necessary to conclude a necessary Being (one which logically cannot not be) unless one leaves experience and enters the purely conceptual realm.

2- Existential statements are not necessary. The conclusion of the cosmological argument purports to be an existentially necessary statement.

But necessity is a characteristic of thought, not of being. Only statements are necessary, not things or beings. The only necessity that there is resides in the logical, but not in the ontological realm.

3. A noumenal cause cannot be derived from a phenomenal effect.

The cosmological argument illicitly assumes that one can move from an effect in the realm of appearance (the phenomenal) to a cause in the realm of reality (the noumenal). Things-to-me are not things-in-itself. One does not know what reality is (only that it is). Causality is merely a category of the mind that is superimposed on reality, but it is not constitutive of reality.

Whatever necessity the causal connection has is made by the mind; it is not found in reality.

4. What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary.

Flowing from the former criticism is the implied objection that the rationally inescapable is not necessarily the real. It might be necessary to think of something as being so when in actuality it is not so. Hence, even a logically necessary Being would not necessarily exist.

5. The cosmological argument leads to metaphysical contradictions.

If one assumes that categories of thought do apply to reality and proceeds with cosmological argumentation, then one eventuates in contradictions such as: there is both a first cause and there cannot be a first cause (both of which are logically demanded by the principle of sufficient reason).

6. The concept of a "necessary Being" is not self-clarifying. It is not clear what the meaning of "necessary Being" actually is. The concept does not clarify itself. Without conditions no concept of necessity is possible. But necessary Being is conceived of as having no conditions for its existence whatsoever. Hence, the only way it could be meaningful is eliminated by its very definition in the theistic argument.

7. An infinite regress is logically possible. There is no contradiction in the concept of an infinite regress of cause. Indeed the principle of sufficient reason demands it. For it says that everything must have a reason. If this is so, there is no reason to stop asking for a reason when we arrive at any given cause in the series. In fact, reason demands that we keep on asking for a reason, ad infinitum. (Of course, reason also demands that we find a first reason, which grounds all the other reasons. But this is precisely the contradiction one gets into when he applies reason beyond the senses to reality.) So far as logical possibility is concerned, an infinite regress is possible.

Some of these objections are more important than some others. I will study firstly these objections whose solution can help to the solution of other objections. The problems of existence posed by Kant are the core objections and have been repeated in various shapes by some later philosophers as Bertrand Russell and Norman Malcolm5.

Mulla Sadra's view is that these objections are not invalid in all aspects. These objections contain some insights which are very helpful for a good understanding of the problem. Kant's statements manifest new philosophical awareness neglected by earlier view of philosophers this eases the way for solving the problems, especially in the light of Mulla Sadra's view about existence and its fundamental reality. Therefore, have I will not reject all the criticisms posed by Kant but try to show the strengths and weaknesses of his view. Some aspects of his views in these criticisms are very near what had been stated in Mulla Sadra's philosophical view about existence while others are rejected by Mulla Sadra's view which has some extra distinctions regarding existence that are neglected by Kant. In reply to Kant’s objections I will try to show both the consistency and inconsistency of his viewpoint with Mulla Sadra's in order to understand what is missed in Kant's thought.

The Rejection of both the Idea and the Existence of God

One of the accurate distinctions in Kant's statements is between existence and other properties, while in the ontological arguments there is a confusion of predicates concerning perfection and existence. Existence differs from every other predicate. Kant focuses his criticisms on four forms of the ontological argument in the view of Descartes and Anselm. Each of these philosophers has two or three forms of this argument to which Kant objects the argument that can be stated in summary in a logical shape as the follows:

a: Anselm6:

First form of the argument:

1. Whatever can be affirmed (predicated) of the most perfect Being possible (conceivable) must be affirmed of it (otherwise, by definition, it would not be the most perfect Being possible)

2. It is possible to affirm a real existence (outside of the mind) of the most perfect Being possible.

3. Hence, a real existence of the most perfect Being possible must be affirmed.

Second form of the argument:

1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a necessary Existent what is logically necessary for its concept of it.

2. Real existence is logically necessary for the concept of a necessary Existent.

3. Hence, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent exists.

b: Descartes7:

First form of the argument:

1. It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept whatever is essential to the nature (definition) of that concept (e.g. a triangle must have three sides).

2. Existence is a logically necessary part of a necessary existent (otherwise it could not be defined as a necessary Existent).

3. Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.

Second form of Descartes' argument for Caterus:

1. Whatever is of the essence of something must be affirmed of it.

2. It is of the essence of God that He exists (for by definition His essence is to exist).

3. Therefore, existence must be affirmed of God.

Kant objects to these formulations of the argument two main criticisms. Firstly he tries to show that it is not necessary to affirm the existence of a necessary existence. This means that there is no contradiction involved in rejecting both the idea and the existence of a necessary being. He assumes, in the beginning, the predication of existence in a proposition but he denies that it is necessary to affirm existence of a necessary being. His attack, in this criticism, is aimed at this necessity. This objection paves the way for the next objection, namely, that the existence is not a real predicate. We will survey and analyze this latter independently in the next objection. The objection is based on the following objection which I will analyze for it,

Necessity does not apply to existence but only to propositions. Necessity is a logical, not an ontological qualifier.

To examine this objection, we must study the necessity of existence in Kant's view. He firstly explains necessity by the fact that in analytic propositions the predicate is ascribed to subject necessarily so that the affirming subject with rejecting predicate constitutes a contradiction. He says8:

If in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arise a contradiction, and hence, I say, that the former belongs to the latter necessarily.

But rejecting existence from a subject and its predicate cause no contradiction9:

But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction, because there is nothing left that can be contradicted. To accept a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradiction at all in admitting the non-existence of the triangle and of its three angles.

Then he extends this rule to the necessary existence10:

The same applies to the concept of an absolutely necessary Being. Remove its existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible. There is nothing external to which the contradiction could apply, because the thing is not meant to be externally necessary; nor is there anything internal that could be contradicted, for in removing the thing out of existence, you have removed at the same time all its internal qualities. If you say, God is almighty, that is a necessary judgment, because almightiness cannot be removed, if you accept a deity, that is an infinite Being, with the concept of which that other concept is identical. But if you say, God is not, then neither his almightiness, nor any other of his predicates is given; they are all, together with the subject, removed out of existence, and therefore there is not the slightest contradiction in that sentence.

Kant tries to show that reality and "___ exists" differ from the concept of existence and that the concept has no power to posit reality. He does not use existence and non-existence for understanding the meaning of "something exists". Instead, he uses the word "admit" for "exist" and "reject" for the word "not exist". This terminology makes the difference between notion of existence and its reality clearer.

He has another correct accuracy in the meaning of necessity especially in logical usage of this word. That is the conditionality of necessity with the stipulation of "if its subject exists". The triangle has three sides necessarily if there exists a triangle; but if there is no triangle at all there will be nothing to have three sides necessarily, and removing both three sides and triangle is not a contradiction. Then he extends this matter to necessary being. Necessary existence has its essential attributes like almightiness necessarily, but this necessity depends on the stipulation: "if there exists externally a necessary Being. "Were there no necessary Being, the rejection of existence from its essence would not constitute a contradiction.

In explanation of the origination of the meaning of necessity, he says11:

...People have imagined that by a number of examples they had explained this concept, at first risked at haphazard, and afterwards become quite familiar, and that therefore all further inquiry regarding its intelligibility were unnecessary. It was said that every proposition of geometry, such as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, and people began to talk of an object entirely outside the sphere of our understanding, as if they understood perfectly well what, by that concept, they wished to predicate of it.

He continues that this necessity, that is about judgment, cannot be extended to existence12:

But all these pretended examples are taken without exception from judgments only, not from things, and their existence. Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment.

then, he explains the conditionality of logical necessity by the stipulation: "if the subject exists in reality"13:

The above proposition did not say that three angles were absolutely necessary, but that under the condition of the existence of a triangle, three angles are given (in it) by necessity

We said before in the section on necessity and possibility that all logical essential necessity has the stipulation: "if the subject exists or remains in existence." This necessity is in analytic propositions that the essence or essential properties of a thing are ascribed to the thing itself. Therefore, in the negation of subject, no contradiction takes place. But we said that in the light of the fundamental reality of existence, if we ascribe existence to real existence or to the truth of existence, this will not be a logical essential necessity (that is ascribed to quiddity and a quidditive meaning) but a philosophical essential necessity. The difference from logical necessity is indicated by Kant in his statement that "the unconditioned necessity of judgment is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things".

Kant looks at every necessity as a logical one, while this necessity is about quiddities in so far as they are quiddities, not about real existence in view of the fundamental reality of existence. In logical propositions the necessity is stipulated by the existence of the subject. But in existential propositions the reality of existence and its truth is just its subject or a part of it- not like triangle or another quidditive concept. The ascription of the reality of existence to this subject (as its predicate) is undoubtedly necessary, because it predicated of it what is essential to the subject. Therefore, the negation of existence and reality from its subject involves a contradiction. It is clear that, this or that existent being -in so far as it is the reality of existence and the mind abstracts quiddity from its existential limitations- have existence or exists necessarily, because it is existence. Therefore, the negation of existence from this kind of subjects causes a contradiction. Is it possible, in this case, to reject or remove the subject -in Kant's terminology- i.e. to negate real existence (that is the reality of existence) from this kind of subject without involving contradiction?

The truth of existence is necessarily the truth of existence, and removing existence from this subject constitutes a contradiction. Therefore, in these existential propositions, there is no way to reject the subject as well as the predicate, so no contradiction is involved. This means that the claim of Kant “if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction” applies only to logical propositions, not to existential propositions.

Fortunately, Kant points to propositions whose subjects cannot be removed, but he says that he cannot accept these kinds of subjects:14

We have seen therefore that, if I remove the predicate of a judgment together with its subject, there can never be an internal contradiction, whatever the predicate may be.

The only way of evading this conclusion would be to say that there are subjects which cannot be removed out of experience, but must always remain. But this would be the same as to say that there exist absolutely necessary subjects, an assumption the correctness of which I have called in question, and the possibility of which you had undertaken to prove. For I cannot form to myself the smallest concept of a thing which, if it had been removed together with all its predicates, should leave behind a contradiction; and except contradiction, I have no other test of impossibility by pure concepts a priori.

Why can't Kant accept a subject the removal of which constitutes a contradiction, while we said before that the removal of existential subjects causes a contradiction? This is because he searches his concepts to find these propositions and as we said before, what can be found in the mind is quiddity not reality of existence, and that quidditive concepts can form only logical propositions not existential ones; there is no logical proposition the removal of whose subjects constitutes a contradiction.

Furthermore, he is in a position that cannot accept that the mere idea of necessary Being cause it to be real, the matter whose correctness is in question -and I agree with him. Therefore, he neglected existential propositions that may not be constructed through conceptions like necessary Being.

It must be noted that one should distinguish between reality of existence and concept of existence, the matter that had made serious trouble for the ontological arguments. The confusion of reality of existence and its notion opens some windows for Kant to penetrate, and to pose some correct criticisms against this argument. Although these criticisms are not complete and neglect some other philosophical affairs, and although Kant does not distinguish clearly between reality and notion of existence, his statements pave the way for this distinction.

After showing that the rejection of the concept of necessary Being with all his attributes causes no contradiction, Kant proposes an objection against his position, and replies. The objection is that his view may be avoided by the most real Being. Kant states this objection with an argument for this position as follow15:

Against all these general arguments (which no one can object to) you challenge me with a case, which you represent as a proof by a fact, namely, that there is one, and this one concept only, in which the non-existence or the removal of its object would be selfcontradictory, namely, the concept of the most real Being (ens realissimum). You say that it possesses all reality, and you are no doubt justified in accepting such a Being as possible. This for the present I may admit, though the absence of self-contradictoriness in a concept is far from proving the possibility of its object. Now reality comprehends existence, and therefore existence is contained in the concept of a thing possible. If that thing is removed, the internal possibility of the thing would be removed, and this is self-contradictory.

This is a restatement of Leibniz' argumentation of the ontological argument that can be formulated as follow16:

1- If it is possible for an absolutely perfect Being to exist, then it is necessary that it exist, for, a. By definition an absolutely perfect Being cannot lack anything.

b. But if it did not exist, it would be lacking in existence.

c. Hence, an absolutely perfect Being cannot be lacking in existence.

2- It is possible (non contradictory) for an absolutely perfect Being to exist.

3. Therefore, it is necessary that an absolutely perfect Being exist.

In support of the crucial minor premise Leibniz gave this argument:

1. A perfection is a simple and irreducible quality without any essential limits.

2. Whatever is simple cannot conflict with other irresolvable simple qualities (since they differ in kind).

3. And whatever differs in kind with another cannot conflict with it (since there is no area of similarity in which they can overlap or conflict).

4. Therefore, it is possible for one being (God) to possess all possible perfections.

Kant firstly argues his position that "the absence of self-contradictoriness in a concept is far from the possibility of its object" by these statements found in the footnote of this paper17:

A concept is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory. This is the logical characteristic of possibility, and by it the object of the concept is distinguished from the nihil negativum. But it may nevertheless be an empty concept, unless the objective reality of the synthesis, by which the concept is generated, has been distinctly shown. This, however, as shown above, must always rest on principles of possible experience, and not on the principle of analysis (the principle of contradiction). This is a warning against inferring at once from the possibility of concepts (logical) the possibility of things (real).

Then he begins to reply to this objection against his position by the argument that the proposition "the most real Being exists" is either an analytic propositions or a synthetic one. If it is analytic, there is no more knowledge about the most real Being, while we need a new knowledge about His existence and if it is synthetic, there can not be any contradiction in rejecting it such a contradiction can happen only in an analytic proposition by admitting the subject and rejecting the predicate. He says18:

I answer: Even in introducing into the concept of a thing, which you wish to think in its possibility only, the concept of its existence, under whatever disguise it may be, you have been guilty of a contradiction. If you were allowed to do this, you would apparently have carried your point; but in reality you have achieved nothing, but have only committed a tautology. I simply ask you, whether the proposition, that this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, I grant you as possible) exists, is an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, then by its existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but in that case, either the thought within you would be the thing itself, or you have presupposed existence, as belonging to possibility, and have according to your own showing deduced existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The mere word reality, which in the concept of a thing sounds different from existence in the concept of the predicate, can make no difference. For if you call all accepting or positing (without determining what it is) reality, you have placed a thing, with all its predicates, within the concept of the subject, and accepted it as real, and you do nothing but repeat it in the predicate. If, on the contrary, you admit, as every sensible man must do, that every proposition involving existence does not admit of removal without contradiction, a distinguishing property which is peculiar to analytical propositions only, the very character of which depends on it?

Then Kant argues against the opinion that reality or determination cannot be contained in a concept, because this predicate enlarges the subject19:

I might have hoped to put an end to this subtle argumentation, without many words, and simply by an accurate definition of the concept of existence, if I had not seen that the illusion, in mistaking a logical predicate for a real one (that is the predicate which determines a thing), resists all correction. Everything can become a logical predicate, even the subject itself may be predicated of itself, because logic takes no account of any contents of concepts. Determination, however, is a predicate, added to the concept of the subject, and enlarging it, and it must not therefore be contained in it.

Investigation:

Leibniz as well as Descartes and Anselm saw a difference between the most real Being and all other beings. They hoped this difference would help them to an a priori argument for the existence of God. The characteristic that differs from all other ones that can be ascribed in the world to every other being was so bright and important for them that they thought they can use it as a proof for the existence of God.

We shall study this matter in the view of Mulla Sadra. He, also, differs necessary existence from all other beings, but his position is not to use this matter as a proof for the existence of God, but as only the real distinction between God and other beings in the light of the fundamental reality of existence. Based on his view, real existence is ascribed necessarily to every real existence that has occupied reality in every existential proposition, whereas quiddities are mentally posited and are not fundamentally real.

Therefore, every real being, either necessary or contingent, has existence necessarily. But, this necessity is of two kinds, one is possible beings which have this necessity bysomethingelse, while the other is a necessary being-by-essence. In the former the existential necessity depends on another being, hence it need not exist in every time. This necessity remains until that "something-else" necessitates it, while in the latter there may not be any thing to limit this necessity. And as this necessity does not depend on another being it can not be removed from it in any time, situation or condition. As we said before, this "necessity-by-essence" was named "eternal necessity" because this kind of philosophical necessity requires the eternity of what has this necessity. If a being has existence necessarily by essence, and it is uncaused and is an essential existence that stands on itself, then it must inevitably be an eternal being. Because, in any condition, it may not even be supposed that it does not exist. The difference between eternal necessity and logical essential necessity is neglected in Kant's view. He does not distinguish these two kinds of necessity. His claim that "if I remove the predicate of a judgment together with its subject, there can never be an internal contradiction" applies only to the logical essential necessity that does not require eternity of subject, because the ascription in the logical essential necessity is conditioned by preservation of subject. If the subject disappears then the ascription of predicate to subject will cease to remain, so there will not be such a necessity; but in eternal necessity there is no stipulation or condition for ascription of predicate to subject. Therefore, absolute necessity is only in eternal necessity and others are conditioned.

Although the necessity of necessary being differs from the logical necessity, this difference has no power to prove the real existence of God. Mulla Sadra did not apply this difference in proving the existence of God in the Seddiqin Argument. It is an argument for proving the eternal necessity of God, not one for proving God through eternal necessity. All that was said in the Seddiqin Argument was premises for proving the Necessary Being. But those philosophers that posed this argument intended to set forth an argument to show that the eternal necessity of absolute existence is real, but what must be proved is the eternal necessity of this Being, not its logical necessity.

What is wrong in the ontological argument that places its power for proving the existence of God in question? Before answering this question, we must study another important distinction in Mulla Sadra's view that is as a key for solving some famous philosophical questions. By this distinction we can analyze this Kant's objection and the next one.

Primary Essential Predication and Common Technical Predication

Predication is a kind of unification between two things, because it means "this is that". This meaning requires, also, a kind of differing factor between those two, as well as that union, in order to be two things that have a kind of union. If this is not so, there will not be two things but one, and there is no meaning for unification. Therefore, in every predication there must be a unity from one aspect and a difference in another aspect to make that predication true. Hence, there can not be a predication between two completely distinct things, because there is no union between them, nor can there be a predication between a thing and itself, because it does not differ from itself (unless one thing be regarded from two points of view, when there will be two things and this unification may happen).

Now, this union is either in the meaning of two things or only in their external reality. The former is named "primary essential predication" and the latter is called "common technical predication" by Mulla Sadra20. Therefore, the primary essential predication is that kind of predication in which the subject happens to be the same as the predicate with regard to "concept", e.g. "man is man", or as can be said in the definition of man "man is a rational animal". The difference, in this case, between subject and predicate is for the points of view like compendium and detail. The common technical predication is that in which the subject is the same as the predicate only with regard to "existence” (mental or external existence) or concrete object, while with regard to conception they are different from each other, e.g. "man is animal". The meaning of "man" is different from "animal", but the existential sample of man or its object is also an animal.

This distinction between the two kinds of predication is important in some paradoxes be which, in the beginning, some double correct propositions seem to be contradictory. That is, it seems that one of them must be true and the other should be false, while both of them can be true with regard to the two kinds of predication. I cite some of these propositions to prepare the explanation of these two predications in the ontological argument:

(1). preparatory example: When you say "verb is verb" this proposition is true by a primary essential predication that means the meaning of verb is just a meaning of verb as well as an existential sample of verb is just a verb.

But, when you say "verb is a noun" it means the word "verb" as it is a word for naming a kind of words is a noun. This example is not an example for those two kinds of predication, but is only for showing the difference of points of view for predication.

(2). Mulla Sadra sets forth in a section about "non-existence" and its affairs21, a proposition that "the absolute non-existence may not be informed" and that he has some demonstration for proving this proposition, but if it were true then the predication "may not be informed" would be an information about absolute non-existence. Therefore this proposition would involve a self-contradiction.

Mulla Sadra replies: The absolute non-existence, in so far as it is mere nonbeing in reality, may not be informed, while the absolute non-existence in so far as its meaning is a kind of conception in the mind has a mental existence, therefore it may be informed about it by this predicate "...may not be informed."

Thus, absolute non-existence by way of common technical predication (that refers to its existence not meaning) may not be informed, while absolute non-existence by way of primary essential existence (that refers to its meaning in the mind) may be informed by "may not be informed."

(3). We can divide all beings into two kinds: "being subsistent in the mind" and "being non-subsistent in the mind". The latter, in spite of being non-subsistent in the mind, is subsistent in the mind, because we know it as a meaning in the mind and ascribe something to it. It is a rational being and mental existence. Therefore, the being non subsistent in the mind is not subsistent in the mind by way of primary predication; but it is subsistent in the mind by way of common technical predication.

(4). Of The "particular" by definition. It is absurd to suppose that its truthfulness is more than one, like Brussels, this book, that man etc. By this definition the "particular" has many samples (more than one); therefore it is not a particular but a "universal". Based on this matter, we say "particular is particular by way of primary essential predication, and particular - in so far as it has a meaning in the mind and a mental existence that involves all beings that have that character- is not particular (but universal) by way of common technical predication”.

(5). Our intellect has the power to recognize the impossibility of a "partner of the creator" by saying: "a partner of the creator is impossible" in spite of the fact that predicating something to some other thing depends on the representation of the latter (i.e. the subject), while whatever is established in the intellect or imagination is an "existent” which must be judged as "possible", so it is a being that must be created entirely by God. Therefore, a partner of the Creator is not a partner of the Creator by way of common nonprimary predication but it is a creature of Him. This proposition does not involve a contradiction; while a partner of the creator is such by way of primary essential predication.

The problem in all of these examples is the result of confusion between "concept" and the "referent of concept". By distinguishing these two, it can be understood that any concept which is actualized, whether in the mind or in the external world, does not cease to be that concept, and the boundary of its "essence" does not become transformed; nay, "existence" brings it out just as it is.

Returning now to survey the ontological argument, the problem in this argument is the confusion of "concept of existence" and the "referent of the concept". With regard to distinguishing these two, or the difference of existence by way of primary essential predication from existence by way of common predication, the confusion and fallacy of the ontological argument can become manifest. Because, if we negate the concept of existence from "most perfect being" in the concept of God by way of primary predication (that refers to its meaning) then it involves a contradiction. But if the "most perfect being” did not exist (in external world) by way of common predication then it would not result in the negation of existence by way of primary predication. In the ontological argument it is said that "existence is a logically necessary part of the concept of a necessary Existent, therefore it is impossible to negate that a necessary existent does exist." If, in this claim, the existence is predicated to necessary being by way of primary predication, then it is impossible to negate existence (its concept) from it; but this predication does not require its external reality and does not prove existence by way of common predication for the Necessary Being. If the predicate, in this argument, is the referent of the concept of existence (as in the result of the argument it is so claimed) and it is being existence in common predication, then there is no impossibility in rejecting existence in common predication from the concept of necessary being or negating this perfection from its concept, and there is no contradiction involved. If the most perfect concept that is the concept of unlimited and infinite existent lacks the referent of this concept, then it will not entail any contradiction. Moreover, the contradiction happens when the same predicate is affirmed and rejected of the same meaning at the same time, but if there are two predicates or one from two points of view, then the affirmation and rejection of those two will not result in any contradictions. The concept of unlimited and most complete existence is the most complete existence by way of primary predication. It is a mental concept in common predication that exists in mental existence but it is not necessary that it have a referent in the external world, for it is like what we said about "partner of the Creator". The contradiction will happen if the predicate is the same as the subject either both are primary or both are common.

The confusion of the concept and the referent of the concept in some other arguments of Muslim philosophers (which they supposed to be a Seddiqin kind of argumentation) put the validity of their argument in question. All the problems arise when one wants to find the referent of the concept by the concept; but if an argument begins from reality (not from its concept) and then set forth an argument, it will not suffer from this confusion -just as is done in the Seddiqin Argument.

That Existence Is not a Real Predication

Kant carefully distinguishes existence and all other perfections in ontological arguments based on the sameness of these two. His attack is aimed toward ontological arguments that use existence like other perfections. He shows the error of this supposition by scrutinizing in the meaning of "__ exists". I set forth his view then I will compare his view with Mulla Sadra's on the fundamental reality of existence where the consistency and inconsistency of these two views can be observed.

Kant's view can be formed like this22:

Existence is not a predicate, as though it were a perfection or property that could be affirmed of a subject or thing. Existence is not a perfection of an essence, but a positing of that perfection. Kant implies the following argument to support this point:

(1). Whatever adds nothing to the conception of an essence is not part of that essence.

(2). Existence adds nothing to the conception of an essence (i.e. no characteristic is added to an essence by positing it as real rather than as imaginary; a real dollar does not have any characteristics which an imagined one lacks)

(3). Therefore, existence is not part of an essence (i.e. it is not a perfection which can be predicated of something).

If Kant's last criticism is solid, it invalidates at least the first form of the ontological argument given by Anselm. In Kant's point of view, Anselm's argument would really amount to this:

1. All possible perfection must be predicated of an absolutely perfect Being.

2. Existence is a possible perfection which may be predicated of an absolutely perfect Being.

3. Therefore, existence must be predicated of an absolutely perfect Being.

According to Kant's criticism, the minor premise is wrong. Existence is not a perfection which may be predicated of anything. Existence is not a predication of a characteristic but an instantiation of a characteristic or thing. Essence gives the definition and existence provides an exemplification of what was defined. The essence is given in the conceptualization of something; existence does not add to this conceptualization but merely provides a concretization of it. Hence, existence neither adds nor detracts from the concept of an absolutely perfect Being. This has been a standard objection to the ontological argument since Kant.

He says23:

Being is evidently not a predicate, nor a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the admission of a thing, and of certain determination in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is almighty, contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and almightiness. The small word is, is not an additional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and say, God is, or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses possibility only, by my thinking its object as simply given and saying, it is. And thus the real does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify the concept, the former the object and its position by itself, it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my concept would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate concept. In my financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars, than by their concept only (that is their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained analytically in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state), synthetically; but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my concept.

Kant, in these statements, argues for showing that "existence does not add anything to the concept of a thing." Although this is a correct fact, his statements must be surveyed in all of his claims that in some other aspects are not complete. I compare his claims with Mulla Sadra's view.

(1) Kant says: "Being is not a real predicate". Mulla Sadra and his disciples accept that Being is not a predicate like other predicates and that it differs from other predicates, but they do not have this opinion that the existence cannot be a predicate.

Someone that has never seen an elephant can recognize the meaning of elephant by its definition and its characteristics; afterwards, he asks "does the elephant exist." Then he will have new knowledge by the answer that "yes, the elephant exists"; therefore, the sentence "the elephant exists" will be a proposition because it is a knowledge that may be false or true. No one can doubt that this sentence is a proposition. But, according to Mulla Sadra's view, these propositions differ from other propositions in that something is ascribed to some other thing. In this latter the structure of proposition is constructed from three things, the subject, the predicate and the relation and ascription of predicate to subject; while in the former, i.e. existential propositions, the proposition is constructed from two things, the subject and realness of this subject that is the predicate of the proposition. Therefore, propositions are of two kinds, three-parts propositions and two-parts propositions. In threeparts propositions there are three things in the proposition (subject, predicate and ascription of predicate to subject), whereas in two parts one there are two things (subject and ascription reality to it).

This distinction solves some other philosophical problems like what is argued against the fundamental reality of existence by Illuminative philosophers. If quiddity, they say, is mentally posited and the existence is fundamental real they, then in every proposition that we ascribe existence to a quiddity like "the elephant exists", before ascribing something to the subject there must be or exist firstly the subject so that it will be possible to ascribe something to it. In other words, the ascription is after the subsistence of the subject. Therefore, before ascribing existence to a quiddity, the quiddity must exist or have (another) existence and so on ad infinitum. That is, according to the philosophical rule that "the subsistence of a thing for another thing is after the subsistence of that other thing for which the subsistence is going to be proved", the subsistence of existence for quiddity is after the subsistence or existence of quiddity. That means that the quiddity must be subsistent or have existence in order that there be the possibility of predicating existence of it.

Mulla Sadra answers24 that that philosophical rule applies to the subsistence of one thing for another thing, not to the subsistence of a thing. Therefore, all propositions in which existence is predicated of a quiddity differ from others in that something is predicated of some other thing, so that in the latter the last philosophical rule applies while in the former this rule can not apply.

I set forth this problem and Mulla Sadra's answer in order to show that existence can be predicated to a quiddity and that there is nothing wrong in this predication.

But those objections posed by Kant are in the supposition that three-part propositions are the same as two-part propositions. Perhaps the word "real" in Kant's statement "being is not a real predicate" points to Kant's opinion that it can be a predicate but not the same as other predicates when we assume a thing or attribute to be a predicate, whereas existence is not an independent thing or attribute, so that it can be an additional property.

(2) Kant writes: "It [existence] is merely the copula of a judgment"; he continues that "the proposition, God is almighty, contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and almightiness". In the light of the fundamental reality of existence, this "having its object" is just the real existence, that is, reality outside the mind. This existence is not a copula but a reality; it is not for relating two parts of a proposition but is the real existence of each of those parts. We said before, in the section "types of existence", that in addition to independent existence there is, also, copulative existence in reality, that is, for example, real relation between subject and predicate (and in the existence of a caused being). Therefore, the existence is not only the copula of a judgment, but is either an independent existence or a copulative existence. Mulla Sadra's philosophical view as developed in the second part was a demonstration of those both kinds of existence25.

(3) From one point of view, Kant's view that the existence is not an addition to a concept, is just what Mulla Sadra argues. Because the fundamental reality of existence is that there is nothing in reality but existence; the quiddity is its limitations grasped by the mind; and all attributes have quidditive meanings that differ basically from existence.

Therefore, in reality there is nothing other than existence that can be added to it. Kant says26:

By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing (even in completely determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. Otherwise, it would not be the same that exists, but something more than was contained in the concept, and I could not say that the exact object of my concept existed.

But, from another point of view, the meaning of existence in the mind (that differs from its reality) can be added to quiddity. We argued this additionality with its demonstrations in the section "Existence and Quiddity".

(4) Kant argues that a hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. Then he concludes that "but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my concept"27.

By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing (even in completely determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. Otherwise, it would not be the same that exists, but something more than was contained in the concept, and I could not say that the exact object of my concept existed. Nay, even if I were to think in a thing all reality, except one, that one missing reality would not be supplied by my saying that so defective a thing exists, but it would exist with the same defect with which I thought it; or what exists would be different from what I thought...

This opinion is compatible with Mulla Sadra's view that the quiddity, in so far as it is quiddity, is in reality the same as in the concept. The quiddity sometimes appears in external existence and at other times has mental existence. Therefore, the externality of a quiddity does not make it greater or more than its mentality. In explaining existence and quiddity above it was noted that28: "...Here, it must be added that existence has two aspects, one external and another mental. But even in the mind the separation of quiddity from existence is not conceivable. It is obtainable only by rational analysis and laboring, because what is in the mind is a "mental existence" just as something in the external world is an "external existence". But it is of the very nature of the intellect to notice quiddity in abstraction, totally discarding both modes of existence, by not taking them into consideration, not by simply negating them. In other words, if as a result of the hard work of the mind we separate quiddity from both kinds of existence, then quiddity would not be existence." This means the sameness of quiddity in the mind and in the external world.

(5) Quidditive meaning, in so far as it has the same ascription to existence and non-existence, must be a contingent meaning in relation to both mental and external existence. Therefore, every being that has a quiddity (that is the result of abstraction by mind from limitations of a real being) must be a possible being. This is also compatible with Kant's statements29:

If, then, I try to conceive a being, as the highest reality (without any defect), the question still remains, whether it exist or not.

and

If, however we are thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder that we cannot find any characteristic to distinguish it from mere possibility.

But if we are concerned with the reality of existence, the qualifier changes to necessity. Every existent being, in so far as it is existence, is ascribed existence necessarily; and in so far as it has a quiddity, existence is ascribed to its quiddity contingently.

Therefore, the ascription of existence to the quiddity needs reason, and that necessity does not make the quiddity real. Although the pure existence exists necessarily, this necessity, according to Seddiqin Argument, does not conclude that it exists. The Seddiqin Argument is an argument for proving the eternal necessity of existence, not an argument for proving the realness of the concept of a necessary being. Every concept can be possible even the necessary being, otherwise we may not doubt its reality. The work of the cosmological argument is to prove the reality of this concept; and this attempt is meaningful. The difference of the Seddiqin Argument from ontological argument is that the ontological argument tries to prove the reality of the meaning of necessary being through its meaning, and after constructing that concept; while the Seddiqin Argument tries to prove the eternal necessity of the reality of existence, which afterwards will be named God.

Mulla Sadra, also, accepts what Kant says30:

Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside it, in order to attribute to it existence.

and

The concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite incapable of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with regard to what exists .

It must be added that possibility belongs to quidditive meanings, but if something does not have a quiddity -grasped through limitations of existence- then it may not be conceived as possible. This matter will be explained afterwards.

(6) We said that the meaning of existence is an additional meaning to quiddity, while its reality is not an addition to quidditive concept, but just the reality of that concept.

Kant refers to this second additionality and correctly rejects it. How do Mulla Sadra and his disciples explain this addition?

They divide propositions into two kinds: "the predicate extracted from the subject" and the "predicate by way of adherence"31. The first is abstracted and extracted from the bottom and depth of the reality of the thing while the second one is a predicate whose abstraction from the subject means that one essence or external reality adheres to the essence and reality of subject.

The first one is more general than "analytic" in Kant's terminology, because it contains, beside essence and the essential character of subject, the meanings abstracted from the reality of the subject. Their main character is that they do not have any referent distinct from the subject, like the meaning of "oneness", "causality", "existence" and "individuality".

It is obvious that the meaning and concept of "oneness" is different from meaning and concept of the quiddity that is predicated of it. But the quiddity does not need any referent and reality distinct from the referent and reality of "oneness" in order for the quiddity to be qualified by "oneness"; likewise "causality", "individuality" and "existence".

Although the meaning of causality differs from that of the essence that is cause, it has no referent and reality other than the reality of the thing that is qualified by causality.

The predicate by way of adherence is opposite to the predicate extracted from the bottom of subject. It is a predicate whose ascription to the subject depends on the reality of another referent distinct from the subject. That referent is allocated to the predicate, and at the same time is unified with subject, like for example "white" (in referent to bodies) and "knowing" (in referent to souls), for they cannot be attributed to the subject as predicates except through the meditation of "whiteness" and "knowledge" which are external and additional to the reality of what is white and of the one who knows. Whiteness is from category of quality, while white thing is a substance; therefore, these predicates must be predicates by way of adherence.

Let us study existence as a predicate in Kant's terminology about propositions which he divides into analytic and synthetic. Is the proposition that existence is predicated of a subject analytic or synthetic? If this predication is about reality and referent of a thing it will not be synthetic, but analytic. If this predication concerns the meaning of a (quidditive) subject and the concept of existence it will be a synthetic, because the meaning of that subject is different from that of existence. But if the meaning of subject is not a quidditive meaning or a meaning that is not different from existence, but is the existence

itself or something that contains the meaning of existence, then the predication of the meaning of existence to this kind of subject will be analytic, i.e. the predicate is abstracted from the essence of subject.

Hence, "predicate extracted from subject" that can explain also the predication of existence, differs from "analytic" in Kant's terminology.

That the words "Necessary Being" have no consistent meaning

This objection is posed by Kant against ontological arguments that are based on the meaning of "necessary Being"; these arguments try to extract the reality of necessary Being from its meaning, which must be clear in order to be a strong foundation for the rest of the argument. Kant believes that these words are understood by a negative definition that has not enough power to give it a consistent meaning. He says32:

People have at all times been talking of an absolutely necessary Being, but they have tried, not so much to understand whether and how a thing of that kind could even be conceived, as rather to prove its existence. No doubt a verbal definition of that concept is quite easy, if we say that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible. This, however, does not make us much wiser with reference to the conditions that make it necessary to consider the non-existence of a thing as absolutely inconceivable. It is these conditions which we want to know, and whether by that concept we are thinking anything or not. For to use the word unconditioned, in order to get rid of all the conditions which the understanding always requires, when wishing to conceive something as necessary, does not render it clear to us in the least whether, after that, we are still thinking anything or perhaps nothing, by the concept of the unconditionally necessary.

This objection renewed in some statements of contemporary philosophers like Bertrand Russell33, John Hospers34 and Mackie35. Philosophers who work in realm of analytic and linguistic philosophy have been interested in this question.

However, this inconsistency of the meaning of necessary Being that can produce some difficulty for ontological argument does not apply to the Seddiqin Argument.

Because the Seddiqin Argument is based not on the meaning of necessary Being, but on the reality of existence that must indicate to the richness and independence of the most real and complete existence.

But, how do we have the meaning of God as the pure, rich and most real existence in Mulla Sadra's view? As said above, this meaning is not a negative but a positive meaning. It may be useful for some negations to have this meaning; but the essence of this meaning is positive and real. Those negations do not construct this concept; the way of negation is only a way for grasping this meaning. On the other hand, how clear is this meaning of God? The clarity of the meaning of God, according to Mulla Sadra, is based on the clarity of existence that we explained previously at the beginning of the introduction of his philosophy, which we recall here36:

According to Sadra the "notion of existence" is one of the best known concepts.

It is self-evident and is reasonable by itself, because it is self apparent and makes others apparent. There is no need of any other thing to make its notion clearer. A defining term must always be immediately known and clearer than the defined term. But nothing is more evident than existence: all defining terms of existence are but explanations of the word; they can be neither a "definition" nor a "description." Since existence is absolutely simple as will be explained- it has no specific difference or genus; hence it has no definition. It can not have any description, because a "description" is obtainable only by an accidental property which is part of the five universals whose division itself is based on the thing-ness of quiddity, whereas existence and its properties are derived from an entirely different source from quiddity37.

But the deepest reality of existence is in the extremity of hidden-ness38. Because its deepest reality is external; if its reality should come to our mind this would be a refusal of reality, because in so far as it is reality -not notion- it must be external and outside mind. Furthermore, were its reality to be actualized in the mind -like the reality of fire- its effects also would be actualized - and in our example our mind must burn!

Mulla Sadra says39:

"The truth of existence is the clearest thing in appearance and presence; and its essence is the most hidden thing in grasping and understanding the depth of its reality"

And in another book under the title "On explanation of grasping the truth of existence" he says40:

"It is not possible to conceive the reality of existence and its depth of truth, neither by a definition that consists of genus and differentia nor by a definition that consists of genus and special accident nor by a meaning equal to existence. Because, conception of the truth of external truth of every thing is acquisition of that thing in the mind and the transition of that meaning from the external to the mind. This action is obtainable about every thing other than existence (i.e. quiddities), but it is not possible about existence (because the transition of existence from the external to the mind, cause annulment of its truth, and what is grasped from existence by the mind is a phantom of the truth of existence not its reality). Therefore, it is not possible to have a way to the truth of existence, unless via intuition by inner insight not by way of definition and limiting and demonstration and reason and understanding by words and terms..."

Therefore, although the referent and reality of necessary Being is completely hidden, its notions is most clear and obvious. A. Javadi Amoli, in explanation of this meaning says41:

... That being whose existence is necessary and that reality conditioned by no stipulate, although they do not have any categorical and quidditive meaning, but are constructed from some general concepts so that, apart from the manner of abstraction and perception, are very evident and people understand them very clearly.

That the Cosmological Argument Depends on an Invalid Ontological Argument

This criticism posed by Kant is an objection to the cosmological argument that can destroy the cosmological argument by destroying its foundation. In surveying this objection, I shall attempt answer some questions each of which is sufficient to reject Kant's claim: first, whether the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument; second how and in what part the ontological is based on the cosmological? third what kind of cosmological argumentation depends on ontological one? (should Kant's claim be true); fourth whether this objection may be applicable to the Seddiqin Argument, that differs from cosmological argument.

The cosmological argument appears to proceed partly a posteriori. Its starting point is the empirical premise that something exists. It thus appears different in kind from the ontological proof, which proceeds entirely a priori. as Kant notes42:

In order to lay a secure foundation for itself, this proof takes its stand on experience, and thereby makes profession of being distinct from the ontological proof, which puts its entire trust in pure a priori concepts.

But Kant goes on to claim that this is mere pretense43:

...the so called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The appeal to experience is quite superfluous;...

There seem to be two claims here: first, that the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument, and that if the latter is not cogent then neither is the former; and second, that the appeal to experience in the cosmological argument is superfluous, that because of the dependence just mentioned the ontological argument alone is sufficient to give the desired conclusion of the cosmological argument.

Kant isolates a certain proposition which he claims is assumed in the cosmological argument. Of this proposition he says44:

... this is the proposition maintained by the ontological proof; it is here being assumed in the cosmological proof, and indeed made the basis of the proof; and yet is an assumption which this latter proof has professed to dispense.

and a bit later45

... this is precisely what the ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological proof has refused to admit, although the conclusions of the latter are indeed covertly based on it .

Kant characterizes the first part of the cosmological argument as follows46:

It runs thus: If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premise contains an experience, the major premise the inference from there being any experience at all to the existence of the necessary. The proof therefore really begins with experience, and is not wholly a priori or ontological.

In any case, the present objection is not Kant's. The superfluousness he has in mind does not lie in the attempt to use a posteriori means to establish a necessary being47.

He writes48:

... experience may perhaps lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but is unable to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate thing.

And just before that49 :

... the cosmological proof uses this experience only for a single step in the argument, namely, to conclude the existence of a necessary being. What properties this being may have, the empirical premise cannot tell us.

In both these passages Kant seems not to object to using empirical premises to establish the existence of a necessary being. Nothing is claimed to be superfluous about that50.

The real problem comes later. The cosmological argument is supposed to be a proof of God (or an ens realissimum, etc.), not just a necessary being. How can we tell what sort of properties belong to this necessary being? How do we get from necessary being to God? To answer this, i.e., to complete what we are calling the second part of the argument, we must resort to reason alone. We can no longer rely on experience:51

Reason therefore abandons experience altogether, and endeavors to discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, which among all possible things contains in itself the conditions essential to absolute necessity. Now these, it is supposed, are nowhere to be found save in the concept of an ens realissimum; and the conclusion is therefore drawn, that the ens realissimum is the absolutely necessary being.

And he continues:

But it is evident that we are here presupposing that the concept of the highest reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence; that is, that the latter can be inferred from the former. Now this is the proposition maintained by the ontological proof; it is here being assumed in the cosmological proof, and indeed made the basis of the proof; For absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere concepts. If I say, the concept of the ens realissimum is a concept, and indeed the only concept, I must also admit that necessary existence can be inferred from this concept. Thus the so-called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts.52

Kant tells us how this further commitment comes about. He writes:53

If the proposition, that every absolutely necessary being is likewise the most real of all beings, is correct (and this is the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof), it must, like all affirmative judgment, be convertible, at least per accidents. It therefore follows that some entia realissima are likewise absolutely necessary beings. But one ens realissimum is in no respect different from another, and what is true of some under this concept is true also of all. In this case, therefore, I can convert the proposition simpliciter, not only per accidens, and say that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But since this proposition is determined from its a priori concepts alone, the mere concept of the ens realissimum must carry with it the absolute necessity of that being; and this is precisely what the ontological proof has asserted and what the cosmological proof has refused to admit, although the conclusions of the latter are indeed covertly based on it.

As we have seen, Kant, in this criticism, attacks the cosmological argument offered by Leibniz and some others that begins with the meaning of necessary being then endeavors are directed to prove that this meaning is a real one and has reality. Whether this criticism is valid or not, whether and the cosmological arguments are as Kant says, was the core of some replies by some of philosophers of religion; and we shall not introduce them at this point. However, there are some other cosmological arguments that begin not with the meaning of necessary being, but with the real existence of something in the world, like that offered by Norman L. Geisler. He believes that Kant's criticism does not apply to his restatements and another new form of the cosmological argument.54

... This [dependency of cosmological argument on the ontological one] is not true of the argument given here. It begins with existence, not thought (e.g., it begins with "something exists" not with "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"). It proceeds with ontologically grounded principles and not with mere rationally undeniable thought (i.e., it proceeds with "Nothing cannot cause something" rather than "Everything must have a sufficient reason"). Our restated cosmological argument concludes with a real Ground of all finite being as opposed to a logically necessary being (i.e., with "unlimited cause of existence for all limited existence," as opposed to "a Being which logically cannot not be"). The restated cosmological argument does not begin with the a priori and at no point does it borrow from the purely conceptual to complete its task. It is not based on the invalid ontological argument.

However, does this criticism apply to the Seddiqin Argument? Is this argument based on ontological argument? There is no need to waste more in response to these questions; it is sufficient to note that the Seddiqin Argument, in spite of some similarity, is neither a cosmological argument nor an ontological one. This argument that begins with the "fundamental reality of existence", not with the meaning of necessary being or with any incomplete fact in the world. Therefore, this criticism can not apply in it.

That there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable

David Hume laid down what has become a standard objection to the ontological proof as well as to any alleged proof for God's existence. It has the following basic logical form:55

(1). Nothing is rationally demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction (for if it leaves open any other possibility, then this position is not necessarily true).

(2). Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction (if it were contradictory, it would not be distinctly conceivable; it can not be possible).

(3). Whatever we conceive to exist we can also conceive as non-existent (the existence or nonexistence of things can not be ruled out conceptually).

(4). There is no being, therefore, whose nonexistence implies a contradiction.

(5). Consequently, there is no being whose existence is rationally demonstrable.

It seems that there is no need to add more explanation in reply to this criticism in view of all said above about two kinds of predication in Mulla Sadra's view: primary essential predication and common technical predication.56 It is sufficient to note that necessary existence as a concept that has a mental existence is not necessary, but it is a meaning whose existence is possible. But necessary existence (if there is a referent for it) is necessary; indeed, every existent being exists necessarily. But this necessity is not the result of that meaning, but it must be concluded from an external reality that is not its meaning.

Therefore, the third premise of Hume's objection that "Whatever we conceive to exist we can also conceive as non-existent" does not apply to the Seddiqin Argument. A.

Javadi Amoli, one of the contemporary disciples of Mulla Sadra, says:57

"... Existence and external reality does not come from essence and essential characters of the meaning of necessary existence that is a mental concept. The necessity that is considered in necessary existence is not a necessity that is in the relation between subjects and predicates, but it a necessity that is equal and just the external existence; and the meaning of necessary being that indicate its reality, has not this necessity. Although the concept of necessary existence is necessary existence by way of primary essential predication, but it is a mental affairs by way of common technical predication that comes into existence in the content of perception and awareness of existence as a possible reality..."

There is further explanation in the reply to the next criticism.

That Existential Statements Are not Necessary.

This objection is a very famous criticism against cosmological argument and has been repeated in the statements of most philosophers of religion since Hume's time.

That existential necessity and its meaning be understood in some other way than logical necessity is important for the cosmological argument. But this causes some other criticisms which I will note here in the views of Hume and Kant and some other contemporary philosophers. I will explain Mulla Sadra's view about this necessity whose correct explanation is necessary for the cosmological argument. Afterwards, I will note that the Seddiqin Argument is a real existential proof that depends on a necessity different from the cosmological argument, i.e., necessity-by-itself. In other words, the words independent or rich existence (as opposed to dependent and poor existences) must be used instead of necessary existence (in the cosmological argument that can also be true) as opposed to possible beings.

The various forms of this objection are:

Hume:

No proposition about existence can be logically necessary. The opposite of any proposition about experience is always logically possible. But if it is logically possible that anything known by experience could have been otherwise, then it is not rationally inescapable that it be the way it is. It follows that nothing based in experience is logically demonstrable.

Kant:

Existential statements are not necessary. The conclusion of the cosmological argument purports to be an existentially necessary statement. But necessity is a characteristic of thought, not of being. Only statements are necessary, not things or beings. Necessity resides only in the logical, but not in the ontological realm.

What is logically necessary is not ontologically necessary. Flowing from the former criticism is the implied objection that what is rationally inescapable is not necessarily real. It might be necessary to think of something as being when in actuality it is not so. Hence, even a logically necessary Being would not necessarily exist.

To reply to this criticism (which is against the cosmological argument), I will explain first Mulla Sadra's view about the origin of the meaning of necessity, and then the reply from his point of view.

Mulla Sadra argues58 that "necessity" in logic and philosophy (ontology) has the same meaning. This means that the meaning of necessity that is applied in logic, is, also, used in philosophy and is ascribed to external existences and realities. Nay, necessity is an evident meaning that proves its reality and truthfulness, originally, by philosophy; logic uses the result of that philosophical investigation as a postulate; then it explains its thirteen kinds in the realm of concepts and qualities of propositions like the essential, the descriptive, the conditional, the temporal and etc.

He argues that "necessity", "possibility" and "impossibility" are some evident meanings and do not have an actual definition. But the investigation of their reality and the division of things into necessary, possible and impossible or into necessary and possible is a philosophical division because the subject of philosophy is existence and beingness, and the comparison of every thing with existence by two exclusive disjunctive propositions results in the division of all things into necessary, possible, and impossible (or the division of existence into necessary and possible by one disjunctive proposition results in two kinds of being).

That exclusive disjunctive proposition is nothing other than the law of non contradiction. Because, the impossibility of gathering or removing two contradictories implies that every thing, as regards existence, has either necessary existence or not. The first is necessary being; if it does not have this necessity, then it will have either necessity of non-existence or not. The former is impossible and the latter is possible. (Likewise all existent being divides into necessary and possible.)

Necessity is considered first in philosophy, or is recognized in reality; then logic determines its referent in its own realm, namely mental concepts.

Some of Muslim theologians like "Ghazi Azodi Iji"59 suppose that the necessity in philosophical necessity differs from that in logical necessity. If these two, they say, had the same meaning, then, in all conditions that essential characters of a thing are ascribed to it, this would require that the thing be a necessary being; for example, since number four is an even number necessarily, therefore it must be concluded that number four is a necessary being.

Mulla Sadra answers60 that the meaning of necessity is the same, but the difference of meaning is with regard to predicates not with regard to the meaning of necessity that is the mode of the proposition. Therefore, that necessity requires that number four must be necessary in even-ness, not in existence.

Logic does not utilize philosophy only in the application of necessity. It makes use of philosophy in some other affairs, like predication as follow: Being is divided, under the title of unity and multiplicity, into "one" and "many", each of which divides into some other division like specific, generic or accidental unities and also pure unity and the unity that is ascribed to a multiple that is in identity. This identity is predication (that is either "primary essential" or "common technical"). Logic utilizes predication that is the result of above philosophical divisions as a postulate, and organizes its special matters accordingly.

Otherwise, logic cannot prove the origin of predication.

Logic depends on philosophy not only in many of its postulates but also in the origin of its subject, that is knowledge and concept or presentation and judgment.

Consequently, "necessity" is an evident meaning, and the judgment about its reality is a philosophical (ontological) matter; logic applies this philosophical meaning in the realm of relations and connection of propositions.

"Necessity", in spite of its unitive meaning, has various orders in different cases. The objection arises from two things:

Firstly, when "necessity" is considered merely in a logical sense its philosophical application that refers to external realities is neglected.

Secondly, when "logical necessity" is limited to analytic propositions every demonstration that results in a necessary conclusion must be in the realm of concepts.

Mulla Sadra argues against this supposition that "necessity" is not restricted in essential property in analytic propositions. But includes also some other essentials he calls "essentials of section of demonstration". Those essentials are more general than essentials in analytic propositions that come from analyzing a thing and finding its essential properties.

"Possibility" is a meaning that is not in the essence of any quiddity. It is abstracted only after comparing quiddity with existence and non-existence, and then is predicated of that quiddity. The meaning of "possibility" does not include essence or essential characters of any quiddity to which this meaning is ascribed.

The "need" for another being is not a meaning that can be taken from essence or essential characters of a possible being. Therefore, the "need" as well as possibility is from the "essentials of the section on demonstration".

The cosmological (necessity and possibility) argument (in Mulla Sadra's view) depends not on mental analysis of meanings and quiddities which are conceived, but on intellectual analysis of realities that exist externally. In this argument, even the meaning of existence does not appear in so far as it is a mental meaning, but the meaning of existence is attended to as regards its referent and reality. The real referent of existence is an evident judgment for any one who is not a sophist.

A possible being which exists externally (i.e., an external referent of possible being) needs another being in external reality to remove its need, and that being necessarily exists externally.

The external referent and reality of necessary Being does not have any quiddity other than His reality and existence: His quiddity is just His reality and external existence.

His necessity has no referent distinct and separate from His reality and it is not other than intensity of existence. Consequently, the necessity of God as necessary being is not like necessity in analytic propositions, i.e., it is not like logical necessity (like essential or conditional necessity) that refers to quality of connection of a predicate to subject; rather it refers directly to the intensity of reality that has no truth other than external-ness or reality.

Since Kant holds that necessity is a merely logical concept in the realm of analytic propositions, he supposes that if God, as necessary Being, has the necessity of external existence, then the external existence must be taken in His meaning. Thus negation of its existence (i.e., negation of referent and external existence) requires a contradiction as a negation of the essence and essential character of a thing.

A. Javadi Amoli, one of the contemporary disciples of Mulla Sadra says:61

"... Existence and external reality does not come from essence and essential characters of the meaning of necessary existence that is a mental concept. The necessity that is considered in necessary existence is not a necessity that is in the relation between subjects and predicates, but it is a necessity that is equal to and just the external existence; and the meaning of necessary being that indicates its reality, has not this necessity. Although the concept of necessary existence is necessary existence by way of primary essential predication, but it is a mental affairs by way of common technical predication that comes into existence in the contain of perception and awareness of existence as a possible reality..."

The necessity-possibility argument (as a kind of cosmological argument) in Mulla Sadra's view uses the "need" had by possible being for its external truth to another being. Therefore, if a possible being has reality externally, then this need has also external truth; consequently, the other which removes this need has real referent.

Therefore, although the meaning of necessary Being can be understood apart from its referent (even in the case that requires the supposition of non-existence of the world) to deny Him, there is no way to deny Him in external reality and truth. Because, if reality is not necessary (because it possesses some characteristics inconsistent with the character of necessary being), it must be possible being (because of the disjunctive proposition which announces necessity or non-necessity of existence for existent beings). But the reality of possible being without a necessary being as cause is a contradiction.

This was Mulla Sadra's view about necessity in the words of his contemporary commentators. All said above removes the criticisms stated about necessity in the cosmological argument, but not in the kind of argument posed by Leibniz but that is named as necessity-possibility argument based on Mulla Sadra's philosophical investigations in this argument.

However, the Seddiqin Argument differs from the necessity-possibility or cosmological argument, because the latter is based on quidditive possibility, while the former argues through "poverty possibility", that is, really existential poor-ness and the word possibility is ascribed to it figuratively. The mere truth of existence, based on the fundamental reality of existence and its analogical gradation, etc., has some characters like completeness, rich-ness, unlimited-ness, etc. Those poor existences must depend on Him because they are not other than poor-ness (not a being that have poor-ness accidentally).

Therefore, what is stated by Kant and Hume not only does not apply to necessity-possibility argument, but also cannot penetrate in the Seddiqin Argument.

That an Infinite Series Is Possible

In most such argumentation, the defenders of the cosmological argument, needs to demonstrate the absurdity of an infinite succession of causes in proving the existence of God. In all cosmological arguments which is argued by following philosophers there is one premise that indicates this absurdity, namely:

1- Aristotle:62

... An infinite regress of actualizers is impossible (for the whole series would not be actualized unless there is a first actualizer)...

2- Alfarabi:63

... There can not be an infinite regress of causes of existence...

3- Avicenna:64

... There can not be an infinite series of causes of being, but there can be an infinite series of causes of becoming (like father begets son, who begets son, etc.) ...

4- Thomas Aquinas:65

a. The argument from motion: There can not be an infinite regress of actualizers or movers. ...

b. The argument from efficient causality: There can not be an infinite regress of (essentially related) efficient causes. ...

c. The argument from possibility and necessity: There can not be an infinite regress of necessary beings each of which has its necessity dependent on another. ...

5- Duns Scotus:66

... There cannot be an infinite regress of productive beings, each producing the being of the one following it. ...

6- Leibniz:67

... There cannot be an infinite regress of sufficient reasons. ...

In all these cosmological arguments one premise that must be proved is the impossibility of infinite regress in causes. Yet this is not possible in the view of Hume and Kant. I am not, here, in a position to examine all the demonstrations for proving the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes in response to the criticisms of Hume and Kant. Perhaps, some kinds of these demonstrations are not valid (like demonstrations for annulling preparatory causes), and some others which differ in kind have no trouble with those criticisms. I am, here, examining Seddiqin Argument with this criticism. As we said before in the section “the advantages of Mulla Sadra’s Seddiqin Argument over Avicenna’s”, (and, also, in Sabzavari and Tabatabaii’s view) this argument does not need a proof against the infinite regress of causes. To repeat:

Since in Avicenna's philosophy "quidditive possibility" is discussed, he needed to demonstrate the absurdity of infinite succession in proving the existence of God, while in Sadra's Seddiqin Argument in which existential poor-ness (poverty possibility) is mentioned there is no need to demonstrate the absurdity of infinite succession. Mulla Sadra himself after proposing his argument said about this advantage:68

"This way that we measured is firmest and most honorable and simplest one so that the disciple of Him does not need any intermediate thing other than Him for having a knowledge about His essence and attributes and acts; and there is, also, no need to annul infinite succession and circular causality..."

Some commentators of Sadra's philosophy are of the opinion, which they ascribe to him, that this argument not only does not need to rule out infinite succession but that it is a proof for rejecting any infinite succession.69

Notes

1 See David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

2 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Max Muller, pp. 398-[^403]: I will refer to this book in notes which will come later as “CPR”.

3 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

4 CPR. p. 404-410, see notes 1-4 also Norman L. Geisler Philosophy of Religion pp.145-147 and 181-[^185]:

5 You can find these criticisms in “Malkolm” in Plantinga, The Ontological Argument, p.136

6 See Anselm’s Basic Writings, translated by S. N. Deans, or Alvin Plantinga, The Ontological Argument, pp.3-[^27]:

7 Descartes Meditations in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, volume I, translated by Elizabeth S.

Haldane and G. R. T. Ross.

8 CPR. p. 399

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. [^398]:

12 Ibid., p. [^399]:

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, pp. 10-[^17]:

17 CPR, p.400

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. p. [^401]:

20 See Mulla Sadra, Asfar I pp. 292-[^294]: Mulla Sadra carefully shows the difference between these two kinds of predication in Islamic philosophy. By this distinction he has a good solution for soul important problems as mental existence and the characters of knowledge, etc.).

21 You can see all of these examples of the two kinds of predication in the following: Mulla Sadra, Asfar, pp. 238-240, Tabatabaii, Bedayat al-Hikmat , p. 27; and Nehayat al-Hikmat , p. [^58]:

22 See Norman L. Geisler, Philosophy of Religion, p. [^147]:

23 CPR, pp. 401-[^402]:

24 You can find that distinction (between two parts propositions and three parts propositions) and the illuminative philosophers’ objection against the fundamental reality of existence along with Mulla Sadra's and his disciples’ answers in: Mulla Sadra, Asfar I p. 40-47, Al-Mashaiir, p. 135-138; Tabatabaii, Bedayat al-Hikmat , p. 20-[^21]:

25 See part two, chapter 1, section “Types of existence”

26 CPR, p. 401

27 Ibid 28 See page [^75]:

29 CPR, p. [^403]:

30 .Ibid.

31 .See Sabzavari, Sharh al-Manzoomah, p. 29, and Javadi Amoli, Proof of Divine Existence p. [^203]:

32 CPR, p.398

33 See “A Debate on the Argument from Contingency”, F. C. Coplestone and Bertrand Russell, in Louis P.

Pojman, Philosophy of Religion, An Anthology, pp. 6-[^11]: This debate was broadcast in 1948 on the Third Program of the British Broadcasting Corporation and published in Why I Am Not a Christian, by Bertrand Russell.

34 John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp. 293-[^295]:

35 J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, pp. 82-[^86]:

36 See the beginning of the section “Existence” from chapter 1 of the second part.

37 See Mulla Sadra,* Al-Asfar* pp. 23-27, 68-69; Al-Shavahid al-Robubiyyat, pp. 7, 8; Al-Masha'ir, pp 13-19; Sabzavari Mulla hadi, Sharh al-Manzumat fi al-Hikmat in its translation by Mohaghegh Mehdi and Izutsu Toshihiko, The Metaphysics of Sabzavari p.[^31]:

38 Mulla Sadra, Al-Masha'ir, p .[^12]:

39 Mulla Sadra, Al-Shavahid al Robubiyyat, pp. 7-[^8]:

40 .See Mulla Sadra, Al-Shavahid al Robubiyyat, pp.14-17, M.H. Tabatabaii, Bedayat alHikmat , p. 13; Osoole Falsafeh wa Raveshe Realism (The Principles of Philosophy and Method of Realism) , p. 29

with footnotes by Motahhari.

41 A. Javadi Amoli, Proofs of Divine Existence, p. [^206]:

42 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958), B.634

43 .B.[^636]:

44 .B.[^635]:

45 .B.636-[^637]:

46 .B.632-[^633]:

47 Russell is not the only writer on the cosmological argument who thinks there is something superfluous about using a posteriori considerations to prove the existence of a necessary being. See, for example, H. J.

Paton, The Modern Predicament (London, 1955), pp. 199-200, and Patterson Brown, “St. Thomas’ Doctrine of Necessary Being”, The Philosophical Review, [^73]:1(January, 1964): 78. However, The writers, unlike Russell, do not attribute such a claim to Kant.

48 B.[^635]:

49 B.[^634]:

50 There are many passages indicating that for Kant a necessary being would be one whose existence can be determined a priori. (See, for example, B631, 640, 645, [^662]:) Thus he was well-positioned to make the objection Russell attributes to him. But he did not do so.

51 B. 634-635

52 B. 635

53 B. 636-637

54 .Norman L. Geisler, Philosophy of Religion, p. [^211]:

55 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Norman L. Geisler, Philosophy of Religion, p.

[^146]:

56 See page [^207]:

57 A. Javadi Amoli, Proofs of Divine Existence, p.163-[^164]:

58 Mulla Sadra’s statements about origin of the meaning of necessity and possibility is scattered in his book Asfar. To explain his view I use his commentator, A. Javadi Amoli; see A. Javadi Amoli, Proofs of Divine Existence, p.158-[^159]:

59 Ghazi Azodi Iji, Sharhi Mavaqif, Vol. III p.[^121]:

60 Mulla Sadra Asfar, vol. I p.[^91]:

61 A. Javadi Amoli, Proofs of Divine Existence, p. [^163]:

62 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII ch. 8

[^63]: Alfarabi, Oyoun al-Masa’il p. 50.

64 Avicenna, Al-Negat, p. [^210]:

65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1,2,3

66 Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, pp. 129ff.

67 Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, pp. 32-[^39]:

68 Mulla Sadra, Asfar, VI, pp. 25-[^26]:

69 See A. Javadi Amoli, Sharhe Hekmat Mota'alieh Asfar Arba'ah, sec.1 from vol. IV, p.134, and M.T. Mesbahi Yazdi, Amoozeshe Falsafeh, PP. 79-80,[^343]: