Mulla Sadra's Seddiqin Argument For the Existence of God

Conclusion

The Seddiqin Argument, as an argument for proving the existence, attributes and acts of God, is not much known by Western philosophy, what assumes there are three or four important sets of arguments for the existence of God, namely the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological and perhaps the moral. This can be because of the assumption in the view of Western thinkers that Islamic philosophy came to an end with the death of Averroes and/or it ceased to exist with what was written by Ghazzali (1058-1111) against philosophical thinking in his important and influential book, namely Tahafut al-Falasifat. In reality, what came to an end was only the first phase of the whole history of Islamic philosophy. With the death of Averroes, Islamic philosophy ceased to be alive for the West, but this does not mean that it ceased to be alive for the East. In fact, Islamic philosophy did not develop in all Muslim countries after Ghazzali and Averroes especially among Sunni Muslims; and in the Arabian areas there was no longer a large interest in developing philosophy. Since these Muslims were the majority and had more relations to the West, the assumption that there were no new philosophical views in Muslim countries grew in the West. This assumption was an obstacle between Islamic philosophy and Western philosophy and impeded active relation between their ideas.

In fact, the truth of the matter is that a kind of philosophy which deserves to be regarded as typically and characteristically Islamic developed not so much before the death of Averroes as after. This typically Islamic philosophy arose and matured in the periods subsequent to the Mongol invasion, until in the Safawid period in Iran it reached the apex of vigorous creativity. This peculiar type of Islamic philosophy which grew up in Iran among the Shiites has come to be known ashikmat or theosophy (lit. "wisdom"). We can trace the origin of thehikmat back to the very beginning of the above-mentioned second phase of the history of philosophy in Islam.

Hikmat is structurally a peculiar combination of rational thinking and Gnostic intuition, or, we might say, rationalist philosophy and mystical experience.

The most famous and important philosophers of this second phase of Islamic philosophy is Mulla Sadra. He had very new ideas in philosophy (especially ontology) that made him the brightest star in Islamic philosophy. His new ideas mark a turning-point in Islamic philosophy so that the other philosophers after him were affected by his view points.

The Seddiqin Argument that we analyzed in this research is a more developed argument for proving the existence of God in the light of his philosophical views about existence, necessity, causality etc. The fundamental reality (principality) of existence is the most important bases of his philosophy and can change our view about more other philosophical affairs.

Consequently, the above study is divided into three parts. The first introduced Mulla Sadra as an Islamic philosopher to make clear his background, life, works, views and historical relation to other schools, etc. This was a preparatory part for introducing the one who projected the Seddiqin Argument in the true Seddiqin manner of argumentation.

The second part was devoted to the explanation of the Seddiqin Argument. Since this argument is based on some philosophical views of Mulla Sadra that without which the argument can not be understood, I allocated three chapters for this explanation about “existence”, “necessity” and “causality” in his view. Then the Seddiqin Argument in Mulla Sadra’s view was presented in the interpretations of two contemporary commentators of his philosophy. There were not the final statements about Seddiqin Argument; for the argument had some background in Avicenna’s thought which Mulla Sadra improved, as well as developments after Mulla Sadra by Sabzavari and Tabatabaii, which were presented also. In the end of this part I compared the Seddiqin Argument with what is known in the western philosophy as the ontological argument, and enumerated three differences between these two arguments by which the Seddiqin Argument has been vaccinated against some criticisms made against the ontological argument.

The third part examined the Seddiqin Argument in relation to standard criticisms that raised against the soundness of ontological and cosmological arguments.

Since most important criticisms are taken from Hume and Kant, their criticisms were first presented, then the Seddiqin Argument was examined in relation to these criticisms specially those ones which refer to existence and necessity. This part reviewed seven more important criticisms. Since other criticisms are studied indirectly during explanation of the foundations of Seddiqin Argument, they were not examined later but could be part of another larger study of this argument afterwards.

The Seddiqin Argument was not originally an attempt to prove that God, as that which most people conceive, exists, but is an attempt to transcend our perception to the real meaning of God that according to Mulla Sadra is nothing but the pure truth of existence. The difficulty in proving the existence of God is not in affirming the proposition “God exists” but in having a good knowledge and conception about Him.

The negation of His existence is because of weakness not in the argumentation but in the conception of His nature. Avicenna said in his Logic: “all thanks belong to God that whoever denies Him [does not deny Him but] of course denies what he has conceived.” When one has a good transcendent perception from God it is equal to affirming His existence.

I think Mulla Sadra reached this view because of some hints from Islamic thought about this matter in the Quran and some prayers quoted from the prophet Mohammed and his relatives. In one of these prayers it is said:

“... How can it be demonstrated for You [God] by what is not but need in existence to You? Does any other than You have any appearance that You do not have, so that it can make You appear? When did You disappear so that You need a reason that denote You? And when did You go out of sight so that some effects can be what cause us to reach to You? ...”

Therefore, the arguments which use some effects or special facts in the universe to reach to God do not have enough power to give us a good conception about God who must be clearer than those effects. In the light of this view, Mulla Sadra introduced his Seddiqin Argument which arises from most evident facts in the world, i.e., existence (or reality in Tabatabaii’s view).

What he did was to give not a demonstration, but a good survey of the reality of existence that refers firstly to God then to other things. In this survey, he founded his philosophy on the fundamental reality of existence and its circumstances. In my research I introduced only a brief survey of the results of this view in his philosophy. The fundamental reality of existence has also other consequences in other philosophical matters like the reality of time and the substantial movement in the world. A thorough survey of the fundamental reality of existence and its results need more research. However, I used only those parts of his philosophy that are essential to introduce the Seddiqin Argument. I explained, in this research, only the main purpose of the Seddiqin Argument that is proving the existence of God in the views of Mulla Sadra and his disciples.

This argument has also some other consequences more beyond proving the existence of God, and Mulla Sadra’s argument is so structured that can be useful for these results. These consequences can be used for proving the unity (in some special meaning) of God, the quality of his attributes and the relation between God and other beings.

Explanation of these consequences also can be done in some other researches which can clarify the differences between his view in the light of the fundamental reality of existence and other traditional conceptions about these matters.

For example, he has a detailed and interesting answer to the problem of evil by his view about attributes of God (like His power and mercy) and the relation of God to other beings. The survey in his answer to this problem can also be the subject of further research. He also has a term explaining the nature of God, namely, “the simple truth all things and not any of them”. But it can be difficult to understand what he means, yet it is also very comprehensive explanation of the matter. The present research could prepare other research in these fields.

The Seddiqin Argument differs from both the ontological and the cosmological arguments both in the kind of argumentation and in the conception of and intention from God. These two arguments have encountered some objections. Hume and Kant criticized them systematically and the other philosophical objections usually originate from their criticisms. Some of these criticisms arise from analysis of some philosophical affairs like existence, necessity etc. Some of these standard critics created serious troubles for some kind of these arguments (especially the ontological) so that their correctness were in question.

Mulla Sadra based his Seddiqin Argument on such founds that they could be protected against these criticisms. He proposed his philosophical foundations in detail in order to protect the argument from those attacks. Consequently, to examine the Seddiqin Argument with those systematic criticisms, we must survey the foundations of the Seddiqin Argument in Mulla Sadra’s view.

The third part examined, the Seddiqin argument and its foundations along with the more important standard criticisms and tried to show that these criticisms do not disturb the Seddiqin Argument because it provide a new idea about God which is nothing but the pure truth of existence and a new argumentation that strengthens this idea. These criticisms focused on existence and necessity. Some other criticisms were enumerated, but they were not so important that Seddiqin Argument was examined directly with them. These criticisms were answered indirectly during explanation of foundations of Seddiqin Argument. The position of Seddiqin Argument against these criticisms and also some others posed by other philosophers like Russell, Haspers, Mackie etc. can be examined in another research that may show Mulla Sadra’s answer to these objections. The present research can provide the main key for solving those problems.