The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-century Philosophy

4- Conclusion: The Varieties of Analysis

What conclusions can be drawn from these studies of analysis in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology? At the very least, they should correct some common misunderstandings. It is frequently assumed that ‘analysis’ just means decomposition, and that it is analysis in this sense, particularly in the form of conceptual analysis, that is characteristic of analytic philosophy. But as we have seen, there are many other forms of analysis in play, even if they combine with decompositional analysis in intricate ways in actual practices of analysis. Moreover, the decompositional conception and its centrality in reductive projects was subjected to criticism at just the time that analytic philosophy began to establish itself as a tradition in the early 1930s.

Distinctive forms of analysis did indeed emerge in analytic philosophy and phenomenology. In my view, the most important of these was Frege’s introduction of quantificational logical analysis (a type of transformative analysis, extending function-argument analysis from mathematics to logic), which was further developed and pursued by Russell, most notably, in the theory of descriptions. Not only did this open up new possibilities of philosophical analysis (reductive, eliminative and explicatory) but the issues raised by its use also set much of the agenda in the development of analytic philosophy. As far as phenomenology is concerned, the introduction of the method of reduction was what Husserl himself saw as his breakthrough. Aimed at identifying and clarifying the presuppositions in our everyday and scientific thinking, this can be regarded as the central characteristic of the parallel analytic turn that took place in giving rise to phenomenology.

Moore’s and Russell’s rebellion against British idealism was a significant moment in the development of analytic philosophy, but it was not significant because it introduced a new form of analysis. On the contrary, it simply took over an existing, decompositional conception, in a particularly crude form. It was significant because it marked the start of a sustained attempt to follow through the implications of putting that conception to work, in the context of rejecting idealism. Russell was far more successful than Moore in this regard, most importantly, because he was able to draw on and develop quantificational logic, driven by his aim of demonstrating logicism. This led to the more complex form of analysis exemplified by the theory of descriptions, combining transformative logical analysis with decompositional metaphysical analysis. What characterizes the analytic turn in giving rise to analytic philosophy, then, was thissynthesis of two forms of analysis, and what has characterized analytic philosophy ever since is the continually developing syntheses of forms of analysis that have their roots in the work of the early analytic philosophers. Those forms have evolved in response to the changing epistemological and metaphysical environments.

As I said above, this volume focuses on certain key figures in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology in the period prior to the Second World War. As I have tried to bring out, a revealing picture of the development of philosophical analysis emerges. But even in the period concerned, there are many other significant figures and relationships, consideration of which would shed further light on this development. A fuller story would have to include, for example, the debate about analysis among those connected with the Cambridge School of Analysis,[^20] the interaction between Wittgenstein and the various members of the Vienna Circle,[^21] the impact of Carnap and other logical empiricists on the American scene,[^22] the transformation of phenomenology by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976),[^23] and Ryle’s early engagement with phenomenology.[^24]

In the wider context, there are also relationships between philosophers within and without the two traditions that are important in understanding the differing conceptions of analysis. The debate between Russell and Joachim is discussed by Griffin, but Russell also sparred, for example, with Henri Bergson (1859-1941), who was a very influential figure in the first half of the twentieth century and whose ideas on the superiority of ‘intuition’ over analysis Russell criticized.[^25] Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) was even more important, and the influence of psychoanalysis on philosophical methodology and on Wittgenstein’s method, in particular, has frequently been discussed.[^26] There are also other philosophers who wrote on methodology and who developed conceptions of analysis in direct opposition to those of analytic philosophers, most notably, R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943), who was concerned to combat both Moorean philosophy and the logical positivism of A. J. Ayer (1910-89).[^27]

All of this is part of the complex story that is the history of twentieth-century philosophical analysis. At a time when the history of analytic philosophy has come of age, I hope that the papers brought together in the present volume will provide the basis for further investigations of philosophical analysis and the relationships between the analytic and phenomenological traditions. At a time, too, when philosophical methodology is once again high on the agenda, I also hope that the volume will encourage greater self-consciousness about methodology and appreciation of the varieties of analysis and of the value of understanding the historical roots of the conceptions and methods that we all too often take for granted.[^28]