The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth-century Philosophy

Notes


[^1] For detailed accounts of the development of Russell’s early philosophy in the context of British idealism, see Griffin 1991 and Hylton [^1990]: For an account of Moore’s philosophy, see Baldwin 1990.

[^2] For an outline of the history of the decompositional conception of analysis, see Beaney 2003a.

[^3] Again, for an outline of the history of the transformative conception of analysis, see Beaney 2003a.

[^4] Wisdom [^1931]: Cf. Hacker 1996, pp. 72, 281. I mention Bentham’s conception in talking of ‘paraphrastic analysis’ in §1 of my paper (p. [6]) below.

[^5] This requires qualification, since Frege also came to think that phrases of the form ‘The concept F’ are misleading. So further analysis is needed. But I ignore these complications here. I say more in §2 of my paper below.

[^6] For details, see Beaney 2003a, §[^6]:5, where further references can be found; 2003b, which focuses on the central role played in the debate by Susan Stebbing (1885-1943). Cf. §1 of my paper below.

[^7] On Carnap’s conception of explication, as it developed from the idea of rational reconstruction in the Aufbau, see also Beaney [^2004]:

[^8] Reference to the ‘phänomenologische Reduktion’ occurs in the so-called ‘Seefeld’ manuscripts of 1905; cf. Schuhmann 1977, p. [^92]: The first public mention occurs in lectures given in 1906-7 (Husserl 1906-7). Cf. Mohanty 1995, p. 57; Moran 2000, pp. 138, 146, 493.

[^9] See, for example, the papers published in Horgan, Tienson and Potrč [^2002]:

[^10] Once again, for an outline of the history of the regressive conception of analysis, see Beaney 2003a. Let me clarify my use of the terms ‘mode’ and ‘conception’ at this point (cf. §1 of my paper, pp. [2-3] below). As I see it, in actual practices of analysis, all three of the modes I have distinguished are typically involved, as illustrated by Frege’s logicist project (cf. §2 of Reck’s paper below). But one of those modes may be privileged in a certain conception, and then we may speak, e.g., of the decompositional conception (such as the early Moore undoubtedly had).

[^11] For an account of Husserl’s ‘discovery’ of reduction, see Moran 2000, ch. [^4]:

[^12] See Burge 2005, especially the introduction and the papers in Part III.

[^13] See Frege 1914; cf. Frege [^2004]: I discuss the relationship between Frege and Carnap on the issue of explication in Beaney 2004.

[^14] This has frequently been referred to as just ‘Hume’s Principle’; but this does not do justice to Georg Cantor’s role in the story of the use of this principle. Cf. Reck and Beaney 2005, p. [^1]:

[^15] In Levine’s account, these are formulated slightly differently, as (Num1) and (Num2); cf. p. [10] below.

[^16] Admittedly, in the Grundlagen (1884), Frege went on to raise some doubts about the use of contextual definition, but his subsequent introduction in the Grundgesetze (1893) of Axiom V, which asserts an analogous equivalence, did not indicate any change in his underlying view of the status of such equivalences, and hence of his conception of numbers as objects.

[^17] Levine notes that Russell introduced logicist definitions of numbers in the spring of 1901, but as late as May 1902 was still hesitant about identifying numbers with equivalence classes (see pp. [12, 15] below).

[^18] See especially Griffin 1991 and Hylton 1990, [^2005]:

[^19] It is based on a paper I gave at a conference on the common sources of the two traditions in Memphis in 2001, and which was subsequently published as Beaney [^2002]: I have substantially shortened it for the present volume. I also drew on this paper in my entry on analysis for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Beaney 2003a), where further details can be found, as well as an extensive bibliography on conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy.

[^20] Cf. Beaney 2003b; Urmson [^1956]:

[^21] See, e.g., Baker [^1988]:

[^22] See, e.g., Hylton [^2001]:

[^23] See, e.g., Moran 2000, ch. [^6]:

[^24] See, e.g., the debate between Thomasson 2003 and Brandl [^2003]:

[^25] See Russell 1912, [^1913]:

[^26] See, e.g., Baker 2004, chs. 8-[^10]:

[^27] Collingwood 1933, [^1940]: Cf. Beaney 2001, 2005.

[^28] I am grateful to the contributors to this volume, and especially Peter Hacker and Erich Reck, for comments on the first draft of this introduction.