The Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam
Chapter 6: The Abdication of Hasan
During the last year of 'Ali's caliphate, Muawiya b. Abi Sufyan, the
governor of Syria and the main challenger of 'Ali, managed to bring a
large part of the Muslim empire under his control. He also had the
authority vested in him, though under doubtful and ambiguous
circumstances, by 'Amr b. al-As at the arbitration of Adruh after the
battle of Siffin. Nevertheless, he could not claim for himself the title
of Amir al-Mu'minin while 'Ali was yet alive. 'Ali was still the
legitimate caliph chosen by the community at large in Medina; this was
not publicly repudiated by the community as a whole, nor was the
declaration of Abu Musa al-Ash'ari deposing 'Ali and that of 'Amr b.
al-'As installing Mu'awiya accepted by the Muhajirun and the Ansar.
Thus, despite all his military and political successes, Mu'awiya could
do no more than style himself only as Amir.[^1]
With 'Ali's assassination, the road was finally cleared for the
realization of the ultimate goal of Mu'awiya's ambitions. The very
favourable circumstances that prevailed in the form of the impotence of
Medina and the remnant of the pious section of the community and the
vacillating nature of the Iraqi supporters of 'Ali's successor Hasan,
coupled with the characteristic shrewdness of Mu'awiya, made it easier
for him to complete the task he had initiated after the death of
'Uthman: the seizure of the caliphate for himself and his clan.
Hasan, the elder son of 'All and Fatima, was acclaimed as caliph by
forty thousand people in Kufa immediately after the death of his
father.[^2] We are told that at the battle of Siffin (Safar 37/July
657), less than three years before his death, 'Ali had in his army
seventy Companions who fought for the
Prophet at Badr, seven hundred of those who renewed their allegiance to
Muhammad (bay'at ar-ridwan) at the time of the treaty of Hudaybiya, and
another four hundred from other Muhajirun and Ansar.[^3] Many of them
were still residing in Kufa with 'Ali as he prepared for a final
encounter with Muawiya. They must have participated in the election of
Hasan and must have accepted him as the new caliph, otherwise our
sources would have recorded their opposition to his succession. To this
there is no testimony at all. The people of Medina and Mecca seem to
have received the news with satisfaction, or at least with acquiescence.
This is evident from the fact that not a single voice of protest or
opposition from these cities against Hasan's accession can be located in
the sources.
Two major reasons can be advanced for this attitude. First, at the time
of 'Ali's death almost all the distinguished Companions of the Prophet
from among the Muhajirun were dead. Of the six members of the Shura
appointed by 'Umar, only Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas was still alive; the other
members of the leading elite of the community had also died.
Among the younger nobility such as 'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas, 'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr, Muhammad b. Talha, and 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar, none could match Hasan, the elder and dearest grandson of the prophet. The people of Medina still remembered that ardent love and affection which the Prophet had showered upon his grandsons: that he interrupted his sermon and descended from the pulpit to pick up Hasan, who had stumbled over his long tunic and fallen down while entering the mosque;[^4] that he allowed his grandchildren to climb on his back while he was prostrating himself in prayer.[^5]
There are numerous accounts describing extraordinary favours being bestowed by Muhammad on his grandsons; these are preserved not only by the Shi'i sources, but are overwhelmingly transmitted by the Sunni works as well.[^6] Hasan is also unanimously reported to have resembled the Prophet in appearance.[^7] Secondly, the people of Mecca and Medina naturally could not be expected to be pleased to see Mu'awiya, the son of Abu Sufyan, the representative of the clan of Umayya, become their leader. It was Abu Sufyan who had organized the opposition to Muhammad and had led all the campaigns against him.
The Umayyads in general, and the Sufyanids in particular, did not
acknowledge Muhammad until the fall of Mecca; their Islam was therefore
considered to be of convenience rather than conviction. Mu'awiya, for
his part, depended on the support of the Syrians, whom he had
consolidated behind himself, and to whom he had been attached for close
to twenty years as governor of the province, and on the support of his
large and powerful clan and their clients and allies who swarmed around
him. It was therefore natural, under the circumstances, that the
inhabitants of the holy cities, who formed the nucleus of the Islamic
Umma, would not oppose Hasan's caliphate, especially since the
alternative was the son of Abu Sufyan and Hind.
As for the people of Iraq, the eldest son of 'Ali was the only logical
choice, though not all of his supporters were motivated by the same
feelings or attachment to the same cause. To a great number of them
Hasan's succession meant the continuation of 'Ali's policy against the
rule of Mu'awiya and against the domination of Syria over Iraq. To some
others, Hasan was now the only person worthy of leading the community on
religious grounds.
Whether motivated by merely political or by religious considerations,
however, it cannot be denied that the Iraqis acclaimed Hasan as caliph
on the grounds that he was the grandson of the Prophet through 'Ali and
Fatima. Hasan's spontaneous selection after the death of 'Ali also
indicated Iraqi inclinations, though in vague terms, towards the
legitimate succession to the leadership of the community in the line of
'Ali. It seems that the people of Iraq, even at that early period, were
quite clear in distinguishing the line of the Prophet through Fatima
from other members of the Hashimite clan, otherwise they would have
chosen, for example, 'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas, who was a cousin of the
Prophet, was senior in age to Hasan and was experienced in affairs of
state, having been 'Ali's governor in Basra.[^8] Hasan's close
relationship to the Prophet is frequently referred to as the reason for
the special consideration of the people for him.
Following the custom established by Abu Bakr, Hasan made a speech on
the occasion of his accession to the caliphate. In this speech, reported
in many sources with varying lengths and wordings, Hasan praised the
merits of his family and the special rights and unmatched qualities of
his father. He emphasized his own intimate relations with the Prophet,
described his own merits and claims, and quoted the verses of the Qur'an
which exalt the special position of the Ahl al-Bayt.[^9] Qays b. Sa'd b.
'Ubada al-Ansari, an ardent supporter of 'Ali and a trusted commander of
his army, was the first to pay homage to him.
The forty thousand troops of Iraq who had sworn allegiance to 'Ali on the condition to die for him ('ala'l-mawt) readily hailed Hasan as their new caliph.[^10] Apparently expressing his own sentiments as well as those of the Iraqi army, Qays tried to impose the condition that the bay'a should be based, not only on the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet, but also on the condition of the war (qital) against those who declared licit (halal) that which is illicit (haram). Hasan, however, succeeded in avoiding this commitment by saying that the last condition was implicitly included in the first two. The more militant among the Iraqis, eager to fight against Mu'awiya, were not in favour of exclusion of the third condition from the terms of the bay'a, but they nevertheless paid their allegiance to him.[^11]
Later events would demonstrate that Hasan was perhaps from the very
beginning quite apprehensive of the fickle-mindedness of the Iraqis and
their lack of resolution in time of trials; and thus he wanted to avoid
commitment to an extreme stand which might lead to complete disaster. He
was moreover a peace-loving man of mild temper who hated to see the
shedding of Muslim blood.^12 However, according to the majority of the
sources, the oath of allegiance taken by those present stipulated that:
“They should make war on those who were at war with Hasan, and should
live in peace with those who were at peace with Hasan.”[^13]
Hasan's acclamation as caliph by the Iraqis, and a tacit approval, at
least an absence of protest or opposition, from the Hijaz, Yemen, and
Persia, were a great cause of alarm to Mu'awiya, who had been working
for the office since the death of 'Uthman and who, after five years of
ceaseless struggle, at last saw a clear path to undisputed authority
since 'Ali was no longer alive. He lost no time in taking action. First
of all, as soon as the news of Hasan's selection reached Mu'awiya, he
denounced the appointment, and both in speeches and in letters announced
his firm decision not to recognize Hasan a caliph.[^14] secondly, he
dispatched many of his agents and spies to arouse the people against
Hasan. Such agents had already been quite active in the provinces of
Yemen, Persia, and the Hijaz, which were still within 'Air's domain
though not fully under his control at the time he was killed.
These agents were active even in the heart of Iraq and Kufa, 'Ali's only
solid possession. Of this activity there is no doubt at all. This
already organized espionage network was now intensified by Mu'awiya and
expanded to a much larger scale. There are numerous exchanges of letters
on the subject of these spies between Hasan and Mu'awiya and between
'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas and Mu'awiya.[^15] Mu'awiya did not even deny
these subversive activities. Finally, he began preparations for war and
summoned all the commanders of his forces in Syria, Palestine, and
Transjordan to join him.
Not long after, the Syrian leader marched against Hasan with an army of
sixty thousand men,[^16] taking the usual military route through
Mesopotamia to Maskin, on the Tigris boundary of Mosul towards the
Sawad. When Mu'awiya warlike intentions became clear, Hasan had to
prepare for war and was compelled to take the field before he had time
either to strengthen himself in his position or to reorganize the
administration that had been thrown into chaos by the death of his
father.
The purpose of this prompt action by Mu'awiya was two fold: first, by
his demonstration of arms and strength, he hoped to force Hasan to come
to terms; and secondly, if that course of action failed, he would attack
the Iraqi forces before they had time to consolidate their position. It
was for the first reason that Mu'awiya intentionally moved towards Iraq
at a very slow pace, while sending letter after letter to Hasan asking
him not to try to fight and urging him to come to terms.
If Hasan was defeated on the battlefield, this would give Mu'awiya only
power and authority; but if Hasan abdicated, this would provide Mu'awiya
with a legal base and legitimize his authority as well. This was what
was trying to achieve. Moreover, Hasan defeated, or even killed, still
represented a serious threat unless he resigned his rights; another
member of the Hashimite house could simply claim to be his successor.
Should he resign in favour of Mu'awiya, such claims would have no
validity and the Umayyad position would be secured. This strategy proved
correct, as will be seen below. Even after the death of Hasan, ten years
later, when the people of Iraq approached his younger brother Husayn
concerning an uprising, the latter advised them to wait as long as
Mu'awiya was alive because of Hasan's treaty
with him.
The correspondence between Hasan and Mu'awiya, which continued
throughout this period, makes interesting reading and provides some
useful information. Both referred to the old question of the caliphate
with polemical arguments. In one of his long letters to Mu'awiya, Hasan
argued his rights to the caliphate on the grounds that the authority of
the caliphate stems from the Prophet of God, who was the most excellent
and the best of men on earth and through whose guidance the Arabs found
light while they were deep in darkness and attained honour and glory
while they were disgraced, and that Hasan was the nearest to the Prophet
in blood and relationship. Hasan then used his father's argument, which
the latter had advanced against Abu Bakr after the death of Muhammad,
that if Quraysh could claim the leadership over the Ansar on the grounds
that the Prophet belonged to Quraysh, then the members of his family,
who were the nearest to him in every respect, were better qualified for
the leadership of the community. In the last part of his letter Hasan
wrote:
“We were shocked to see that some people snatched away our right from
us even though they were men of excellence, virtues, and merits, and
were the forerunners in Islam [reference to the first three caliphs].
But now what a great astonishment and shock it is to see that you, O
Mu'awiya, are attempting to accede to a thing which you do not deserve.
You do not possess any known merit in religion (din), nor have you any
trace (athar) in Islam which has ever been praised. On the contrary, you
are the son of the leader of the opposition party from among the parties
(hizb min al-ahzab) [a reference to the “confederacy” which under
Mu'awiya's father, Abu Sufyan, made the last united effort to crush
Medina]; and you are the son of the greatest enemy of the Prophet from
among Quraysh… so give up your persistence in falsehood (batil) and
enter into my homage as other people have done, for you are certainly
aware of the fact that I am far more entitled to the caliphate than you
in the eyes of God and all worthy people. Fear God, restrain yourself
from rebellion and from shedding the blood of the Muslims; for, by God,
there would be no good for you to meet your Lord with the responsibility
of the blood of the Muslims.”[^17]
Mu'awiya's detailed reply to Hasan is even more interesting, especially
since he used the argument used by 'Umar b. al-Khattab against 'Ali.
Writing to Hasan, Mu'awiya argued:
“Whatever you said about the excellence and merits of the Prophet, he
was indeed the most excellent among all men before and after him, past
or present, young or old. Indeed God had chosen Muhammad for His
message, and through him we received guidance, were saved from
destruction, and came out from darkness and error.
“You have mentioned the death of the Prophet and the dispute which took
place among the Muslims at that time. In this you are clearly making
accusations against Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and Abu 'Ubayda, and against those
virtuous men among the Muhajirun and Ansar. I hate this accusation
against the people whose actions, according to us and other people, were
beyond doubt and reproach.
“When this community had some disagreements after the Prophet
concerning the leadership, it was not ignorant of your family's merits,
your priority, and your close relationship to the Prophet; and the
community was also not unaware of your exalted place in Islam and your
qualifications in it. But the community saw that this thing [the
caliphate] would be better placed among Quraysh in general and they
therefore selected Abu Bakr.
This is what the people thought best in the interest of the community.
You are asking me to settle the matter peacefully and surrender, but the
situation concerning you and me today is like the one between you [your
family] and Abu Bakr after the death of the Prophet. Had I believed that
you had a better grasp over the subject people than I do, that you could
protect the community better than I, and you were stronger in
safeguarding the properties of the Muslims and in outwitting the enemy
than I, then I would have done what you have asked me. But I have a
longer period of reign [probably referring to his governorship], and am
more experienced, better in policies, and older in age than you. It
would therefore be better for you not to insist on what you have asked
me; if you enter into obedience to me now, you will accede to the
caliphate after me.”[^18]
Mu'awiya's letter is significant in that it gives a clear idea of the
direction Muslim polity was henceforth opting to adopt openly.
Mu'awiya's arguments for his claims to the caliphate manifest those
guidelines and the principles by which the question of the caliphate had
been previously decided in the case of the first three caliphs, and he
claimed that the same considerations must remain the deciding factors
now and in the future.
To him it was the interest of the state and the profane aspects of the community which must decide the question of the leadership. Mu'awiya did not deny Hasan's exalted position in relation to the Prophet and his superior place in Islam, but claimed that this was not the criterion for the leadership of the community. The qualifications for the office, according to Mu'awiya's arguments, were personal power and strength, ability in political affairs and administration, expansion of the empire, and ability to defend the Muslims and rule the subject effectively. In this way, Mu'awiya made explicit what had been so far implicit: the separation between political and religious principles, which was henceforth permanently established. Thus, in due course, the majority of the Muslims placed the religious leadership in the totality of the community (Jama'a), represented by the 'ulama', as the custodian of religion and the exponent of the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet, while accepting state authority as binding.
They came to be known as the Sunnis. A minority of the Muslims, on the
other hand, could not find satisfaction for their religious aspirations
except in the charismatic leadership from among the people of the house
of the Prophet, the Ahl al-Bayt, as the sole exponents of the Qur'an and
the Prophetic Sunna, although this minority too had to accept the
state's authority. This group was called the Shi'a.
Before proceeding further in an attempt to reconstruct the events which
ultimately led to the abdication of Hasan, a word seems necessary
regarding the sources of our information on the subject. The struggle
between Hasan and Mu'awiya has not yet been thoroughly and critically
studied and remains one of the most obscure chapters of early Islamic
history. Wellhausen, giving only a short and sketchy account of Hasan's
abdication,[^19] complains that the events are recorded with confusion
and fragmentation and that it is, therefore, difficult to place certain
critical details of the episode in precise chronological order. Indeed,
chronology is always a serious problem in early Muslim histories. But in
his brief description of the subject it seems that Wellhausen depended
solely on Ya'qubi,[^20] Dinawari,[^21] 'and Tabari.[^22] Both Yaqubi and
Dinawari usually gloss over details in their short and compact
histories, and it would therefore be futile to expect from them a
comprehensive account of the abdication of Hasan.
Tabari provides more information than the first two but does not cover
the subject with his usual thoroughness and he leaves the reader
unsatisfied on many important questions. Moreover, all three of these
sources suffer from a common weakness in that their renderings lack the
exact sequence of events, a problem which makes it difficult to
determine whether Hasan abdicated of his own free will or was forced by
the circumstances to do so.
There are, however, three other early and important sources which were
not' used by or were unavailable to Wellhausen. These works, already
referred to above, were authored by Ibn A'tham al-Kufi[^23] (died ca.
314/926), Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahani[^24] (died 356/967), and Ibn
Abi'l-Hadid[^25] (died 655/1257). Abi'l-Faraj records the whole event
from Abu Mikhnaf with verifications and additions from five other chains
of transmitters, commenting that “these narratives are mixed one with
the other, but are near in meaning to each other.”
Ibn Abi'l-Hadid, though a late author, is one of the best informed. He
takes his material primarily from the famous early historian Mada'ini
and completes the account from Abu Mikhnaf. The second part of Ibn
Abi'l-Hadid's account thus is similar to the corresponding portion of
Abu'l-Faraj; the fact that both Abo Mikhnaf and Mada'ini wrote on the
subject is confirmed by the lists of their works recorded by Ibn
Nadim.[^26]
Abu Muhammad Ahmad b. A'tham al-Kufi al-Kindi must be given a place of
special importance, for his Kitab al-Futuh is perhaps one of the
earliest comprehensive and systematic works on the early conquests of
Islam and the civil strife in the community. According to Doctor
Sha'ban,[^27] a modern scholar, this work was composed in 204/819; this
mean: his date of death must be placed some time in the middle of the
3rd/9th century and not in 314/926 as has so far been assumed. In any
case, his history has proved to be a major source for the early history
of the Arabs, particularly for events in Iraq. Ibn A'tham was fortunate
enough to have access to the works of Zuhri, Abu Mikhnaf, Ibn al-Kalbi,
and some other lesser traditionists in their original and unadulterated
forms. According to his methodology, as is evident in the Futuh, he
combines the traditions of these early writers into a connected and
coherent historical narrative without interruptions and without citing
his sources for each individual tradition.
Nevertheless, whenever he records some significant tradition, he does
mention the name of his source; in this respect Mada'ini is the most
frequently cited authority. According to Sha'ban, Ibn A'tham, being a
contemporary of Mada'ini, had the pronounced advantage of quoting this
great master in his lifetime.[^28] Comparison of the narratives of Ibn
A'tham with the tradition of Mada'ini recorded by Tabari show that Ibn
A'tham not only provides a useful check for the material recorded by
Tabari, but also adds important details which Tabari has ignored and
which are preserved in the Kitab al-Futuh. In the episode of Hasan it is
through Ibn A'tham that the complete narrative of Mada'ini has come down
to us. This is confirmed by a comparison of Ibn A'tham's account with
that of Ibn Abi'l-Hadid, who cites Mada'ini as well; the latter gives
only an abridged version of Hasan's abdication, but Ibn A'tham has
recorded a complete description of the course of events from Mada'ini.
From these three sources we receive the complete texts of the lengthy
correspondence between Hasan and Mu'awiya, of which only two letters
have been quoted above. There seems to be no reason for doubting the
authenticity of these texts. There is a rich literature of
correspondence exchanged between important personalities during the
classical period of Islam, and this material is frequently quoted in the
Arabic sources.[^29] The correspondence between Hasan and Mu'awiya must
be considered in this light and must be given its due importance.
Together with the other sources mentioned above, such literature enables
us to form a clearer picture of the episode than has so far been
available.
Tabari narrates the events in two independent versions from Zuhri and
'Awana. Zuhri's account seems somewhat to favour the case of Mu'awiya at
the expense of Hasan,[^30] or at least glosses over those details which
might weaken the position of the founder of the Umayyad caliphate. This
is understandable, for Zuhri was closely attached to the Umayyad court
and was writing under the successors of Mu'awiya. His account is an
unclear isolated report not recorded by other authorities; and in
contrast to this, 'Awana's account[^31] appears to have been more
balanced in describing the circumstances under which Hasan abdicated.
Unlike Zuhri's version, 'Awana's bears considerable historical merit in
that it very largely conforms with the accounts reported by other
authorities such as Ya'qubi and Dinawari.
According to Zuhri, Hasan was from the very beginning inclined to hand
over the caliphate to Mu'awiya in return for the most favourable terms
he could secure for himself from his rival. Before his death 'Ali had
entrusted the leadership of his forty-thousand-man Iraqi army to Qays b.
Sa'd, one of his trusted and zealous supporters, for the campaign
against Mu'awiya. Qays was a great enemy of Mu'awiya and the Syrians,
and had sworn allegiance to 'Ali to the death. Hasan knew that Qays
would never agree to his plans for abdicating in favour of Mu'awiya, and
therefore he deposed Qays from the command of the army and appointed
'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas in his place.
The Kufans were already suspicious of Hasan's intentions because he had not clearly committed himself to fight against Mu'awiya at the time when homage was paid to the former. Soon they came to the conclusion that Hasan was not the person to lead them against their Syrian enemies, and they became increasingly restless. Not long after Hasan came to be aware of their ill-feelings towards him, he was attacked by a Kufan and sustained a lance wound in his thigh. Unlike all the other accounts, Zuhri specifies neither the place nor the timing of this attack on Hasan, which renders the whole account still more ambiguous and unclear.
After having been attacked, Hasan hastily wrote toMu'awiya that he was renouncing the caliphate on the condition of receiving from him a certain sum of money. As Hasan sent his envoy to Mu'awiya with his letter, the latter simultaneously dispatched his own envoy to Hasan with a blank sheet of paper, signed and sealed by Mu'awiya, on which Hasan was to inscribe whatever terms for abdication he wanted. The letters crossed. When Mu'awiya received Hasan's letter he was overjoyed to see that the latter had decided to abdicate without much difficulty; he kept Hasan's letter as evidence of this and informed him that he had accepted Hasan's terms. When Hasan received Mu'awiya's carte blanche letter, he added further financial demands on it. Upon meeting Mu'awiya, perhaps on the occasion of the official transfer of power, he asked the Syrian leader to discard his previous letter and replace it with the carte blanche on which Hasan had written new terms regarding financial arrangements.
Mu'awiya now refused to grant anything further, saying: “Everything you
first requested I agreed to and granted to you; my open offer to you
cannot any more be binding on me since you have already committed
yourself.” Hasan therefore could get nothing more from Mu'awiya and was
sorry for his hasty action in writing his terms of abdication.[^32]
Zuhri also tells us that as soon as 'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas noticed
that Hasan was negotiating terms of abdication with Mu'awiya, he himself
secretly began treating with Mu'awiya for safe conduct and a grant of
money for himself. Mu'awiya readily agreed to Ibn 'Abbas' terms,
whereupon the latter abandoned the army and moved to Mu'awiya's camp in
the darkness of night.[^33]
Hasan's army, finding itself without a leader, again chose Qays as
commander on the condition that he carry on the war until the adherents
of 'Ali were granted amnesty and security for their lives and property.
Qays easily gained these concessions from Mu'awiya, who himself was
quite willing to grant such concessions if it would enable him to reach
a peaceful settlement and avoid a confrontation with Qays' strong army.
He made direct offers to Qays himself, but the latter refused the money
that was offered to him by Mu'awiya and, without making any deal for
himself, he gave up resistance on condition of amnesty and security for
the Iraqi army.[^34]
Zuhri's pragmatism in reporting the events of the abdication of Hasan
raises more questions than it answers. This account, which clearly shows
minimal resistance on the part of Hasan, must have been circulated by
the Umayyads themselves, who, in the absence of the three principles of
ijma', nass, and shura by which the previous four caliphs had been
nominated, were anxious to find a legal basis for their rule. Hasan's
voluntary abdication in favour of Mu'awiya, as Zuhri would have us
believe, provides such a legal ground. It was natural that Zuhri in the
environment of Umayyad Damascus, should adopt the tradition which must
have been most popular and in widest circulation in that city. The
events that led to Hasan's abdication do not seem, however, to have been
as simple as Zuhri describes.
'Awana's account in Tabari[^35] and in the other sources named above
gives a somewhat different impression of the events and stands in sharp
contrast to that of Zuhri. According to 'Awana, Qays did not have
command of the whole army during the lifetime of 'Ali, but rather only
of the vanguard of 12,000 men, over which he continued to retain command
when Hasan succeeded his father. At the news of Mu'awiya's advance
towards Iraq, Hasan sent Qays with his 12,000 troops as an advance guard
to check the enemy until Hasan himself could follow with the main
force.[^36] According to Ya'qubi, Abu'l-Faraj, and Ibn Abi'l-Hadid, the
vanguard of 12,000 men was sent by Hasan under the command of 'Ubayd
Allah b. al-'Abbas, and along with him were sent Qays b. Sa'd and Sa'id
b. Qays as advisors by whose counsel 'Ubayd Allah was to be guided.[^37]
The reason for Hasan's delay in departure seems to have been some lack
of enthusiasm on the part of his supporters. This is evident from a
report that when he appealed to the Kufans to march with him against
Mu'awiya, there was a poor response. It was only when 'Adi b. Hatim, an
old and devoted follower of 'Ali and the chief of the tribe of Tayyi,
addressed the Iraqis, urging them to respond to the call of “their Imam,
the son of the daughter of their Prophet”,[^38] that they came out to
participate in the war.
Soon after, Hasan left Kufa with his main army and reached Al-Mada'in,
where he encamped in the outskirts of the city. Qays and his vanguard
had already reached Maskin, facing Muawiya's army. The Syrian governor
tried to bribe Qays by offering him a million dirhams if he would defect
from the ranks of Hasan and join him. Qays rejected the offer with
contempt, saying: “You want to deceive me in my religion.”[^39] Mu'awiya
then made a similar offer to 'Ubayd Allah b. al-'Abbas (or his elder
brother 'Abd Allah, as Zuhri reports), who accepted it and went over to
him with 8,000 men. Qays was thus left with 4,000 soldiers, waiting for
the arrival of Hasan.^40 'O We may note here in passing that though
'Ubayd Allah did go over to Mu'awiya before Hasan announced his
abdication, the timing of 'Ubayd Allah's defection as given by Ya'qubi
does not seem correct. 'Ubayd Allah's defecti6n must have occurred only
shortly before Hasan's abdication, as will be discussed below.
However, while Hasan's vanguard was waiting for his arrival at Maskin,
Hasan himself was facing a serious situation at Al-Mada'in. Some of his
troops rebelled against him, plundered his tent, and fell upon him. Five
different versions of this rebellion are given in the sources. According
to 'Awana,[^41] someone suddenly spread the news in the army of Hasan
that Qays had been defeated and slain and that the troops should flee.
Hasan's tent was then plundered, and he himself was attacked. If this
version is correct, the spreading of the rumour must have been a
well-calculated ruse and an act of espionage by the spies of Mu'awiya,
who had, without any doubt, infiltrated the rank and file of Hasan's
army.
A second version is given by Ya'qubi,[^42] who reports that as soon as
Hasan reached Al-Mada'in, Mu'awiya sent Al-Mughira b. Shu'ba, 'Abd Allah
b. 'Amir, and 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Umm al-Hakam to Hasan as his mediators.
After they talked to Hasan confidentially, and while leaving his camp,
they spread the news that Hasan had agreed to abdicate in favour of
Muawiya, whereupon Hasan's soldiers fell upon him and plundered his
tent. Ya'qubi also records that Mu'awiya sent his men to Hasan's camp to
spread the news that Qays had made peace with Mu'awiya and had come over
to his side, while simultaneously he spread the word in the army of Qays
that Hasan had made peace with Mu'awiya.'^43 In this case, again,
Mu'awiya's machinations are responsible for the mutiny in Hasan's
army.
The third version is given by Dinawari. According to his report,
i;1asan left Kufa for Al-Mada'in, and by the time he reached Sabat, in
the outskirts of Al-Mada'in, he had discerned that some of his troops
were showing fickleness, lack of purpose, and an indifferent or
withdrawn attitude to the war.[^44] Hasan therefore halted at Sabat,
encamped his army there, and made a speech, saying:
“O people, I do not entertain any feeling of rancour against a Muslim.
I am as much an overseer over yourselves [of your interests] as I am
over my own self. Now, I am considering a plan; do not oppose me in it.
Reconciliation, disliked by some of you, is better [under the
circumstances] than the split that some of you prefer, especially when I
see that most of you are shrinking from the war and are hesitant to
fight. I do not, therefore, consider it wise to impose upon you
something which you do not like.”[^45]
When his people heard this, they looked at each other, reflecting their
suspicions. Those among them who were of Kharijite persuasion said:
“Hasan has become an infidel (Kafir) as had become his father before
him.” They suddenly rushed upon him, pulled the carpet from under his
feet, and tore his clothes from his shoulder. He called for help from
among his faithful followers from the tribes of Rabi'a and Hamdan, who
rushed to his assistance and pushed the assailants away from him.^46
The fourth version is given by Mada'ini in Ibn Abi'l-Hadid,[^47] who
says that while Hasan was on his way to Al-Mada'in he was wounded by a
lance at Sabat and his belongings were looted. When word of this reached
Mu'awiya, he spread the news far and wide, whereupon the nobles and
leaders from among the 12,000-man vanguard of Hasan egan defecting to
Mu'awiya. 'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas informed Hasan of the grave situation,
and it was at this point that Hasan called the Iraqi leaders of his main
army and, with great disappointment, told them of his intention to
terminate the struggle and abdicate. Before proceeding to the fifth
version, it would be appropriate to point out here in passing that
according to all four of these versions, Hasan's decision to abdicate
was forced upon him by the circumstances and was not of his own free
desire.
The fifth version is given by Ibn A'tham and Abu-'l-Faraj,[^48] whose
sources are not clear. Ibn A'tham, as noted above, does not often cite
his source. At the beginning of his narrative Abu'l-Faraj quotes Abu
Mikhnaf along with five other informants; thus it is not clear whether
this particular account is taken from Abu Mikhnaf himself or from any
one of the other five narrators. According to this version, when Hasan
arrived at Al-Mada'in he suddenly halted his army there and made a
speech in which he declared his intention to abdicate.
Wordings of the speech, with few variations, are almost the same as that
quoted above from Dinawari. After hearing Hasan's speech some of his
troops fell upon him, plundered his tent, and tore his clothes. This
version, unlike the other four described above, gives no reason for
Hasan's decision to deliver his speech at that particular moment at
Al-Mada'in and thus renders it rather ambiguous. It also presents
serious contradictions and raises many unsolved questions. One would
ask, for example, why did Hasan encourage the people and make speeches
asking them to join his army for the war against Mu'awiya, as has been
quoted earlier from Abu'l-Faraj himself. Why would he go all the way
from Kufa to Al-Mada'in with all the necessary preparations for battle,
and yet suddenly change his mind and make a declaration of peace at
Al-Mada'in? We should therefore accept one of the four previous
explanations, of which the most probable is Dinawari's that Hasan's
speech and his announcement of his resignation from the office were
prompted by the Iraqis' treacherous attitude and finalized by Mu'awiya's
successful use of espionage and diplomacy.
After such treatment at the hands of his own troops, the disheartened
and shaken Hasan found it impossible to stay in the army camp; he took
to his horse and, escorted by his close associates and faithful
followers, rode to the safety of the White Castle of Al-Mada'in, the
residence of his governor. It was on this road, just before reaching the
castle, that a die hard Kharijite, Al-Jarrah b. Sinan al-Asadi, managed
to ambush Hasan and wounded him in the thigh with a dagger, shouting:
“You have become an infidel (Kafir) like your father before you.”[^49]
Al-Jarrah was overpowered and killed; Hasan, bleeding profusely, was
carried to the castle, where he was cared for by his governor, Sa'd b.
Mas'ud ath-Thaqafi. The news of the attack on Hasan, having been spread
by Muawiya was soon in wide circulation. This further demoralized the
already disheartened troops of Hasan and led to large-scale desertion
from his army.[^50]
After describing this, Ya'qubi, Dinawari, and Tabari fail to give a
detailed account of further events and hurriedly describe Hasan's
abdication, although the first two sources do contain a few fragmentary
sentences in passing which are of limited value. Keeping in view their
method and style, this brevity is understandable. Ibn A'tham and
Abu'l-Faraj, however, record for us in detail the events which took
place between the incident of the attack on Hasan and his abdication.
The accounts of these two, however, vary in certain points and must be
treated separately.
According to Ibn A'tham, at the time when Hasan was having these
difficulties at Al-Mada'in, Qays b. Sa'd with his 12,000-man vanguard
was already at Maskin, facing Mu'awiya's army and awaiting Hasan's
arrival. When he heard of the attack on Hasan, Qays thought it wise to
engage his army in battle with the Syrians so that they should not have
a chance to brood over the situation and become further demoralized. An
encounter between the two armies took place, resulting in some losses on
both sides. Mu'awiya's envoys then came forward and addressed Qays,
saying: “For what [cause) are you now fighting with us and killing
yourself? We have received unquestionable word that your leader has been
deserted by his people and has been stabbed with a dagger and is on the
verge of death. You should therefore refrain from fighting until you get
the exact information about the situation.” Qays was thus forced to stop
fighting and had to wait for the official news about the incident from
Hasan himself. But by this time troops had begun defecting to Mu'awiya
in large numbers. When Qays noticed this large-scale desertion, he wrote
to Hasan about the gravity of the situation.[^51]
After receiving Qays' letter, Hasan lost heart and immediately called
in the Iraqi leaders and nobles and addressed them in dejection and
disgust:
“O people of Iraq, what should I do with your people who are with me?
Here is the letter of Qays b. Sa'd informing me that even the nobles
(ashraf) from among you have gone over to Mu'awiya. By God, what
shocking and abominable behaviour on your part! You were the people who
forced my father to accept arbitration at Siffin ; and when the
arbitration to which he yielded [because of your demand) took place, you
turned against him. And when he called upon you to fight Mu'awiya once
again, then you showed your slackness and lassitude. After the death of
my father, you yourself came to me and paid me homage out of your own
desire and wish. I accepted your homage and came out against Mu'awiya;
only God knows how much I meant to do [i.e how full of zeal and spirit I
was in facing Mu'awiya's challenge). Now you are behaving in the same
manner as before [with my father). O People of Iraq, it would be enough
for me from you if you would not defame me in my religion, because now I
am going to hand over this affair [the caliphate] to Mu'awiya.”[^52]
Ya'qubi gives the same reason for Hasan's decision, though, as
mentioned above, he covers the matter very briefly.
If this statement is accepted, it sufficiently explains the whole
situation and the circumstances which made Hasan decide in favour of
abdication. The statement clearly reflects that Hasan, from the very
beginning, even from the time of was suspicious of the unreliable
character of the Iraqis. In his judgement they were impulsive people who
talked with emotion, but when the time came for action and trial they
never stood firm. This fact is not directly mentioned by the sources for
the event of Hasan's abdication, but it appears at the time when his
brother Husayn was going to Iraq in response to the Kufan appeal to lead
them in rebellion. All those who advised Husayn against responding
positively to the Ku fan appeal clearly reminded him how the Iraqis had
deserted (khadhalu) his father and brother at the critical moment.[^53]
Hasan's feelings are an echo of 'Ali's attitude towards the majority of
his Iraqi supporters, a sentiment which he expressed time and again in
his speeches preserved in the Nahj al-Balagha and in many other early
sources.
After his speech before the leaders of the Iraqis, Hasan immediately
sent word to Mu'awiya informing him of his readiness to abdicate. When
the news of Hasan's decision reached Qays, he told his associates: “Now
you must choose between the two, either to fight without a leader (Imam)
or to pay homage to the misled (dalal) [Mu'awiya].” They replied:
“Paying homage is easier for us than bloodshed.” Thus Qays, along with
those who were still with him, left the battlefield at Maskin for Kufa.
Surprisingly enough, the name of 'Ubayd Allah b. al-'Abbas does not
appear at all in this account.
Turning to Abu'l-Faraj, we are told, as has already been quoted above
from Ya'qubi, that the leader of the 12,000 man vanguard was 'Ubayd
Allah b. al-'Abbas and not Qays b. Sa'd. Both Mu'awiya and 'Ubayd Allah
reached Maskin with their armies on the evening of the same day that
Hasan reached Al-Mada'in. On the second day, after the morning prayer,
while Hasan was confronted with the mutiny of his troops and was
wounded, there was at Maskin a brief encounter between Mu'awiya and
'Ubayd Allah. When night fell, Mu'awiya sent a message to 'Ubayd Allah,
saying:
“Hasan has informed me of his decision to make peace and hand over the
caliphate to me. If you come under my authority at once, you will be
treated as a leader (matbu'); otherwise I will penetrate [into your
forces] and then you will be made only a subject (tabi). If you join me
now I will pay you one million dirhams, half of which will be paid
immediately, and the second half when I enter Ku fa.”[^54]
During the night, 'Ubayd Allah secretly slipped through to Mu'awiya's
side. In the morning the people assembled, waiting for him to come and
lead them in the morning prayer. When, after a search, he was not found,
Qays came forward, led the prayer, and then made a fiery speech
attacking 'Ubayd Allah, his father 'Abbas, and his brother 'Abd Allah
for their wavering character and time-serving policies. Hearing Qays'
words, people shouted: “Thanks be to God that he ['Ubayd Allah] has left
our ranks; now we will rise and pounce on our enemy,” and set off to
make an attack. Busr b. Abi Artat, a confidant of Mu'awiya, came forward
with 20,000 troops and shouted: “Here is your leader ['Ubayd Allah], who
has already paid homage [to Mu'awiya], and Hasan has also agreed to make
peace. For what, then, are you killing yourselves?” Qays then addressed
his people again and asked: “Choose one of the two, either fighting
without an Imam or pay a strayed and misled homage [to Mu'awiya].” The
people said that they would continue to fight even without an Imam, made
a brief attack on the Syrians, and then returned to their bases. When,
however, it became clear that Hasan had agreed to abdicate, they
returned to Kufa.[^55]
Abu'l-Faraj's rendering of the events between the attack on Hasan and
his abdication is important in that it gives a more logical and
understandable timing of the defection of 'Ubayd Allah, which was
confusingly recorded by other sources. From his account it also becomes
clear that of the two brothers, the one who defected was 'Ubayd Allah
and not his elder brother 'Abd Allah, whose name appears only in Zuhri's
account. However, Abu'l-Faraj's report that the Iraqis replied to Qays
that they would continue to fight even without an Imam must be rejected
on the simple grounds that it is contrary to all other sources, who
unanimously report that the troops replied in favour of accepting
Mu'awiya.
The terms and conditions on which Hasan abdicated are reported by the
sources not of only with major variations, but also with confusion and
ambiguity. Ya'qubi and Mas'udi do not mention the terms of peace at all.
Tabari mentions three conditions directly, and the fourth indirectly in
a different context. The first three conditions were:
1: that Hasan would retain the five million dirhams then in the
treasury of Kufa;
2: that Hasan would be allowed the annual revenue from the Persian
district of Darabjird;
3: that 'Ali would not be reviled and cursed, as had been the practice
of Mu'awiya since the beginning of 'Ali's caliphate at least not in
Hasan's presence.[^56]
The first condition, that Hasan would retain five million dirhams from
the treasury of Kufa, makes no sense for two obvious reasons. Firstly,
Hasan, until his abdication, was the sole caliph in Kufa, and thus the
treasury was already in his possession. Secondly, our sources agree that
it was 'Ali's strict practice to empty the treasury at the end of every
week. It is thus difficult to believe that within a few months of
Hasan's accession,[^57] especially considering the heavy expenditure for
war and the unorganized state of the administration (and therefore of
tax collection as well) due to 'Ali's sudden death, the treasury of Kufa
had become gorged with five million dirhams. It is interesting to note
that after a long gap in which Tabari describes the brutalities of Busr
b. Abi Artat in administering Basra, he mentions a fourth condition of
abdication. This tells us that “Hasan made peace with Mu'awiya on the
condition that all the friends and followers of 'Ali, wherever they
might be, would be given amnesty and safe conduct.”[^58] As will be seen
below, this condition is recorded by other sources in its appropriate
place.
In his account of the abdication, Dinawari records for us the following
conditions:
1 : that no one from among the people of Iraq will be treated with
contempt, and that every one of them will be guaranteed peace and safety
no matter what charge or offences might be pending against them;
2: that Hasan will be entitled to the annual revenue of the district of
Ahwaz (instead of Tabari's Darabjird);
3: that preference should be given to the Hashimites (the 'Alids and
the 'Abbasids) over the Banu 'Abd Shams (Umayyads) in the granting of
pensions ('ata) and awards.[^59]
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr and Ibn al-Athir, two judicious writers on the lives
of the Companions of the Prophet, and some other sources, record yet
another two conditions:
1: that no one from among the people of Medina, the Hijaz, and Iraq
will be deprived or dispossessed of anything which they possessed during
the caliphate of 'Ali;
2: that the caliphate would be restored to Hasan after the death of
Mu'awiya.[^60]
Abu'l-Faraj, like others, does not seem to be interested in recording
the conditions in detail. According to him, Mu'awiya sent 'Abd Allah b.
'Amir and 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Samra as his envoys to Hasan to discuss the
terms of peace.
On behalf of Mu'awiya “they granted the terms of peace to Hasan to which
Mu'awiya had agreed: that no one from among the Shi'at 'Ali would be
molested, that the name of 'Ali would not be mentioned except in good
terms, and some other things which Hasan wanted.'[^61]
The most comprehensive account, however, is given by Ibn A'tham,[^62]
which must have been taken from Mada'ini, since Ibn Abi'l-Hadid[^63]
describes almost the same conditions, quoting Mada'ini as his authority.
According to Ibn A'tham, after the incidents at Al-Mada'in and after the
statement which Hasan made before the nobles of Iraq, as quoted above,
he sent 'Abd Allah b. Nawfal b. al-Harith to Mu'awiya to inform him of
Hasan's willingness to abdicate and to discuss the terms of abdication
with the Syrian leader on his behalf. The only condition which Hasan
stipulated to 'Abd Allah was a general amnesty for the people. 'Abd
Allah reached Maskin and told Mu'awiya that Hasan had authorised him to
negotiate the conditions of peace on his behalf, laying down the
following terms:
1 : that the caliphate will be restored to Hasan after the death of
Mu'awiya;
2: that Hasan will receive five million dirhams annually from the state
treasury;
3: that Hasan will receive the annual revenue of Darabjird; 4: that the
people will be guaranteed peace with one another.[^64]
Hearing this, Mu'awiya took a blank sheet of paper, affixed his
signature and seal, and said to 'Abd Allah: “Take this carte blanche to
Hasan and ask him to write on it whatever he wants.” Mu'awiya asked his
associates around him to stand witness to his signature and promise.
'Abd Allah, with the carte blanche and accompanied by some of the nobles
of Quraysh, among them 'Abd Allah b. 'Amir, 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Samra,
along with some other nobles from among the Syrians, returned to Hasan
and told him: “Mu'awiya has agreed to all the conditions I have asked of
him for you and which you yourself can write on this blank paper.” Hasan
replied: “As far as the caliphate is concerned, I am no more interested
in it; had I wanted it I would not hand it over to Mu'awiya. As for the
money, Mu'awiya cannot make it a condition for me when the [real] issue
in question is a matter of concern for the Muslim [community].” Hasan
then called his secretary and asked him to write: “These are the terms
on which Hasan b. 'Ali b. 'Abi Talib is making peace with Mu'awiya b.
Abi Sufyan and handing over to him the state or government of Amir
al-Mu'minin 'Ali:
1: that Mu'awiya should rule according to the Book of God, the Sunna of
the Prophet, and the conduct of the righteous caliphs;
2: that Mu'awiya will not appoint or nominate anyone to the caliphate
after him, but the choice will be left to the shura of the Muslims;
3: that the people will be left in peace wherever they are in the land
of God;
4: that the companions and the followers of 'Ali, their lives,
properties, their women, and their children, will be guaranteed safe
conduct and peace. This is a solemn agreement and covenant in the name
of God, binding Mu'awiya b. Abi Sufyan to keep it and fulfil it;
5: that no harm or dangerous act, secretly or openly, will be done to
Hasan b. 'Ali, his brother Husayn, or to anyone from the family of the
Prophet (Ahl Bay: an-Nabi; this agreement is witnessed by 'Abd Allah b.
Nawfal, 'Umar b. Abi Salama, and so and so.”[^65] Ibn A'tham's rendering
of the terms of peace as dictated by Hasan solves many problems and
explains the different ambiguous accounts of other sources. The timing
of the carte blanche sent by Mu'awiya to Hasan was confusing in Tabari,
whereas Ibn A'tham's timing of it makes it understandable.
Tabari, Abu'l-Faraj, and some other sources cite the names of 'Abd
Allah b. 'Amir and 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Samra as being sent by Mu'awiya as
his envoys to Hasan to discuss the terms of peace; Ibn A'tham, while
confirming this report, gives the proper and logical occasion of their
commission. Ibn A'tham records the conditions in two parts: one laid
down by Hasan's envoy 'Abd Allah b. Nawfal, and the other dictated by
Hasan himself, as enumerated above. If both sets of conditions are
combined together, these, with the exception of the first two conditions
mentioned immediately above, are the same as those found scattered in an
unorganized way in other sources.
The first of these conditions, that Mu'awiya should rule according to
the Qur'an, prophetic Sunna, and the conduct of the righteous caliphs,
strongly reflects the tendency and spirit of the epoch which was still
predominant in the function and character of the office of the
caliphate. In all probability, the immediate successor of 'Ali and the
Rashidun caliphs would not have handed over the office without
expressing this traditional condition, at least outwardly, if we must be
so sceptical in accepting such reports. It should be noted, however,
that from the time of the Shura, 'Ali, his house, and his supporters
always emphasized following only the Sunna of the Prophet and refusing
to acknowledge the validity of the Sunna of the first three caliphs. It
therefore seems likely that reference to the conduct of the righteous
caliphs was added later on in an attempt at reconciliation of the Jama'a
as has been seen above. Naturally Hasan could not contradict his own
father's stand at the Shura, where the latter refused to accept the
Sunna of Abu Bakr and 'Umar.
The second condition–that Mu'awiya would not nominate anyone to the
caliphate and would leave the choice to the Shura of the Muslims–should
not be difficult for us to accept. The precedent of nominating the
successor, only to be endorsed by a few leading personalities, had
already been set by Abu Bakr when he appointed 'Umar as his successor.
The decision of Abu Bakr was, however, dominated by his sincere concern
for the interests of the Muslim community in general, and he did not
appoint his son or even a relative to public office. It was not to be so
with Mu'awiya and the Umayyads. Thus the imposition of this condition on
Mu'awiya by Hasan was a natural corollary of the situation. The
condition that the caliphate be restored to Hasan after Mu'awiya's
death, reported by many sources, must have been at least discussed.
From the letter of Mu'awiya quoted above, we may safely deduce that
Mu'awiya referred to Hasan's succession after himself as a strong
possibility, but without giving any clear undertaking on his own part.
Some time later, the Shi'a, gathering together, showed their disapproval
of the fact that Hasan had not asked for sufficient guarantees and had
not secured an undertaking in writing from Mu'awiya that the latter
would leave him the caliphate after his death.
Finally, the most interesting point seems to be Mu'awiya's acceptance
of the complete amnesty to all the followers and companions of 'Ali. The
acceptance of this particular term proves the falseness of Mu'awiya's
stated reason for fighting, which was to avenge the blood of 'Uthman and
punish those responsible for his murder. Among the Shi'at 'Ali who were
given complete amnesty by Mu'awiya in the terms with Hasan there were
men such as 'Amr b. al-Hamiq al-Khuza'I who was said to have been
involved in the murder, and Malik b. al-Ashtar, who was the leader of
the rebel contingent of Ku fa. It becomes therefore clear that the
reason for the revenge of the blood of 'Uthman was, as has been pointed
out elsewhere, a pretext which Mu'awiya used to realize his ambition to
seize the caliphate for himself.
The agreement having been concluded, Hasan returned to Kufa, where Qays
joined him. Soon afterwards, Mu'awiya entered the city with the full
force of his army. A general assembly was held, and different groups of
people, one after the other, paid him homage. Our sources give a
detailed description of the mixed feelings of the people in accepting as
their new ruler. Many of them adopted a timeserving attitude to
safeguard their interests; others could not hide their dislike, and even
hatred, for the Umayyad ruler, but nevertheless had to reconcile
themselves with the situation.[^66]
The heated remarks, bitter speeches, and resentful dialogues exchanged among the antagonists from both sides make interesting and informative reading which cannot be dealt with in detail here. The speech of Hasan delivered at the insistence of 'Amr b. al-'As and Mu'awiya is worth noting, however. Though quoted by all the sources, the speech is recorded with different wordings and content. The shortest version is given by Tabari from Zuhri and reads: “O people, God has guided you through our elders [Muhammad and 'Ali] and spared you from the bloodshed through those who followed [referring to himself). Indeed this [the caliphate] is nothing but an ephemeral thing; these worldly possessionskeep shifting and changing hands. God said to His Prophet:
'And I do not know if this may be a trial for you and a grant of
[worldly] livelihood to you for a [limited) time.”' (Qur'an, 21:
111).
At this point, Mu'awiya became alarmed and asked Hasan to sit down,
reproachfully asking 'Amr b. al-'As: “Is this what you advised
me?”[^67]
Mada'in!, quoted by Ibn Abi'l-Hadid, gives a much longer version of the
speech, in which Hasan explains the reasons for his abdication as,
besides Mu'awiya's ambitions and rebellion, the unreliable and
treacherous attitude of his supporters. Hasan even referred to the time
of 'Ali and how the people failed him then.[^68] Another source,
Abu'l-Faraj, quotes only one sentence from Hasan's speech, which reads:
“The khalifa [successor of the Prophet) is one who dedicates himself to
the way of God and the Sunna of His Prophet, and not the one who is an
oppressor and aggressor; the latter is only a king (malik) who rules a
kingdom (mulk), whose enjoyment is little, and whose pleasure is
short-lived, leaving behind only a trace of it. I do not know if this is
a trial for you and a grant of [worldly] livelihood to you for a
[limited] period.”[^69] It is interesting to note that if this quotation
Is historically correct, it might be the origin of the use of the word
mulk (king) instead of khilafa (caliph) for Mu'awiya and his successors,
used by Muslim historians from the earliest times. However, there are
numerous instances where Mu'awiya is recorded as saying, in reference to
himself, “I am the first king in Islam.”[^70]
The historical accounts of the circumstances facing Hasan from the
beginning of his caliphate indicate that his abdication was not
motivated by the lure of a life of ease and luxury, as some modern
writers would have us believe. The source specify the causes of Hasan's
abdication as love of peace, distaste for politics and its dissensions,
and the desire to avoid widespread bloodshed among the Muslims.
Moreover, he realistically assessed the situation and was fully aware of
the disastrous consequences for himself, his family, and his handful of
trustworthy followers should he insist on settling the issue by force of
arms.[^71] He thus accepted the political realities then prevailing
while gaining time for the Shi'i trend of thinking to consolidate its
own following on ideological grounds. This is evident from any one of
the versions of his speech quoted above on the occasion of the transfer
of the caliphate to Mu'awiya.
In spite of his abdication of the caliphate, Hasan continued to be
regarded as the leader, or Imam, of the Shi'a after the death of 'Ali.
Even those of the Shi'a who criticized his action of abdication never
ceased to affirm that he had been designated by his father to succeed
him as the Commander of the Faithful. The details of the theory of the
imamate were no doubt worked out later on, but the fact remains that as
long as Hasan was alive he was considered by both the Shi'a and by all
the family members as the head of the house of 'Ali and of the Prophet,
and that was enough for the Shi'a throughout its history to consider him
as the second Imam after 'Ali.
Hasan's abdication was extremely distasteful to those of the Iraqis who
had supported him and his father before him, mainly because of their
hatred of Syrian domination. It was equally disturbing to those of the
Kharijites who had gathered around Hasan in order to fight against
Mu'awiya; it was a Kharijite who furiously attacked Hasan when he heard
of his intention to abdicate. There was yet another group, represented
by men like Hujr b. 'Adi al-Kindi, which was perturbed by Hasan's
decision, but for other reasons. It was this last group that represented
the true Shi'at 'Ali at this stage. They were the people who believed
that 'Ali and his house were entitled to the caliphate on religious
grounds, as opposed to those who supported the cause of 'Ali and then of
Hasan for political or economic considerations.
Thus the Shi'at 'Ali, from the time of the Umayyad domination of the
provinces under 'Uthman, must be divided into two distinct groups,
political and religious. In the civil war between 'Ali and Mu'awiya,
these two groups temporarily found themelves united against a common
enemy. But when Mu'awiya's overwhelming political and military power put
the outcome of the conflict beyond doubt, the political group of Hasan's
supporters crumbled and scattered, defecting in swarms to Mu'awiya's
side, while the religious supporters remained firm in their belief. They
were disappointed by Hasan's action of abdication, but they still
remained persistent in their ideals regarding the leadership of the
community. They did not lose their identity as an opposition group to
the rivals of the house of the Prophet, even after political support for
the family of Muhammad had collapsed; and they refused to accept[^72]
what the majority had willingly or unwillingly accepted, as will be seen
below.
Later on, when the early events of Islam were committed to systematic
writing, both Sunni and Shi'i historians and traditionists explained
Hasan's action in terms of a meritorious deed” by which he reconciled
the opposing parties.
The year of his abdication became known as the 'Am al-Jama'a, the year
of the community, and a tradition attributed to the Prophet was reported
as saying: “This son of mine is a lord (Sayyid), and he will unite two
branches of the Muslims.”[^73] This tradition reflects the efforts of
the second half of the first and early second centuries when a “central
body”, or Jama'a, was emerging from a confused situation and thus
clearly reflects the tendency by which this “central body” was being
formed. The Shi'is thus defended Hasan's action against those extremists
who were blaming him for abdication; on the other hand, the Sunnis
accepted such an explanation as it conformed to their needs for a
reconciliation between the two opposing groups: the party of 'Uthman,
now represented by Mu'awiya, and that of 'Ali, now led by his son Hasan.
This “central body” later on received the title of the Jama'a (commonly
rendered in English as the “orthodox” branch) in Islam, leaving behind
and branding as sectarian a body of those who could not and did not
agree to reconcile themselves to this synthesis.
Though Hasan prevented a bloody military solution of the conflict by
abdicating in favour of Mu'awiya, he did not thereby heal the split in
the community. In fact, his abdication had far-reaching consequences for
the later development of Shi'ism. Previously he had been, at least
nominally, the head of the central body of believers. But now events
were developing in the opposite direction, and the 'Uthmaniya branch,
with Mu'awiya at its head, became the central body, while the Shi'at
'Ali was reduced to the role of a small opposition party and thus was
thrust into a sectarian position. The spokesman for this opposition,
however, was not Hasan himself, but rather Hujr b. 'Adi al-Kindi and his
party.
Supported by a number of diehard Shi'is of Kufa, he never ceased to
protest against Mu'awiya and the official cursing of 'Ali from the
pulpits-a policy imposed by Mu'awiya as a propaganda measure.
The nine-year period between Hasan's abdication in 41 /600 and his
death in 49/669 is one in which Shi'i feelings and tendencies were
passing through a stage of, so to speak, fire underground, with no
conspicuous activities visible above the surface. An historical survey
of this period for the development of Shi'i deals is very difficult, as
our sources are almost silent. Nevertheless, it is not totally free from
the occasional voices raised here and there in support of the house of
the Prophet and against the rule of Mu'awiya. Now and then we hear of
individuals or small groups, mainly from Ku fa, visiting Hasan and
Husayn and asking them to rise in rebellion-a request to which they
declined to respond.[^74]
The silence of the Shi'is during this period might have been due to two
factors. Firstly, the tight grip which Mu'awiya maintained over the
empire through his trained and loyal Syrian forces was too strong to
allow any rising; and secondly, the Shi'i movement was yet not organized
enough to take action against such a formidable power. But it was
passing through a natural process of evolution until it could register a
widespread support and then translate itself into action.
Mu'awiya was, however, fully aware of strong She sentiments among
certain parts of the population of Kufa, and he took various measures to
prevent insurrections. Soon after taking control of Kufa, he transferred
some of the tribes that were devoted to the house of 'Ali from the city,
replaced them with others from Syria, Basra, and Al-Jazira who were
loyal to him.[^75]
After his abdication, Hasan left Kufa and settled in Medina, leading a
quiet retired life without engaging in politics. His attitude could be
understood from the fact that during the journey back to Medina, at
Al-Qadisiya, he received a letter from Mu'awiya asking him to take part
in a campaign against a Kharijite revolt which had just erupted. Hasan
replied that he had given up fighting against Mu'awiya in order to bring
peace to the people, and that he would not take part in a campaign at
his side.[^76] This passive and withdrawn attitude towards Mu'awiya he
maintained while pacifying those of the Shi'is who occasionally visited
him and expressed their bitter feelings against the Umayyad ruler.
Hasan did not live long, however. He died in 49/669, long before his
rival. Mu'awiya took the caliphate from Hasan at the age of 58 and died
in 60/680 at the age of 77, while Hasan at the time of his abdication
was only 38 and died at the age of 45 or 46. This difference in age is
very important to note, especially when we read of Mu'awiya's ambitious
plans to perpetuate the caliphate in his own house and nominate his son
Yazid as his heir-apparent.
This was not possible, because of the terms on which Hasan had abdicated to nor, considering the vast difference in age, could Mu'awiya have hoped that Hasan would die before him. To carry out his plan and fulfil his desire, Mu'awiya had to remove Hasan from the scene. The majority of our sources, both Sunni and Shi'i, historians and traditionists, report that the cause of Hasan's death was poison administered by one of his wives, Ju'da bint al-Ash'ath.[^77] Mu'awiya is reported to have suborned her with the promise of a large sum of money and of marrying her to his son Yazid. After she had completed the task, Mu'awiya paid her the promised sum of money but refused to marry her to Yazid, saying that he valued the life of his son.[^78]
The overwhelming historical testimony, Mu'awiya's desire to nominate his
son as his successor, which he did immediately after Hasan's death,
combined with many other clues found in the sources, make it likely that
Mu'awiya must have been the instigator of the poisoning, though this
will probably never be clearly established. Nevertheless, the fact that
the cause of Hasan's death was poison, administered by his wife Ju'da,
is beyond any doubt an historical truth.
According to Hasan's own statement, this was the third time he had been
poisoned, and this time it proved fatal. Our sources also tell us that
upon receiving the news of Hasan's death, Mu'awiya could not hide his
feelings of relief and even joy and passed taunting remarks to Ibn
'Abbas.[^79] Another fact which the sources unanimously record is that
soon after Hasan's death, Mu'awiya initiated the process of nominating
Yazid as his successor,[^80] as will be seen below. While Mu'awiya took
the opportunity of Hasan's death to go ahead with his plans to secure
Yazid's nomination to the caliphate, the Shi'is of Kufa, on the other
hand, found the occasion appropriate for making another bid to restore
the caliphate to the house of 'Ali.
As soon as the Shi'is of Kufa heard the news of Hasan's death, they held
a meeting in the house of Sulayman b. Surad al-Khuza'i and wrote a long
letter to Husayn. In it, after expressing their grief and condolences on
the death of “the son of the Wasi, the son of the daughter of the
Prophet, and the banner of the guidance”, they invited Husayn to rise
against Mu'awiya and assured him that they would be ready to sacrifice
their lives in his cause. Husayn, however, honouring his brother's
treaty with Mu'awiya, refused to respond and advised them to refrain
from agitation and to stay calm in their houses as long as Muawiya was
alive.[^81]
The most enthusiastic among the Shi'is, however, could no longer remain
idle. Hujr b. 'Adi al-Kindi and his associates, who had never
compromised their Shi'i ideals, now came out in open revolt against
Mu'awiya and his lieutenant Ziyad b. Abi Sufyan, who governed both Kufa
and Basra after the death of the governor of Kufa, Al-Mughira b. Shu'ba,
in 51/671. The revolt is reported in great detail by the early sources
and demonstrates the strong Shi'i feelings of the movement as it
re-emerged at this stage. Even though it was of hardly any consequence
or significance militarily, the fact that many early works devote long
chapters to Hujr[^82] indicates that the episode was of not
insignificant proportions in the revolutionary events of early Islam.
We are told that these die-hard Shi'is had been consistently protesting
not only against the cursing of 'Ali, but also against the rule of
Mu'awiya, whom they considered a usurper of the rights of the house of
'Ali to the caliphate. Their slogan was that “the caliphate is not valid
and permissible except in the family of Abu Turab.”[^83] While Ziyad
himself was in Basra, and Kufa was being administered by his deputy 'Amr
b. Hurayth, they repeatedly went to the mosque and publicly denounced
Mu'awiya and Ziyad. When 'Amr tried to warn them, during one of the
Friday sermons, of the consequences of this open rebellion, they stoned
him and forced him to take refuge in the governor's palace.[^84] The
numerical strength of those who thus demonstrated their support for the
Shi'i cause can be judged from the report that “they used to occupy half
of the mosque of Kufa.”[^85] It may be noted that the mosque of Kufa had
the capacity of accommodating as many as 40,000 people.
Informed by his deputy of the alarming situation, Ziyad rushed back to
Kufa. The governor first sent some Yemeni tribal leaders of Shi'i
inclination, with whom he had managed to establish a modus vivendi, to
warn Hujr of the dangerous path he was following. The sources bear
enough testimony that from the time Ziyad took over the governorship of
Kufa in 51/671 he tried his best to win over Hujr. Ziyad had already
offered him a seat in his administrative council and was willing to
enhance Hujr's position in the tribe of Kinda.
Nothing could change the latter's attitude, however. Indeed, if the
problem is regarded as one of a political nature, then it must be
pointed out that almost all political concessions and material rewards
had already been offered by the governor to satisfy Hujr. Furthermore,
his refusal to accept any of the concessions which the governor was
rather generously offering him could not possibly have involved an
aspiration for further personal power on Hujr's part. He was simply too
old. Even if he had succeeded in bringing the Shi'a to power by making
Husayn caliph, his position would not have been any better than it had
been during 'Ali's time. Such personal gains had already been offered to
him by Ziyad, but he totally refused them. In the final analysis, we are
left with no choice but to accept that Hujr's only motive was his
religious conviction and his unshakable faith in the leadership of the
Ahl al-Bayt.
The tribal leaders, some of them old friends of Hujr, who were sent to
him to mediate and seek a compromise, failed in their efforts, but
nevertheless asked the governor to treat him leniently.[^86] This
indicates the deep respect and high regard in which Hujr was held by
them. One could hardly expect tribal leaders to defend a power-thirsty
politically motivated self-seeker and troublemaker who might challenge
or undermine their own leadership. They would, on the other hand, defend
a man whose deeper religious convictions agreed with their own and who
had greater moral courage to stand by his principles.
Ziyad, however, refused to listen to their pleas for Hujr and sent out
his police to arrest him, but Hujr's active supporters were numerous
enough to repulse them. Realizing the seriousness of the situation,
Ziyad immediately summoned the nobles and leaders, especially those of
the Yemeni tribes, and addressed them, saying that it was their people
who 'were helping Hujr, and if they did not withdraw their support from
him Ziyad would call in the Syrian forces for a complete crackdown. A
phrase of Ziyad's address quoted by the sources is most illustrative of
the character and attitude of these tribal leaders of Ku fa. According
to Tabari, Ziyad said: “Your bodies are with me, but your affection and
passions are with Hujr.”[^87]
Abu'l-Faraj quotes a rather elaborate statement which reads: “Your
bodies are with me, but your passions are with this foolish man
surrounded by flies [i.e., by people who, like flies, gather around any
object]; you are with me, but your brothers, sons, and your clansmen are
with Hujr.”[^88]
Afraid of losing their positions, the tribal leaders of Kufa once again
demonstrated their characteristic weakness and persuaded their
respective clansmen not to expose themselves to Syrian arms. While the
majority of those who had gathered around Hujr finally deserted him,
there was still a sizeable group who refused to leave and resisted
Hujr's arrest. Ziyad had to call in the regular army, specifically
choosing troops from the Yemeni contingent in Kufa, to deal with the
situation.
The task was not so easy, however, not only because of the personal
prestige and the widespread support Hujr enjoyed among the Ku fan
masses, but also because of the fear of tribal complications. A skilled
politician with extraordinary abilities in dealing with rebellions,
Ziyad tactfully managed to involve in the operations the Yemeni tribes
to whom Hujr himself belonged. In this way Ziyad avoided the greater
danger of a serious conflict between the Nizari and the Yemeni groups of
the tribes. Among the Yemeni tribes themselves, he played one off
against the other and terrorized the members and nobles of Kinda, Hujr's
own tribe, threatening them with death and the destruction of their
property if they did not hand over Hujr to him. The lengthy account of
the episode given by Abu Mikhnaf and other early authorities, as
recorded by Tabari and Abu'l-Faraj, is interesting in many ways. It
reveals how the personal interests of the tribal leaders were exploited
to make them act against their own religious aspirations, how tribal
rivalries were played off against each other, how the supporters of Hujr
were coerced, and how ultimately Ziyad succeeded in arresting one of the
most respected leaders of the Shi'is of Kufa and in suppressing a
deep-rooted movement.
Besides Hujr, thirteen other prominent Shi'is were rounded up and
arrested.[^89] The tribal affiliations of the fourteen men arrested
break down as follows: Kinda, two; Hadramawt, one; 'Abs, two; Khath'am,
one; Bajila, two; Rabi'a, one; Hamdan, one; Tamim, three; and Hawazin,
one. It is interesting to note that of these fourteen, eight were from
various Yemeni tribes Kinda, Hadramawt, Khath'am, Bajila, and Hamdan-and
six were from the Nizari tribes of the North-'Abs, Rabi'a, Tamim, and
Hawazin. This shows the dimension of the movement and indicates that the
Shi'I feelings in Kufa were not strictly confined to the Yemenis.
Ziyad decided to dispatch his captives to Syria to he dealt with by
Mu'awiya. Along with them he had to send an indictment duly attested to
by the people. He therefore called in the four heads of the four
administrative divisions of the Kufan population.[^90] These leaders
spelled out the charges against Hujr as follows:
1: “Hujr gathers the crowds around himself and openly reviles and
curses the caliph;
2: He exhorts people to fight against the Amir al-Mu'minin;
3: He caused disturbances in the city and ousted the caliph's
governor;
4: He believes in and propagates the claim that the caliphate is not
valid except in the family of Abu Talib;
5: He preaches that Abu Turab ('Ali) was completely free of all blame,
he praises him, and he urges people to love and respect him;
6: He calls for secession from and denunciation of the enemies of 'Ali
and all those who fought against him;
7: And those of the persons who are with him are the leaders of his
followers and are of a similar opinion.”[^91]
The charges spelled out in this document against Hujr by the four
chiefs of Kufa were no doubt accurate and representative of the
thinking, feelings, and activities of Hujr and his associates. This
document, which appears to have been preserved without any attempts to
falsify or suppress its content, gives us perhaps the clearest picture
of the Shi'I religious position at the time of Hujr, their feelings and
aspirations, their love for the house of 'Ali, and their resentment
against Mu'awiya as a usurper.
Ziyad did not like the indictment, however. The reason, so clearly
recorded by the sources, is very important to note as it sheds light on
the real situation. As Ziyad said after examining the document: “I do
not think this indictment is conclusive enough; I want the attestations
of more witnesses than just these four chieftains to be affixed to
it.”[^92]
The charges laid down in the original document dealt almost exclusively
with Hujr's Shi'i cause and his love for the house of 'Ali. Ziyad
considered that not very many Yemenis, whom he particularly wanted to
bear witness to the charges, would be willing to sign, on the grounds of
Hujr's activities in the cause of Shi'I ideals. Most of the Yemenis were
of Shi'i inclination, with of course varying degrees of practical
commitment. Moreover, it seems, Ziyad was hesitant to inform Mu'awiya
officially that Shi'i feelings and activities were so strong and were
being so openly demonstrated in Kufa while Ziyad was the governor of the
province. It was indeed a unique privilege for him to hold the
governorships of both Kufa and Basra simultaneously, an honour no
official had ever before enjoyed.
Consequently, another indictment was prepared, laying down the
following charges:
1: “Hujr b. 'Adi has cast off his allegiance to the Caliph;
2: He has caused a schism in the community;
3: He curses the Caliph;
4: He calls for war and has created discord;
5: He gathers the people around him and exhorts them to break off
allegiance to the Amir al-Mu'minin and remove him from office;
6: He disbelieves in God.”[^93]
The marked difference between the two documents is clear enough. While
the charges laid down in the first indictment centred on Hujr's
activities and open rebellion for the Shi'I cause, the second stressed
his rebellion against the state and the authority of Mu'awiya, with no
reference to the Shi'I movement. The first document places much emphasis
on Hujr's unshakable love for 'Ali and devotion to his family on
religious grounds; the second replaces this charge with an accusation
that Hujr disbelieved in God, which according to the precedent set by
Abu Bakr provided firm grounds for execution. All the evidence at our
disposal leaves us in no doubt that the charges listed in the first
document are authentic, whereas the second indictment is a revision
fabricated for the reasons elaborated above.
This explains the reports that Mu'awiya was hesitant to accept the
indictment and reluctant to take drastic action against Hujr. Moreover,
as will be seen below, the only condition given by Mu'awiya for the
Shi'i leaders to save their lives was that they must curse and denounce
'Ali. This also indicates that their main offence was their pro-Shi'i
activity and not crimes against the state and Caliph as presented in the
second indictment.
It hardly need be said that Hujr was unmistakably held by the Kufans as
a die-hard and uncompromising Shi'i leader. Re was also considered an
extremely pious Muslim. To this fact even those who did not share his
Shi'i views bore testimony. The Qadi Shurayh b. Harith wrote to
Mu'awiya, saying: “I bear witness that Hujr is a pious Muslim, steadfast
in prayer; he gives alms, observes the fast in the month of Ramadan, and
always performs the hajj and 'Umra… and he indeed commands a high place
in Islam.”[^94]
Nevertheless, Ziyad called the people to attest to the authenticity of
the indictment. Seventy people, of whose names forty-five are
specifically recorded, are reported to have signed the document.[^95]
Some of these signatures were certainly forged, as is commonly indicated
by the sources listing these names. Qadi Shurayh protested in his letter
to Mu'awiya that he never signed the document and that his name had been
added without his knowledge. Some others apologized later for signing,
indicating that Ziyad had put pressure on them to attest to the
charges.[^96]
When the prisoners reached Mu'awiya, there was strong pressure on him
from the various tribes to release their respective clansmen. Seven of
the fourteen prisoners were freed through the efforts and influence of
their relatives. Hujr and the other six were given a chance to save
their lives if they would publicly curse and denounce 'Ali. Mu'awiya's
executioners told them: “We are commanded to give you a chance to save
yourselves by denouncing 'Ali and cursing him; if you refuse to do this
we will kill you.” Hujr and the other six with him steadfastly replied :
“By God, we will never do this.” They were thereupon beheaded.[^97]
That these men would sacrifice their lives rather than denounce 'Ali is
a matter that cannot be taken lightly: there must have been a meaning to
it much deeper than the level of political interests. The history of
religion is full of men who have died rather than compromise their
faith, and the history of man cannot be explained only in political and
economic terms. To read history only in material terms is indeed a
regrettable phenomenon of modern historiography. On the other hand, to
accept religious consciousness in one case and deny it in another,
though the circumstances are similar, is an equally regrettable example
of prejudice.
No doubt, in most cases popular movements in human society are dominated
by political or economic factors, yet there is no dearth of instances
where individual conscience has gone far beyond these considerations.
Hujr was certainly one of these examples. Not only was he given the
opportunity to save his life, but he was also offered by Ziyad both
political power and economic advantages. He refused. To him, achieving
these through denouncing and cursing 'Ali meant the denunciation of the
faith itself. There are political implications to this episode only
insofar as political considerations were ancillary to religious
objectives. Thus Hujr's concern with who should be the caliph was not a
political or economic question: he believed in and was prepared to die
for, as he did, the idea of special qualities being granted by God to
the family of the Prophet, making them specially suited to rule.
Hujr and his companions must therefore be considered as representative
of those first Shi'is who voiced their religious opinion in support of
'Ali immediately after the death of the Prophet, and they were the
forerunners of a progressively developing movement soon to be
crystallized as a full-fledged section of the Muslim community.
He was a distinguished companion of the Prophet, widely respected for his piety and devotion to religious practices, even though a great partisan of 'Ali. His tragic fate sent a wave of grief and shock through the holy cities. Even the Prophet's widow 'A'isha and 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar vehemently protested against his execution.[^98] It is interesting to note that the tragedy of Hujr initiated the martyrology of the Shi'a, and his death was lamented in numerous elegies that developed into a rich literature in Shi'i Islam.
Naturally, the tragedy affected the Kufans most Their sentiments were
stirred up with a deep sense of calamity and produced serious reactions.
They sent a delegation to Husayn at Medina and urged him to lead an
armed revolt against Mu'awiya. Husayn turned down the request with the
same advice as before.[^99] Mu'awiya was not unaware of these overtures
to Husayn and was alarmed by such activities, especially when he
received a letter from his governor in Medina, Marwan b. al-Hakam,
warning that the delegation sent from Kufa was staying in Medina and
having frequent meetings with Husayn. The Caliph wrote a threatening
letter to Husayn as a warning, but the latter maintained in his reply
the same indifferent attitude towards the existing order and assured
Mu'awiya that he would continue to honour the treaty of his
brother.^100
Except for the revolt of Hujr, suppressed by rather severe measures,
the period between the deaths of Hasan and of Mu'awiya is again a quiet
and subdued one in the history of the Shi'i movement. The general
impression which we get from the sources is of an atmosphere of fear and
caution on both sides. Mu'awiya's apprehensive attitude towards the
potential of a Shi'i uprising is demonstrated by his extreme measures
against Hujr and his limited, but quite serious, revolt. The fact that
Mu'awiya, well known for his shrewd diplomacy in achieving his goals,
should act in such a violent manner against Hujr indicates his
uncompromising attitude towards Shi'i sympathies, an attitude perhaps
resulting from fear of the deep-rooted Shi'i movement, especially in
Kufa where the group was strongest.
On the other hand, Husayn's repeated refusal to lead the Kufan
enthusiasts in open revolt reveals his own cautious attitude and desire
to avoid giving Mu'awiya any excuse to completely annihilate the
supporters of the house of 'Ali. Throughout this period, Mu'awiya seems
to have been trying to destroy, at the slightest pretext, those of
'Ali's followers who could not be bought or intimidated into submission;
until this could be accomplished, the Umayyad hold on the caliphate
would remain insecure.
It is not unlikely that one of the reasons for the imposition of
cursing 'Ali from the pulpits was to provoke the Shi'I sympathizers into
open revolt and thus subject them to attack and destruction at the hands
of the Umayyad forces. When Al-Mughira b. Shu'ba was appointed governor
of Kufa in 41/661, one of the duties specified to him by Mu'awiya was
that he should vigorously carry out the cursing of 'All, propagandize
against him and his followers, increase the intensity of the campaign to
disgrace, dishonour, and impugn the character of 'Ali and his followers,
and finally popularize and propagate the virtues of 'Uthman and his
supporters.
The same instructions were given to Ziyad b. Abi Sufyan when he was
entrusted with the governorship of Kufa after the death of Mughira in
50/670.[^101] Both of these governors carried out these duties to the
satisfaction of Mu'awiya. Hujr and a few others could not tolerate this
continuous provocation and fell into the trap, while others remained
cautious and careful. Husayn, on his part, fully understanding the
situation, wisely avoided any provocation against Mu'awiya and waited
for an appropriate opportunity to move into action. In this way, he
saved himself and his party from severe repression on the one hand, and
honoured his brother's treaty, which indirectly involved Husayn as well,
on the other.
Perhaps the most important event in the history of the development of
the Shi'i “Passion” was Mu'awiya's nomination of his son Yazid to
succeed him. The Caliph could not act in this direction as long as Hasan
lived, and it is significant that immediately after the news of Hasan's
death, Mu'awiya began actively working on the project that would fulfil
his desire of perpetuating the rule of his family. This was no easy
task, and the Caliph had to move with great caution and use all those
devices characteristic of his rule: diplomacy, generous gifts, bribes,
and finally threats and oppression. It is not our intention here to go
into the details of how Mu'awiya succeeded in buying off the leaders of
the tribes and silencing the more resolute with severe repression. These
details are preserved in the sources with hardly any serious
differences. It will suffice for our purpose here to note that after
careful arrangements through his governors, Mu'awiya managed to bring
together from most of the provinces deputations which, as planned,
declared their allegiance to Yazid as heir-apparent.[^102]
It was different with the Hijaz, where there lived the elite of Islamic
nobility and the sons of the most prominent Companions of the Prophet,
most important among them being Husayn b. 'Ali, 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar,
'Abd Allah b. az-Zubayr, and 'Abd ar-Rahman b. Abi Bakr. Any delegation
from Medina without them would have been meaningless, thus their refusal
to co-operate was of the utmost gravity. Mu'awiya therefore went to
Medina in person with 1,000 selected horsemen to deal with the
recalcitrants.
According to one version, Mu'awiya, reaching Medina and calling these
four to meet him in the outskirts, treated them in such a harsh manner
that they fled to Mecca. This worked as planned, and in their absence
Mu'awiya declared the nomination of Yazid; this was approved by his
supporters, while others had not the courage to resist. The problem of
Medina solved, Mu'awiya proceeded to Mecca. There he changed his
attitude and first tried to win over these four by treating them with
exceptional friendliness. After spending quite some time with them and
showing his great affection and regard for them, just before he was
about to set out on his return home, he expressed his desire for their
support for Yazid.
Re explained that he was not demanding much from them, that Yazid would
be ruler only in name, and that, under Yazid's name, it would in fact be
they who would have real control of the government. After a spell of
silence, Ibn az-Zubayr spoke and, in the name of all, he rejected the
Caliph's suggestion. The enraged Mu'awiya said : “On other occasions,
when I speak in the pulpit, I allow anyone to object to my speech if he
so wishes; but he who contradicts me today, a sword will silence him.”
Then he entered the mosque of Mecca, taking his four opponents with him,
and declared: “These four men, without whom no decision concerning the
succession can be made, have agreed to Yazid's nomination; so now none
of you people should have any difficulty in doing the same.” Thereupon
people did homage to Yazid, while the four remained silent out of
fear.[^103] Even if this version is cautiously regarded as a later
elaboration, Mu'awiya's going to the Hijaz for the purpose of trying to
compel these persons not to oppose Yazid cannot be denied.[^104]
[^1]: Tabari, II, p.5
[^2]: Tabari, II, pp. I if.; Mas'udi, Muruj, II, p.426; Tanbih, p.300; 'Iqd, IV, p.361; Ya'qubi, II, pp.214 f; Dinawari, pp. 216 f.; Isti'ab. I, p. 385; Usd al-Ghaba, II, p.14
[^3]: Ya'qubi, II, p. 188. According to Ibn Sa'd, VI, pp.4, 370 early Sahaba immediately moved into Kufa and settled there as soon as 'Umar b. al-Khattab founded the garrison city.
[^4]: Usd al-Ghaba, II, p.12; Tirmidhi, II, p. 306; Musnad, V, p.354; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.27
[^5]: Musnad, II, p.513
[^6]: The standard works of tradition usually devote a separate chapter to the special merits of Hasan and Husayn (Bab Manaqib al-Hasan wa'l-Husayn).
[^7]: Ibn Habib, Muhabbar, p. 46; Bukhari, Sahih, II, pp.175, 198; Usd al-Ghaba, II, p.13
[^8]: According to Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahani, Maqatil at-Talibiyin, p.52, 'Abd Allah b. al-'Abbas himself was the first to advance Hasan's nomination and invite the people to pay homage to him as the caliph after the death of 'Ali. See also Hadid, Sharh, XVI, pp.31 f.
[^9]: Dinawari, p. 216; Maqatil, p.52; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.30
[^10]: Tabari, II, p. I; Usd al-Ghaba, II, p.14;
[^11]: Hadid, loc. cit.; Isti'ab,I, p. 383
[^13]: Ibn A'tham, IV, p.148; Tabari; II, p.5; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.22
[^14]: Maqatil, pp.52 f.; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, pp.25 f.
[^15]: Aghani, XXI, p. 26; Maqatil, loc. cit.; Ya'qubi, II, p.214; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.31
[^16]: Ibn A'tham, IV, p.153; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.26
[^17]: Maqatil, p. 56 (from Abi Mikhnaf); Ibn A'tham, IV, p.151; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.24 (from Mada'ini), p.33 (from Abi Mikhnaf with slight variations)
[^18]: Maqatil, p.57 (from Abu Mikhnaf); Ibn A'tham, IV, p.152; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.25 (from Mada'ini), p.35 (from Abu Mikhnaf with slight variations)
[^19]: Arab Kingdom, pp.104-7
[^20]: Ta'rikh, II, pp. 214 f.
[^21]: Akhbar, pp.217 ff.
[^22]: Ta'rikh, II, pp. 1-8
[^23]: Kitab al-Futuh, IV, pp.148-67
[^24]: Maqatil, pp. 46-77
[^25]: Sharh, XVI, pp. 9-52
[^26]: Fihrist, PP.03, 101 f., respectively. The importance of these two authors in early Muslim historiography has been discussed in Chapter 2.
[^27]: M. A. Sha'ban, E12 article 'Ibn A'tham”
[^28]: Sha'ban, op. cit. Cf. Yaqut, Irshad al-Arib ila ma'rifat al-Adib, ed. D.S. Margoliouth, (Leiden, 1007-31), I, p. 379; C.A. Storey, Persian Literature: a Bio-bibliographical Survey (London, 1927), I, ii, p.1260
[^29]: See Ali mad Zaki Safwat, Jamharat Rasa'il al-'Arab fi 'usur al- 'Arabiyat az-Zahira (Cairo, 1937), a four-volume work in which all the letters from the time of the Prophet until the end of the 'Abbasid period have been collected with documentation.
[^30]: Tabari, II, pp., f., 5-8. See Wellhausen, Arab Kingdom, p.107
[^31]: Tabari, II, pp.2-5
[^32]: Tabari, II, pp. I, 5 ff.
[^33]: Tabari, II, pp.2, 7
[^34]: Tabari, II, pp.7-8
[^35]: Tabari, II, Pp.2-4
[^36]: Tabari, II, p.2
[^37]: Ya'qubi, II, p.214; Maqatil, p.62; Sharh, XVI, p.40
[^38]: Maqatil, p. 61; Sharh, XVI, p.38
[^39]: Ya'qubi, II, p.214
[^41]: Tabari, II, p.2
[^42]: Ya'qubi, II, p. 115
[^44]: The Arabic phrase reads .fa lamma intaha ila Sabat raya min ashabihi fashl wa tawakul 'an al-harb.
[^45]: Dinawari, p.216
[^47]: Sharh, XVI, p.22
[^48]: Futuh, IV, p.154; Maqatil, p.63
[^49]: Dinawari, p.217; Ibn A'tham, IV, p.155; Ya'qubi, II, p.215; Maqatil, p.64
[^50]: Dinawari, loc. cit.; Ibn A'tham, loc. cit.; Ya'qubi, loc. cit.; Maqatil, loc. cit.
[^51]: Ibn A'tham, IV, pp.156 f.
[^52]: ibid., p. 157
[^53]: Tabari, II, pp.220, 223, 274; Dinawari, pp.243, 299; ,Iqd, IV, p.376
[^54]: Maqatil, pp.64 f.
[^55]: Maqatil, pp.65 ff.
[^56]: Tabari, II, pp.3-4
[^57]: The shortest period given for his caliphate is three months, the longest is seven months.
[^58]: Tabari, II, p.13
[^59]: Dinawari, p. zi8
[^60]: Isti'ab, I, pp.355 f. Usd al-Ghaba, II, p. 14 adds: “and some other conditions like this.” See also Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Sawa'iq al-muhriqa, p.134; Al-Imama wa's-siyasa, I, p.140
[^61]: Maqatil, pp. 66 f.; Sharh, XVI, pp.43 f.
[^62]: Ibn A'tham, IV, pp. 158 f.
[^63]: Sharh, XVI, pp.22 f.
[^64]: Ibn A'tham, IV, p. 158
[^65]: Ibn A'tham, IV, pp.159 f.; Sharh, XVI, pp.22 f.
[^66]: Ibn A'tham, IV, p. 165
[^67]: Tabari, II, p.6; Ya'qubi, II, p.215
[^68]: Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.28
[^69]: Maqatil, pp.72 f.
[^70]: Isti'ab, III, p.1420; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya Wa'n-Nihaya, VII I, p.135
[^71]: See, for example, his reply to Hujr that he abdicated to save the lives of his handful of true followers, in Dinawari, p.220
[^72]: Ibn A'tham, IV, pp.164 if.; Maqatil, pp.67 ff.; Ya'qubi, II, pp. 216 f.; Dinawari, pp.220 f.; Isti'ab, 1, pp. 387 f.
[^73]: Usd al-Ghaba, II, pp. 13 f.; Isti'ab, I, p.384; Bukhari, Sahih, II, p.198; Tabari, II, p.199; Jahiz., Rasa'il, “Risala fi Bani Umayya,” p 65; 'Amili, A'yan, IV, p.54
[^74]: Dinawari, pp.220 f.
[^75]: Tabari, I, p.1920
[^76]: Baladhuri, Ansab, IVA, p.138; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.14. Also see Vaglieri, EI2 article “Hasan”
[^77]: Mas'udi, Muruj, II, pp. 426 f.; Maqatil, pp.73 f.; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, pp.10 f., 17; Isti'ab, I, pp. 389 f.; Usd al-Ghaba, II, p.14; Ya'qubi, II, p.225; Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat, II, p.66
[^78]: Mas'udi, Muruj, II, p.427; Maqatil, p.73; Hadid, Sharh, XVI, p.11
[^79]: Dinawari, Akhbar, p.222; Ya'qubi, II, p.225; 'lqd, IV, p. 361; Mas'udi, loc. cit.
[^80]: Ibn A'tham, IV, pp. 206, 224 f.; Maqatil, p.73; Ya'qubi, II, p. 228; Isti'ab, I, p.391
[^81]: Ya'qubi, II, p.228; Dinawari, p.221
[^82]: See Tabari, II, pp.223-5; Baladhuri, IVA, pp.211-36; Aghani; XVI I, pp.78-96; Dinawari, pp. 223-5 ; Isti'ab, I, pp.329-33
[^83]: Tabari, 11, p. 131; Dinawari, Pp. 223 f.; Aghani; XVII, PP.79 f
[^84]: Aghani; XVI I, p. 81; Baladhuri, IVA, p.214
[^85]: Aghani; XVII, p. 81; Baladhuri, IVA, p.214
[^86]: Ibn Sa'd, VI, p.219
[^87]: Tabari, II, p.117; Baladhuri; IVA, p.214
[^88]: Aghani; XVII, p.82
[^89]: See Tabari, II, pp. 117 ff; 136
[^90]: After assuming control of Kufa, Ziyad regrouped the entire population into four administrative quarters and appointed a head of his own choosing in charge of each quarter. This has been discussed in chapter 5 in connection with the general assessment of the situation in Kufa.
[^91]: Tabari, II, p.131; Aghani; XVII, p.89
[^92]: Tabari, loc. cit.; Aghani loc. cit.
[^93]: Tabari, II, p.132; Aghani; loc. cit.; Baladhuri, IVA, p.221
[^94]: Baladhuri, IVA, pp.222 f.; Tabari, II, p.137
[^95]: Tabari, II, pp.133 ff; also, with some variations, Baladhuri, IVA, Pp.221 ff; Aghani; XVII, pp.89 ff
[^96]: See sources cited in note 95 above
[^97]: Tabari; II, p. 140; Aghani; XVII, pp.92 f.; Baladhuri, IVA, p.224
[^98]: Tabari, II, p.145; Isti'ab, I, p.229 f.; Baladhuri; IVA, pp.22, 228, 229 ff
[^99]: Dinawari; p.224
[^101]: Tabari, II, pp. 111 f.; Baladhuri, IVA, pp. 211 f.
[^102]: For details, see Tabari under the years 56 to 6o; also Mas'udi, Muruj; III, pp.27 f.
[^103]: For details see Ibn A'tham, IV, pp.235-49; Ibn Athir, Al-Kamil fi'l-Ta'rikh, (Beirut, 1965)111, pp. 508-11
[^104]: See references quoted above in notes 103 and 104 and also Tabari, II, pp. 175 f.