The Varieties of Normativity: an Essay On Social Ontology

Notes

* The authors thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Ingvar Johansson, Kevin Mulligan, Mariam Thalos, and Raimo Tuomela. This article draws on discussions in Leo Zaibert Five Ways Patricia can Kill Her Husband: A Theory of Intentionality and Blame (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), and in Barry Smith,  “The Ontology of Social Reality” American Journal of Economics and Sociology,  62 (2003): 285-[^309]:

[^1] See for example R. M. Hare’s Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963; A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic , New York: Dover, 1952 ; and Ludwig Wittgenstein, “ A Lecture on Ethics”, The Philosophical Review, 74: 3-[^12]:

[^2] Amongst the most important contributions to the field of social ontology we find: Michael Bratman, Faces of Intention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Margaret Gilbert’s On Social Facts, London: Routledge; 1989, John R. Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality¸ New York: Free Press 1995, and his Rationality in Action, Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2001; Raimo Tuomela’s The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995, and The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [^2002]:

[^3] We shall follow Searle’s lead in accepting a distinction between social and institutional reality. According to Searle institutional facts are a subset of social facts, characterized by the fact that they involve the transmission, cessation, or creation of power, whereas social facts do not directly relate to power. See John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, New York: Free Press, 1995, 38, 79 ff. Searle rejects, however, the idea of a sharp distinction between these two classes in 88 ff.

[^4] H. L. A Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd. Edition, [^1997]:

[^5] H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., 250 ff.

[^6] See, H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., 56 ff., 141 ff.

[^7] Rawls, John, “Two Concepts of Rules”, reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999: 20-[^46]:

[^8] Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, revised edition, Cambridge, Ma.: Belknap Press, [^1999]:

[^9] John Rawls, “ Two Concepts of Rules”, op. cit., [^33]:

[^10] See Leo Zaibert “Punishment, Justifications, and Institutions” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society, 2003, (30): 51-[^83]:

[^11] John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules”, op. cit., [^37]:

[^12] John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules”, op. cit., [^42]:

[^13] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, op. cit., pp. 74 ff, and passim.

[^14] John R. Searle, “How to Derive an ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’”, Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 43-[^58]:

[^15] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. [^132]:

[^16] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p. [^132]:

[^17] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p. [^176]:

[^18] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p. [^176]:

[^19] A. N. Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949) See also David Brink’s discussion of naturalism in his Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 150 ff.

[^20] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p. [^189]:

[^21] David Hume, A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding, L. A. Selby-Bigge, (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 469-[^470]:

[^22] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) pp. 12-13, and passim.

[^23] Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (revised edition), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) Vol. 1, 62-[^79]:

[^24] D. D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, 2nd. edition, (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1990), p. 175, emphasis added.

[^25] D. D. Raphael, Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. [^175]:

[^26] D. D. Raphael, Political Philosophy, op. cit., p. [^175]:

[^27] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., [^187]:

[^28] John R. Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’”, op. cit., p. [^43]:

[^29] John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. [^120]:

[^30] John R. Searle, Rationality in Action, Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2001, p. [^181]: In the Spanish version of Rationality in Action, which was published earlier than the English version, and which is virtually identical to the latter, it is stated that “all” (not merely “virtually all”) speech acts contain an element of promising.

[^31] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., [^33]:

[^32] John R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., 34 ff.

[^33] See, for example the section entitled “Games and Institutional Reality” in his The Construction of Social Reality, op. cit., 66-[^71]:

[^34] H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, in Ronald Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, [^31]:

[^35] H. L. A. Hart, “Law and Morals”, op. cit., [^30]:

[^36] Paragraphs 66 ff. (G. E. M. Anscombe’s translation, New York: MacMillan, 30 ff.).

[^37] See Anthony Ralls, “The Game of Life”, Philosophical Quarterly, 1966, (62): 23-[^34]:

[^38] John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, op. cit, xiii, and Chapter 7, passim.

[^39] John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, op. cit., [^155]:

[^40] John R. Searle, Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, [^14]:

[^41] John R. Searle, Intentionality, op. cit., vii.

[^42] Korsgaard’s lectures are available at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/#Locke%¬20Lectures, from which all quotations here are taken.

[^43] R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, [^52]: