Theological Instructions

LESSON SEVEN: PROOFS OF NECESSARY EXISTENT

Introduction

In the previous lessons we have indicated that the philosophers and the scholars of theology (mutakallimīn) have established several arguments for the proof of God. In this lesson we have brought one of their many arguments, because of the fact that it is elementary, simple and requires less of an introduction in order to establish an existence as necessary (wājib). However the validity of this argument is only for proving necessary existent (wājib al-wujūd), i.e. an existent which does not need, require or depend upon any other existent for coming into being and in order to proof its positive attributes (knowledge, omnipotence, and being above time and space) requires additional arguments.

Text of the proof

Existence through intellectual perception is either necessary existence or possible existence. Intellectually, no existent lies outside these two assumptions and every existent cannot be known as a possible existent because a possible existent always needs a cause (‘illah). If all the causes were possible existents, each one of them in turn requiring a cause, no existent would ever come into being, in other words an infinite series (tasalsul) of causes is impossible (muhāl). Therefore an infinite series (back wards) of causes is compelled to terminate in an existent (mawjūd), which is not a caused thing (ma’lūl) of any other existent, i.e. the necessary existent.

This argument is the simplest argument in philosophy for proving the existence of God. This argument has been constructed with a few intellectual syllogisms and does not need any form of sense perception or experimental sciences as premises. However it has used philosophical concepts and terminologies, hence it requires an explanation about these premises and terminologies mentioned in the argument.

Possibility and necessity

All propositions have two fundamental concepts (subject and predicate) regardless of them being simple or complex, for example in the following axiom, ‘The sun shines’, which establishes shining for the sun, ‘sun’ is the subject and ‘shining’ is the predicate. The establishment of a predicate for the subject has no more than three states:

it is either impossible, such as ‘the number three is greater than the number four,’ or it is necessary, such as, ‘the number two is half of four’ or it is neither impossible nor necessary, for instance, ‘the sun is above our head’.

In logical terminology the first proposition has the state of impossibility (imtinā’), the second proposition is given the attribute of necessity (wujūb), and the third state is considered as possible (imkān) However in philosophy only existence is discussed and those things, which are being incapable of being or of occurring and impossible (mumtani’) will never have an existence (al-wujūd al-khāriji). For this reason philosophy regards existence

from an intellectual perception as being either necessary existence or possible existence.

Necessary existence is known as an existent, which exists in-itself and does not depend upon another existent. Naturally such an existent will have no beginning and no end, because the non-existence of something in a particular time is an indication that its existence is not from itself. In order for it to come into existence it needs another existent, which, is the cause or the condition for its realisation. The absence of this condition or cause would be the reason of annihilation.

Possible existence (mum’kin al-wujūd) is known as an existent, which does not exist in-itself and depends on another existent in order for it to be realised.

This division, which has taken place through intellectual perception, essentially disregards the existence of the impossible (mumtani’ al-wujūd), but it does not have any indication whether the existent is either a possible existent or necessary existent.

In other words the genuineness of this perception can be conceptualised in three essential forms:

1. Every existent is a necessary existent.

2. Every existent is a possible existent.

3. Some existents are necessary existents and some are possible existents.

On the basis of the first and third assumptions, the existence of a necessary existent is established, therefore the assumption that should be reviewed is whether all existents are possible existents or not?

However by disproving this assumption (that all existents are possible existents), the existence of the necessary existent is definitely and confidently proven. The establishment of unity and other attributes must be proven with other arguments.

Therefore in order to disprove the second assumption additional arguments must be utilised one of which, is that it is impossible for all of the existents to be possible existents.

As this argument is not self-evident, it will be explained as follows:

Every possible existent needs a cause and it is impossible to have an endless chain of causes. Thus the endless chain of causes is compelled to terminate at an existent, which is not in need of a cause, i.e. the necessary existent. This argument has introduced other philosophical concepts, which require a brief explanation of it and things related to it.

a. Cause and effect

If an existent requires another existent and depends upon that other existent for its being, then in philosophical terminology the caused existent is known as the effect and the other existent is known as the cause. However it is possible that a cause can also be an effect, and be a dependable existent, not absolutely free from need. If a cause is absolutely free from need and does not depend upon any other existent then it will be the Absolute cause.

By now we have become familiar with the definition of the terms cause and effect.

We will now provide an explanation of the premise mentioned (every possible existent needs a cause).

Possible existence does not exist in-itself and has no alternative other than to depend upon another existent. Thus every predicate, which is recognised for the subject is established either by itself (bi-l-dhāt) or by means of other than itself (bi-l-ghayr). For example every thing either shines in and of itself or requires something else for its illumination, or every body is oily in itself or needs oil for becoming oily. It is impossible for something in itself to not be illuminating or oily and not receive light or oil from something else, and at the same time be oily and illuminating!

Hence the establishment of existence for a subject is either through its essence or by means of other than itself, and when it is not through its essence then it has to be by means of other than itself. Therefore every possible existent, which is not realised through its essence, is bound to be realised by means of other than itself, which implies that it is an effect. This provides us with the fundamental principle of the intellect, that every possible existent needs a cause.

However, some have conceived that the principle of causation means that all existents need a cause and therefore God needs a primary cause. They have overlooked the fact that the subject of the principle of causation is existence in the possible sense and its effect and not in the absolute sense. Not all existents require a cause, only those which are dependable and in need.

b. The impossibility of an endless chain of causes

The last premise used for this argument is that the chain of causes should terminate at an existent, which is not an effect. In technical terms an endless chain of causes is impossible. It is thus established that the necessary existent is the initial cause, which is self-subsistent depending on no other existent.

Philosophy has come up with many arguments in order to disprove infinite series (tasalsul); nevertheless with the minimum of reflection infinite series would almost seem to be self-evident. That is to say, considering the existence of an effect requires a cause and is conditional upon that cause. Furthermore if this state of being caused (ma’lūliyyah) and this conditionality is universal, then no existents would be realised anywhere. This is because the assumption of a few existents that are dependent without the existence of an existent is against the intellect.

Let us assume that a group of runners are waiting to begin a race. They have all decided that they will not commence running until the others have. If this decision prevails among all of them, then none of them would begin to run.

In the same manner if the existence of every existent is conditional upon the realisation of another existent, never would an existent come into being. The realisation of an external existent indicates that there is an existent, which is needless and unconditional.

c. Affirmation of the argument

At this moment, with the understanding of the premises mentioned, we would like to re-affirm our argument:

Every thing that can be considered as an existent has no more than two states:

1. The existent for which existence is necessary and exists by means of its own essence. In technical terms this is known as the necessary existent.

2. The existent for which existence is not necessary and depends upon another existent in order to be realised. In technical terms this is termed as the possible existent.

It is self-evident that if the realisation of a thing is impossible, then it will never come into being; hence every existent is either a possible existent or a necessary existent.

By focusing upon the concept of possible existence it becomes clear that the every referent of this concept is an effect and requires a cause. Furthermore if an existent does not exist by means of its essence then it becomes necessary that it came into existence through another existent, because every attribute that is not existent by means of its own essence has to exist by means of other than itself.

The principle of causation affirms that every existent that is dependent and possible requires a cause. But not every existent requires a cause; otherwise one would conclude that there must then be a cause for God.

From another angle it must be seen that if all existents were possible existents, an existent would never then be realised. This is like assuming that a group of people had conditioned their actions upon each other, which implies no activity. However the external activity of existents establishes the existence of the necessary existent.

Questions:

1- Give the philosophical and logical definition of possibility and necessity.

2- Define necessary existence and possible existence.

3- Define cause and effect.

4- Why does every possible existent need a cause?

5- Explain the principle of causation.

6- Is God subject to the principle of causation? Why?

7- Explain the impossibility of infinite series.

8- Does the belief in a non-created God contradict the principle of causation?

9- Elaborate more on the impossibility of the infinite series? And explain the aim of this argument!

10- How is the logical form of the argument of impossibility of the infinite series?