Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society
Dialogue between East and West
Text of an address by Muhammad Khatami, President of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and President of the Islamic Conference Organization,
to the European University Institute, Florence, on 10 March 1999.
Attending an academic gathering has always been a pleasant and
enjoyable exercise for me. For in such gatherings, the proceedings most
often revolve around three functions: talking, listening and
understanding. Understanding results from talking and listening, and the
two functions of talking and listening,, combined with looking,
constitute the most important physical, psychological and spiritual
activity of a human being. What is gained by looking expands one's realm
of knowledge and also consolidates the consciousness of one's own
presence, the feeling that I exist.
While we talk with others and listen to others, looking takes place from one's home base; from the base labeled 'I', and the world and man belong to the domain of sight, and are subjects of what I can see. But talking and listening combine to make up a bipartite-sometimes multipartite-effort to approach the truth and to reach a mutual understanding.
That is why dialogue has nothing to do with the skeptics and is not a
property of those who think they are the sole proprietors of Truth. It
rather reveals its beautiful but covered face only to those wayfarers
who are bound on their journey of discovery hand in hand with other
human beings.
The phrase, dialogue among civilizations and cultures, which should be
interpreted as conversing with other civilizations and cultures, is
based upon such a definition of truth, and this definition is not
necessarily at odds with the well-known definitions of truth that one
finds in philosophical texts.
Dialogue among civilizations requires listening to and hearing from
other civilizations and cultures, and the importance of listening to
others is by no means less than talking to others. It may be in fact
more important.
Talking and listening create a conversation; one side addresses the
other side, and speech is exchanged. Under what circumstances is man
addressed? In other words, in what kind of a world is he or she'
addressed? The world of science is not the world of speeches and
addresses-science is a conscious effort to discover the relationship of
objects, and for this reason, scientific discourse does not transcend
the level of man's self-consciousness.
But the world of art and the world of religion are the world of
addressing. We are addressed by a work of art, and in religion, words of
God address man. That is why the languages of mysticism and religion are
linked together by genuine and profound ties, and why the earliest
specimens of art that have been created by man are also specimens of
Sacred Art. Man is addressed again and again in the Bible and in the
Holy Qur’an, and it is with this call that the individual human being is
elevated and becomes a person.
Etymologically speaking, the word 'person' is related to persona, the
mask that actors would put on their face in the theatre. But= the
important point here is that in the concept of religious address, when
man is being addressed by God on a general and universal level, and not
in specific terms of religious teaching and codes of conduct, none of
his psychological, social or historical aspects are really being
addressed. What is addressed is man's true, non-historic and individual
nature, and that is why all the divine religions are not
quintessentially different. The differences arise from religious laws
and codes of conduct that govern the social and judicial life of human
beings.
Now we must ask ourselves who is this person that is being addressed.
From the earliest times, philosophers have devoted a major part of
their time and energy to answering this question. They have tried to
explain how, and in what manner we may get to know man, to know him
inside out, in absolute terms. The question of how one can get to know
him or her; and reach the goal of self-knowledge, constitutes a major
part of this philosophical quest.
Recounting the fascinating story of philosophical anthropology, and the
episodes dealing with self-knowledge and self-discovery, would take
several long nights in the thousand and One Nights of the history of
philosophy. Some of these tales were first told in the East and some
originated in the West. It is significant to note that the Eastern tales
explain the Oriental side of man's being while the Western tales reveal
the properties of his Occidental side.
Man is in fact the meeting point of the soul's East and the reason's West. Denying the existence of any part of his essence would impair our understanding of the significance of his being. In our effort to grasp the meaning of the person, we should watch out not to fall into the trap of individualism, or into that of collectivism.
Even though the views expressed by Christian thinkers have helped the modern concept of the individual to crystallize, this should not be taken to mean that there exists a natural link between the two views. Just as the profound attention focused on the meaning of the person as the recipient of the Divine Word should not be credited, in my view, to the influence of personalism.
Of course, it has been said by everyone that in modern society, it is
individual human beings who are the criterion and the yardstick for all
institutions, laws and social relations, and that civil rights and human
rights are in fact nothing other than the rights of this same
individual. On the other hand, collectivism, which was launched
vis-à-vis individualism, was formulated by multiplying the same concept
of the individual, and therefore the two ideologies have the same
philosophical foundation.
For this reason we consider, from. our position of spiritual wisdom,
the antagonism between individualistic liberalism and collectivist
socialism to be superficial and incidental. The concept of the person
can be easily explained in terms of Islamic mysticism. The Islamic
mystics consider man to be a world unto him, a microcosm. Man's
originality does not emanate from his individuality or his collectivity.
His originality is solely due to the fact that it is him, and him alone,
who are addressed by the Divine Call. With this address, man's soul
transcends its boundaries, and with the transcendence of his soul, his
world also becomes a world of justice and humanity.
Anyone who examines even briefly the meandering course of philosophy
from its beginnings to the present will clearly notice
The continuous swing of the philosophers, from one extreme to the
other. The last swing, the last link in the chain, is modernity. This
word, which seemingly is the latest term to be derived from the Latin
modernus, was apparently first used in the nineteenth century. But the
Latin word itself has been in use for more than fifteen centuries, and
it was only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that modernity was
applied to a wide range of concepts in such diverse fields as
philosophy, art, science, history and ethics.
The common denominator in all these concepts is the cataclysm that shook
the very foundations of man's existence and thinking towards the end of
the Middle Ages. It was a cataclysm that pushed man and the world into a
new orbit. Man and the contemporary world (so far as it is affected by
man's ideas) result from this modem orbit into which they were sent in
the aftermath of the Middle Ages. This new orbit was labelled 'modern'
in those times, but today we call it the Renaissance. Italy played a
decisive role in the birth of the Renaissance. Although many books and
essays have been written to describe and explain this great milestone,
there is still a definite need for philosophers, historians and
scientists to think and talk about it.
The sole aim of the Renaissance was not to revive classical Greek
culture. Its principal aim was-as already pointed out by a number of
thinkers-to revitalize religion by giving it a new language and fresh
ideas. The Renaissance defined the man of religion not as someone who
would contemptuously turn his back on the world in order to repress it,
but as somebody who would face the world. The Renaissance man of
religion turns to the world just as the world awaits him with open arms,
and this reciprocal openness and opening up of the world and man
constitutes the most fundamental point about the Renaissance, and
inherently it is a religious event aimed at conserving, reforming and
propagating religion, and not opposed to it or against it.
But this great event ended up, in due course, somewhere diametrically
opposed to the original intention. The opening of the world was
transformed into violent conquest and subjugation. This violent conquest
did not remain limited to mastering nature. Its fires soon spread to
human communities. What came to be known in the socio-political history
of Europe, as colonialism is the result of extending the domineering
attitude of man towards nature and the natural sciences, to men
Modernity without adopting a humanitarian and ethical approach. The
critique of modernity that I propose is undertaken from a vantage point
and angle which is profoundly different from the position of its
well-known critics, especially in the domain of philosophy. Someone who
sets out to prune a tree should not cut the very branch he is standing
on. That is exactly how some of the philosophers of our time are
behaving in their critique of modernity.
By denying Reason any dialectical authority, they turn it either into a
weapon that destroys everyone and everything, itself included, or
transform it into a blunt and rusted sword that can only become a museum
piece. One cannot use Reason as a critical weapon without accepting its
authority and without recognizing its limits.
The critique of pure reason, which opened a new chapter in Western
philosophy and may be taken to mean the critique of everything and all
concepts including pure reason itself, only becomes possible if reason
is endowed with authority. Without the authority of reason-which should
be discussed at length and with precision in some other venue and at a
more appropriate time, without forgetting to discuss its relationship to
domination and power-it will not be possible to have a clear picture and
concept of such vital political issues as human rights, peace, justice
and freedom.
And without this clear concept, our efforts for the establishment of
these ideals will not succeed. But this should not be interpreted as a
call to rationality and European style logo centrism that proceeded
post-modernism. Because of the fact that Europe has given birth to
modern rationality, it should feel a stronger responsibility for
criticizing it and finding a solution to prevent its destructive
consequences.
Europe has itself fallen prey to its over-reliance on rationality, and
is today engaged, through its thinkers and philosophers, in totally
discrediting its own rationality. The Orient, which etymologically
speaking has given rise to a number of words pertaining to order and a
sense of direction, can undertake in, the course of a historical
dialogue with the West aimed at reaching a mutual understanding, to call
on Europe and America to exercise more equilibrium, serenity, and
contemplation in their conduct, thus contributing to the establishment
of peace, security and justice in the world. This sense of equilibrium
and serenity, if it is taken in the Oriental
Age of Enlightenment was an Apollonian era, while Romanticism was the
movement of the pendulum in the opposite direction. The next century
should be a century for turning to the kind of spirituality that
Oriental man has pursued for several thousands of years.
The exuberance and vitality of European culture stems from its critical
approach towards everything, it included. But the time has come for
Europe to take another step forward and view itself differently, as
others see it. This should not be taken to mean that Europe should
forget its great cultural heritage or that it should turn to a new type
of obscurantism. It is rather an encouragement to European culture and
civilization to embark on new experiences to gain a more precise
knowledge of global cultural geography.
In Orientalism, we find that the East is treated as an object of study,
rather than as 'the other side' of a dialogue. For a real dialogue among
civilizations to take place, it is imperative that the East should
become a real participant in the discussions and not just remain an
object of study.
This is a very important step that Europe and America need to take
towards the realization of the 'dialogue-among-civilizations' project.
Of course this is not a one-way invitation. We too, as Iranians, as
Muslims and as Asians, need to take major steps towards gaining a true
knowledge of the West, as it really is. This knowledge will help us to
improve our economic and social way of life. Taking such bold steps by
us and by Europeans would require a character trait that was first
recognized and promoted in Europe by the Italians.
Renaissance historians have written that as a result of the continuous
contacts of the Italians with Byzantium and the, Islamic world, the
people of Italy developed a sense of tolerance. The Italians had been
familiar with Islamic civilization since the time of the Crusades, and
they admired it. This knowledge and familiarity with a foreign culture,
and the sense of wonder that accompanied it, was the biggest factor in
developing this sense of tolerance among the Italian people.
It is ironic that this concept of tolerance that was adopted from the Muslims and is a result of the contacts made by Europeans with them, is now, in our time, being offered by Europeans to Muslims as an ethical and political piece of advice. Evidence of the Muslim influence in the creation of this spirit of tolerance among Europeans is clear and can be traced in Europe's literary history. A very well known play by the German dramatist Lessing entitled 'Nathan the Wise', which is itself based on an Italian work called 'One Hundred Old Tales' (Cento Novelle Antiche) is a case in point.
But the influence of Muslim thought and culture on Italian and European
culture is not limited to the question of tolerance. No nation has the
right to confiscate the contributions of others to its own civilization,
and to deny the share of any civilization in the history of human
culture. Apart from the influence of Muslim philosophy, theology and art
on Europeans, something that has been very instrumental in refreshing
and purifying the temper of Europeans is Islamic literature, in all its
diversity and richness. As an example, one can cite the influence of Ibn
al-Arabi upon Dante, but here fortunately much has been said and written
by well-known European scholars.
Speaking of the historical past without any reference to the future
would be an idle academic exercise, whereas it is imperative upon us,
for the sake of helping human communities and improving the state of the
world, to find out how the relations of Asian countries, and especially
those of the Muslim countries, with Europe stand today.
Why? Because Muslims and Europeans are next-door neighbors, and nations, unlike individuals, cannot choose their neighbors. Therefore, apart from moral, cultural and humanitarian reasons, Islam and Europe must, by force of historic and geographical circumstance, get to know one another better, and then move on to improve their political, economic and cultural relations. Our futures are inseparable because our pasts have been inseparable.
Even today, in our schools of philosophy, the views of Plato, Aristotle; and Plotinus, and those of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Wittgenstein from among the modernists are taught alongside the views of al-Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra. If the great civilizations of Asia view themselves today in a Western mirror and get to know one another through the West, it was Islam that served in the not-too-distant past as a mirror to the West; it was a mirror in which the West could see its own past and its own philosophical and cultural heritage.
If dialogue is not a simple choice but a necessity for our two cultures, then this dialogue should be; conducted with the true representatives of Islamic culture and thought. Otherwise, what good will it do for the West to talk with a few 'Westoxicated' types who are themselves no more than inferior and deformed images of the West. This would not be a dialogue; it would not even amount to a monologue.
A profound, thoughtful and precise dialogue with Islamic civilization would be helpful in finding fair and practical solutions to some of the grave problems that beset the world today. The crisis of the family, the crisis in the relationship of man and nature, the ethical crisis that has developed in scientific research, and many more problems of this nature should be among the items on the agenda of an Islamic European dialogue.
Dialogue is such a desirable thing, because it is based on freedom and
free will. In a dialogue, no idea can be imposed on the other side. In a
dialogue, one should respect the independent identity of the other side
and his or her independent ideological and cultural integrity. Only in
such a case, can dialogue be a preliminary step leading to peace,
security and justice.
In the meanwhile, conducting a dialogue with Iran has its own
advantages. Iran is a door-to-door neighbor with Europe on one side, and
with Asia on the other. Thus Iran is the meeting point of Eastern and
Western cultures, just as man is the meeting point of the soul's East
and the reason's West. The Persian heart and the Persian mind are
brimful with a sense of balance, affection and tolerance, and for this
reason, Iranians are the advocates of dialogue and adherents to justice
and peace.